

PUBLIC POLICY

PUBLISHED BY THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS FOR THE
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Editorial Board

ELISABETH K. ALLISON	HENRY D. JACOBY
SAMUEL H. BEER	ROBERT L. JERVIS
SUZANNE D. BERGER	JAMES R. KURTH
WILLIAM M. CAPRON	MARC J. ROBERTS
PETER GOUREVITCH	MARTIN A. SHEFTER
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON	LESTER C. THUROW
GREGORY K. INGRAM	THOMAS D. WILLETT
JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, <i>Chairman</i>	

Editors

JOHN E. JACKSON, <i>Politics</i>	MICHAEL SPENCE, <i>Economics</i>
JOSEPH STEIN, <i>Assistant Editor</i>	

PUBLIC POLICY is published quarterly by the Harvard University Press for the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Annual subscription, individual \$10.00, institution \$20.00; three-year subscription, individual \$28.00, institution \$56.00. Single copies, individual \$3.00, institution \$6.00. Please add \$1.00 for postage per year for all subscriptions outside the United States. Manuscripts, editorial correspondence, and requests for permission to reprint should be addressed to The Editors, PUBLIC POLICY, Littauer 222, Cambridge, Mass. 02138; business correspondence concerning subscriptions, back issues, and advertising should be addressed to the Harvard University Press, 79 Garden Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

© 1973 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

Published by the Harvard University Press
79 Garden St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Application to mail at second-class rates is pending at Boston, Mass.

THE IMPACT OF CONTRACT SERVICES ARRANGEMENTS ON THE LOS ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND LAW-ENFORCEMENT SERVICES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY

JOHN J. KIRLIN

Under the Contract Services Plan (commonly known as the Lake-wood Plan), the County of Los Angeles contracts to provide a wide range of services to cities within its borders. Virtually all cities in the county contract for a few services (e.g., tax assessment and collection, elections), and many cities purchase the bulk of their services from the county. Included in the services offered are those provided by the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD), and 30 cities out of 77 in the county presently contract for the provision of law-enforcement services.¹

Of the 7,032,075 residents of Los Angeles County (1970 Census), 716,727 received police services from the LASD as residents of contract cities, 1,029,339 received general law enforcement services from the LASD and traffic law enforcement from the California Highway Patrol as residents of county unincorporated areas, and 5,286,000 lived within cities that provided their own police services. In return for providing police services to contract cities, the county received \$11,679,156 in fiscal 1970/71. The total LASD budget appropriation for that year was \$67,240,623, the difference being financed largely from county general funds (all residents of the county pay its basic property tax levy; additional levies are laid by municipalities, special districts, etc., upon citizens living within boundaries).²

This research was conducted largely under a grant from the Urban Policy Research Institute, Beverly Hills, California, and was completed with the support of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, UCLA. Anne C. Cowden assisted in data collection and analysis. John Jackson, John C. Ries, and an anonymous referee offered helpful suggestions on an earlier draft.

¹ Other services provided under contract include: assessor, district attorney, building inspection, sanitation, roadside tree service, emergency ambulances, personnel services and medical examinations, and road maintenance, construction, and engineering.

² Cities purchasing the bulk of their services from the county are, with one exception, those incorporated since the inception of the plan in 1954; there are no legal differences between those cities that contract extensively and those that do

From the perspective of county departments, such as the LASD, the Plan greatly expands the number of relevant actors with whom the department must interact. Contrast the LASD with the Los Angeles City Police Department (LAPD) in this regard: Although roughly twice the size (fiscal 1970/71 budget \$143,451,209), the LAPD relates formally to one mayor, one city chief administrative officer, 15 city councilmen, and a 7-person board of police commissioners, while the LASD relates formally to 5 county supervisors and one county administrative officer, plus, because of the Lakewood Plan, an additional 30 mayors, 30 city managers/administrators, and 120 city councilmen. The impacts of these complex interrelationships upon the LASD and the provision of police services within the county are analyzed in this paper.

Why study the impact of the Contract Services Plan upon the LASD? First, the Plan should be evaluated as an alternative model of the provision of police services during this time of increased attention to the police function. Second, it contains features that would likely be replicated in efforts to restructure governmental institutions in other metropolitan areas. An increasingly common feature of such proposals is a two-tiered structural arrangement (combining elements of both centralization and decentralization) in which functions are shared between an area-wide governmental body and numerous smaller jurisdictions within its borders.³ This is a model with similarities to the Lakewood Plan, and an evaluation of the plan should contribute to relevant debates.

The Lakewood Plan has been in operation since 1954, and its existence has not gone unreported nor unanalyzed. However, wide gaps still exist in our knowledge of its operation and impact.⁴ Much of what has been written is advocative or journalistic in

not. The existence of ongoing departments has inhibited cities incorporated before that date from entering contract arrangements for major municipal services. Between 1954 and 1970 there were no changes in the County Board of Supervisors; this created a period of political stability in which the Contract Services Plan was viewed as a desirable county policy. As is detailed below, "independent" cities (those which maintain the bulk of their own municipal services) have contended that the plan provides subsidized services to contract cities, but they have been unable to destroy it.

³ Committee for Economic Development, *Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas* (New York City, 1970).

⁴ A recent grant from the National Science Foundation will provide opportunity for an extensive evaluation of the contractual provision of municipal services in California, with special attention to the Lakewood Plan.

style, being largely the product of local governmental officials with a stake either in continuation or in abolition of the arrangement.⁵ Economic perspectives have dominated the more sophisticated analyses, with attention being devoted to possible subsidies in the provision of sheriff's services, and to studies of the plan as an institutional arrangement approximating the "public choice" model of government structures for metropolitan areas.⁶ This paper, focusing upon organizational impacts, attempts to fill one gap in understanding of the Contract Services Plan.

The Analytical Strategy: A Model From Organization Theory

Organization theory provides a framework within which an analysis of the impact of the Lakewood Plan upon the Sheriff's Department and upon police services in Los Angeles County can be undertaken. Drawing attention to the fact that organizations must receive continued new resources to sustain operations, contemporary theorists conceptualize organizations as open systems, transforming inputs into outputs which the "environment" (that which is outside of the organization) somehow values enough to provide continued inputs.⁷ This seemingly straightforward model raises a number of questions crucial to understanding the operations of organizations and to suggesting ways in which organizations can be changed.

If organizations must receive continued inputs to ensure survival, and if the road to continued resources is doing something

⁵ For example: L. S. Hollinger, "The Lakewood Plan" (Los Angeles County, mimeo, n.d.); and Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, *Law Enforcement for Los Angeles County: A Blueprint for the Future* (Los Angeles, 1971).

⁶ Donald C. Shoup and Arthur Rosett, "Fiscal Exploitation of Central Cities by Overlapping Governments: A Case Study of Law Enforcement Finance in Los Angeles County," MR-135 (Los Angeles: University of California, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 1969); Robert O. Warren, *Government in Metropolitan Regions: A Reappraisal of Fractionated Political Organization* (Davis: University of California, Institute of Governmental Affairs, 1966); Robert L. Bish, *The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas* (Chicago: Markham, 1971); and Vincent Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis of American Public Administration* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1973).

⁷ For example: James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967); Donald Schon, *Beyond the Stable State* (New York: Random House, 1971); F. E. Emery and E. L. Trist, "The Causal Textural of Organizational Environments," *Human Relations* 18 (1965), pp. 21-32; and James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958).

(outputs) which the environment values enough to ensure the needed supply of resources, a condition of dependency upon the environment exists. One objective of the organization is to reduce this dependency — not absolutely, but in its effect upon the organization. This is not as contradictory as it may first seem, for, as James D. Thompson argues, organizations find themselves trying to meet the need for stability in their internal, productive processes while simultaneously trying to cope with uncertainty and instability in the environments in which they operate.⁸

The primary strategy to resolve this tension is to reduce dependence upon the environment by somehow reducing its uncertainty or instability. The specific tactics employed to accomplish this are almost legion, including vertical integration of manufacturing processes, cartels, legal/political strategies to gain some advantage, co-option, and so on.

The central expectation emerging from this line of argument is that the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department will seek to reduce or mitigate its dependency upon contract cities by making alternatives unappealing and the behavior of cities that purchase its services more predictable. A second expectation stems from the observation that the Sheriff's Department relates most specifically to elite decisionmakers in the contract cities, and particularly to city managers/administrators.⁹ Benefits from the contract arrangement are very important to these elite members, and such factors of the relationship as affect their own role performance will be essential in their evaluation of the desirability of the contract relationship. Consequently, the Sheriff's Department will seek to structure the contract relationship in a manner that will best meet the needs of city managers and councilmen.

Dealing With External Dependencies: Strategies Pursued by the LASD

To deal with the dependencies created by the Contract Services Plan, the LASD has pursued four basic strategies: First, every

⁸ Thompson, *op. cit.*

⁹ This is of course not unique to the Lakewood Plan; most police chiefs probably seek to meet the needs of elites. The plan does, however, make this task more complex by increasing the number of relevant elite members.

attempt is made to keep the price of contracted services as low as possible in order to make the alternative, self-provision of police services, economically unattractive. Second, the internal structure of the LASD has been changed, over time, to better accommodate its relationship with the contract cities. Third, certain of the Sheriff's Department policies have been modified to meet desires of contracting cities. And, fourth, efforts are made to provide the contract cities with the "best" services the Department is capable of rendering, even to the point of furnishing better services than those rendered in the unincorporated areas, which are the other principal sphere of departmental activity. These four strategies are identified as being stimulated by the contract arrangement; other dependencies have elicited additional reactions from the LASD, but these four are largely attributable to the Lakewood Plan.

Minimum Pricing. The price of contract services, particularly of law enforcement, is a central focus of the relationship between the county and the contract cities. Both parties are encouraged to keep the prices to a minimum, the contract cities in order to save money and the county to preserve the relationship. As a consequence, price increases have often been the result of external political pressures, most frequently fueled by the independent cities, which argue that they are subsidizing the provision of services to the contract cities.¹⁰

Upon initiation of the Lakewood Plan, the county agreed to provide police services in return for the revenues generated by traffic fines — surely a generous offer. In 1956, the annual cost for the basic unit of service, a "car" (manned by two deputies around the clock), was approximately \$54,000; in 1965 it was \$105,322. By 1971, it had been raised to \$230,043, and representatives of independent cities maintained that the service was still underpriced.¹¹ Whatever the merits of this argument, the pattern of price increases, most often following externally generated political pressure, attests to the county's reluctance to make the contract purchase of services economically unattractive.

¹⁰ Annual price increases may occur incrementally as a result of increased factor costs (e.g., deputies' salaries); this argument applies to major shifts in the prices.

¹¹ *Los Angeles Times*, May 30, 1973, Part II, page 2. By 1972-1973, the rate per year was \$280,514 for one man in the car on day shift and two men on each evening and overnight shift.

The 1971 price increase illustrates the process. Pressure to increase the contract price of police services came largely from the City of Los Angeles. Consultants hired by the city to analyze the contract system suggested that the prices charged were too low.¹² This conclusion was publicized through City Council committee hearings and received wide news coverage. With pressure mounting for a price increase, the Contract Cities Association, representing the contract cities, retained the consulting firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton to undertake a study of the prices paid. To the surprise of the association, the report concluded that services were in fact underpriced, and recommended a sizable increase.¹³ At this point, the Sheriff's Department publicly entered the dispute, publishing its "Blueprint" document,¹⁴ which attacked the Booz, Allen and Hamilton conclusions, and suggesting several alternative costing models that would result in lower prices. The crucial disagreement between the two approaches centered upon the department's responsibility to render services to all areas of the county, including those that were policed by independent city departments. Thus, the department was defending its self-image as a regional law enforcement body that must anticipate the needs of the whole county, even though actual services rendered were overwhelmingly directed to the contract cities and unincorporated areas. The price ultimately established lay somewhat below that proposed by Booz, Allen and Hamilton.

This, however, did not conclude the story. The Sheriff's Department and the contract cities then elaborated a series of modifications in their relationship, designed to obviate or at least mitigate the price increases. One major adjustment entailed the expanded usage of "one-man" cars. The historical preference of the LASD has been for two-man cars throughout the twenty-four hours of each day. The advent of a traffic-enforcement function with the establishment of the Lakewood Plan resulted in the introduction of one-man cars during daylight hours. (The California Highway Patrol provides traffic-law enforcement in unin-

¹² Shoup and Rosett, fn. 6.

¹³ Booz, Allen and Hamilton, *Determination of Law Enforcement Contractual Costs* (Los Angeles, mimeo, 1971).

¹⁴ Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, *Law Enforcement for Los Angeles County: A Blueprint for the Future* (Los Angeles, mimeo, 1971).

corporated areas, so that the LASD had no previous traffic responsibilities.) Some experimentation had also been done with one-man general law-enforcement cars during the daytime in the city of Norwalk. The price crisis encouraged the expansion of these previous efforts, including the use of one-man cars on night shifts, since personnel costs are the largest component of the price of a "car" in the pricing formula. As an example of the result of this modification, at least one city actually obtained more cars for less cash outlay after the price increase.

Another adjustment involves what may be termed "miniregionalization" of law-enforcement services. Under this approach, a number of contract cities share cars and prorate the cost among themselves. No city has cars that it identifies as its own; the LASD contends that greater flexibility in patrol patterns and in response results in the provision of improved services at lower costs because the total number of cars assigned to each area is lowered. This arrangement was implemented at the Lakewood and Norwalk stations.¹⁵ At the former, the sharing of cars was discontinued after one participating city found itself unable to pay its share of the costs and another chose to experiment with a "team" policing approach of its own.

Finally, contract cities decreased the number of units purchased. Rosett and St. Dennis¹⁶ discovered that, while the number of units purchased decreased nearly 30 percent between fiscal 1969/70 and fiscal 1970/71, the number of patrol division services rendered to contract cities fell only 7 percent between April 1970 and April 1971. Moreover, instead of reducing employment as a consequence of lowered purchases of contract services, the LASD absorbed the displaced personnel with funds from general revenues. Thus, the LASD and contract cities managed to adjust to the price increase with little apparent impact upon services received by the contract cities or upon the department.

Another continuing pattern by which the LASD seeks to keep the costs of services attractive to the contract cities is the way in which it approaches annual contract negotiations. In determining the services that any contract city will purchase, the LASD plays a relatively passive role and is apparently always able to provide

¹⁵ The LASD is divided into fifteen stations, each headed by a captain.

¹⁶ Arthur Rosett and Jerry St. Dennis, *Preliminary Study on County Provided Services* (Los Angeles: Independent Cities Association, mimeo, 1972).

them within the budgetary limits set by the city. The controlling factor in the amount any city pays (and thus the determining factor in the amount of services purchased) appears to be the maximum which the city manager and city council decide is available for this function. Despite the rhetoric from the Sheriff's Department about being unwilling to provide less than some minimum level of service, no occasions are known of any refusal to provide a level of service requested by a city, even when the department was uncomfortable with the level requested. The extreme example of this flexibility of the Sheriff's Department was a city of 35,000 which contracted for only a single one-man car around the clock.

The organizational perspective is important in understanding not only why the sheriff seeks to offer contract services at low prices but also the context that allows the sheriff to behave in this manner. Two features are important: First, the sheriff, although elected to a four-year term by a countywide electorate, has only rarely been challenged at election time, and no incumbent sheriff has even been defeated at the polls since the Los Angeles County Charter went into effect in 1913; in the past 40 year only two men have held the office. No issues relating to the sheriff, even possible subsidies to contract cities and unincorporated areas, have aroused much electoral attention. Second, the budgetary system under which the LASD operates does not give the sheriff any incentives to charge contract cities the full marginal costs of providing them services. The LASD, like other county departments, is given an annual lump-sum appropriation, and the budget-making system does not require revenues from contract cities to match the cost of providing services to them. The constraints that urge full marginal-cost pricing are political forces external to the county government and state statutory strictures against the "gift of public funds." Both of these constraints operate, to the extent they do, not on the sheriff but on the County Board of Supervisors. Only in the last three years has the considerable effort in cost accounting necessary to approximate marginal costs been seriously attempted. The general format of the price-setting formula, first developed by Booz, Allen and Hamilton, is in use and is generally supported by all interested parties, but conflict about justifiable overhead rates continues.

Stability of Sheriff's position

As a consequence of these two contextual features, the LASD has been allowed to minimize the prices charged for services, either through subsidized unit prices, provision of more services than purchased, or the other embellishments discussed above. Relatively isolated from the general electorate, the LASD is free to meet the demands of its customers in contract cities, who are more than just citizens: they are aggregates of citizens who can use the organizational structures of their city governments to bargain, under the threat of contract termination, with the LASD. The constraints that operate upon the county and the LASD, moreover, are those posed by the elites who manage other governmental organizations, primarily the city councilmen and managers of cities that provide their own police services.

Modifications to the Internal Structure of the LASD

Interacting with 30 contract cities differs markedly from providing police services to a population represented by only one body of elected officials. The LASD finds itself responding not only to the County Board of Supervisors but also to the representatives of the 30 cities presently contracting for its services. This environment has encouraged the Sheriff's Department to modify its internal structure to meet the needs of the contract cities. Their principal requirement has been to have someone to whom they could relate as controlling the department's activities in their cities. Thus, from their point of view the preference is for a single, accessible individual in the LASD who can answer any question or act on requests concerning law enforcement. In short, they need "their" police chief. Over time they have come to perceive the station captain serving their city as playing this role. Officially, the sheriff of Los Angeles County is their "police chief," and anecdotes suggest that the incumbent sheriff does not like to hear station captains defined as such, but common practice and language have placed them in this role.

As a result, the Sheriff's Department has gradually moved to an internal structure that facilitates the captains' performance of this role for the contract cities. The clearest example concerns the detective function. At the outset of the Contract Services

Development of police chief role for station captains.

Plan, detectives were organized into a functional unit, centralized at the downtown office. They often worked out of one or another of the stations, but they were responsible to the central office even though they were working from a "field" office. Station captains found this situation awkward: They could not control the allocation of the detectives' efforts and often had no clear information about the status of cases transferred to the detective division. Although this problem certainly affected all station captains, it was apparently felt most acutely by those serving contract cities. Often a call from a contract city concerning a case could not be resolved because the captain did not know what the detectives were doing, nor could he direct their activities as he desired. The problem was resolved by transferring to the station captains control of detectives assigned to their stations; thus, areal organizing principles replaced functional ones and resulted in improved performance of "police chief" roles by the station captains.

Another structural modification attributable to the Lakewood Plan has been the assignment of administrative lieutenants to assist station captains in relations with contract cities. These lieutenants, or the captains themselves, often attend city-council meetings on a regular basis (and always when requested to appear). This is at the discretion of individual captains, and the practice varies.

Policy Adjustments. Although the Contract Plan has apparently caused fewer policy changes than might be expected, several such changes appear to be adjustments to the plan. The expanded use of one-man patrol cars, already mentioned, was a significant alteration and is still somewhat controversial within the ranks.¹⁷ Two other operating changes may also be attributed to the plan.

One continuing complaint of the contract cities concerns the frequency with which LASD personnel are rotated in and out of their cities; they see the rotational policies of the LASD as restricting the ability of deputies to get to "know the city." The department appears to be gradually lengthening the duration of

¹⁷ As producer of the services, the LASD has a clear stake in which of the desires of its consumers it chooses to meet and, because this is not a purely competitive market, retains wide discretion in this area. The discussion of mutual dependencies below details some of the methods by which the LASD here increases its leverage.

assignments, which now average approximately one year. It is also willing to let the desires of contract cities stimulate the reassignment of a deputy out of a city, and it entertains requests to lengthen assignments.

As a second policy response to requests for deputies who know their communities better, the LASD is introducing the Neighborhood Car Plan and in one contract city is experimenting with a team-policing approach. Under the first approach, patrol forces are responsible for the same area over a longer period of time and attempts are made to establish links between officers and community. In the case of team policing, a group of deputies, embodying all of the areas of expertise in the LASD (e.g., patrol, juvenile, and detective), are responsible for providing all police services within their area and ideally have some discretion over their approach to this task.

Better Services. As a fourth strategy the LASD may seek to reduce criticism from contract cities by offering services that are "better" than those routinely provided to unincorporated areas. Arrest statistics are the measure of services used here. Complaints about their usefulness are widespread and varied, but reference to them here seems defensible. Moreover, the lack of alternative measures encourages their use as a measure of output. Since all the statistics are from the same department, potential variability attributable to differing statutes and reporting practices should be reduced. Wilson¹⁸ claims, for example, that the police administrator (or any policymaker attempting to influence the police) focuses upon those organizational variables and measures of output that are available; rates of arrests are so used. Since arrest rates for many offenses are a variable that the LASD can (largely) control, they should enter the department's calculation of how to provide better services to the contract cities.

The null hypothesis here, then, is that arrest rates will not differ between unincorporated area and contract city. The research hypothesis is that they will differ, but the question remains as to the direction of difference. Should we expect arrest rates to be higher or lower in contract cities than in unincorporated areas? It is hypothesized that the arrest rates will be higher in

¹⁸ James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities* (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 57-82.

the contract cities, toward which "better" services are being directed. Wilson provides the rationale for such an expectation. The LASD is large and highly professionalized, factors that according to him encourage the adoption of a "legalistic" style of provision of police services.¹⁹ Similarly, he argues that the professional ethic that infuses California local government (specifically, more professional city managers) correlates with the legalistic style of policing.²⁰ Wilson characterizes this style as follows:

In some departments, the police administrator uses such control as he has over the patrolmen's behavior to induce them to handle commonplace situations as if they were matters of law enforcement rather than order maintenance. He realizes, of course, that the officer cannot always act as if his duty were merely to compare observed behavior with a legal standard and make an arrest if that standard has been violated. . . . But whenever he acts on his own initiative or to the extent that he acts on the initiative of the citizen, the patrolman is expected to take a law enforcement view of his role.²¹

Its consequences are reflected in arrest statistics:

The legalistic style does mean that, on the whole, the department will produce many arrests and citations, especially with respect to those matters in which the police and not the public invoke the law; even where the police are called by the public to intervene, they are likely to intervene formally, by making an arrest or urging the signing of a complaint, rather than informally, as through conciliation or by delaying an arrest in hopes that the situation will take care of itself.²²

As a (partial) control for the variation in community characteristics that correlate with arrest statistics, one sheriff's station was selected for analysis. Norwalk, a station lying southeast of downtown Los Angeles, serves four contract cities and a sizable unincorporated area. As shown in Table 1, the unincorporated area

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 172-199.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 173.

Table 1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREAS SERVED BY THE NORWALK SHERIFF'S STATION

Area	Population		1970 Census				Seven Major Offenses per 10,000, 1970/71
	1960	1970	Median Income	Under Poverty Line	Median Years Education	Spanish Language and Surname	
Unincorporated *	—	72,893	\$11,524	5.1%	12.2	27.5%	199.71
La Mirada	22,444	31,079	\$13,887	3.1%	12.6	12.9%	242.58
Norwalk	88,739	91,829	\$10,879	6.0%	12.0	27.2%	292.02
Pico Rivera	49,150	54,319	\$10,739	6.9%	11.6	61.3%	326.15
Santa Fe Springs	16,342	14,750	\$11,478	3.4%	12.0	48.0%	581.90

*Census characteristics of the unincorporated area are approximate, obtained by identifying census tracts that lie wholly or in major part in the unincorporated area served by the station, then aggregating the characteristics of those tracts.

Sources: Demographic data are from the 1970 Census; all data on offenses and arrests in this and subsequent tables are from the *Statistical Summaries* published every fiscal year by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department.

is of a slightly higher socio-economic status than are the contract cities, and the whole area has a sizable Spanish-surname population that is concentrated disproportionately in the contract cities. As would be expected, given this distribution of community characteristics, the rate of reported "crime" (seven major offenses per 10,000 persons) is lowest in the unincorporated area and highest in Santa Fe Springs.

Comparisons of arrest statistics were made for fiscal 1960/61, 1963/64, 1967/68, and 1970/71 (Table 2). Four types of arrest where deputies have relatively high discretion were chosen for analysis: disorderly conduct (adult and juvenile arrests are shown separately), drunk, drunk driving (in these two cases, adult and juvenile arrests are combined), and curfew violations (juveniles

Table 2. RATIOS OF ARRESTS TO OFFENSES IN AREAS SERVED BY THE NORWALK STATION

Area	Disorderly Conduct		Drunk	Drunk	Curfew Violations
	Adults	Juveniles	Driving		
Fiscal 1960/61					
Unincorporated	.195	.275	.870	1.260	.265
La Mirada	.033	.090	.292	.807	.181
Norwalk	.086	.062	.925*	1.904*	.438*
Pico Rivera	.110	.031	.598	1.800*	.193
Santa Fe Springs	.062	.031	.598	1.503*	.220
Fiscal 1963/64					
Unincorporated	.095	.085	.200	.930	.175
La Mirada	.090	.066	.198	.547	.329*
Norwalk	.062	.096*	.366*	1.288*	.195*
Pico Rivera	.080	.043	.193	1.221*	.261*
Santa Fe Springs	.062	.105*	.368*	1.407*	.210*
Fiscal 1967/68					
Unincorporated	.125	.140	.495	1.160	.270
La Mirada	.169*	.337*	.691*	1.482*	.926*
Norwalk	.169*	.096	1.421*	2.127*	.339*
Pico Rivera	.132*	.098	.758*	2.347*	.227
Santa Fe Springs	.129*	.129	1.205*	2.034*	.235
Fiscal 1970/71					
Unincorporated	2.110	.495	.905	—	—
La Mirada	1.918	.412	1.185*	—	—
Norwalk	2.284*	.781*	1.986*	—	—
Pico Rivera	2.515*	1.172*	1.518*	—	—
Santa Fe Springs	3.478*	1.306*	1.744*	—	—

* Arrest/offense ratio higher than in unincorporated area.

and thus support the hypothesis that the desire of the Sheriff's Department to render its best services to the contract cities results in more arrests in those cities.

The Relationship of Contract City Managers with the LASD

Initial interviews with LASD personnel revealed that they most frequently interacted with city managers and city administrators about police services in contract cities. Because of the important role played by city managers,²⁴ interviews with a sample of contract city managers were undertaken. The questions addressed to them concern the impact of the contract plan upon city managers' roles and their self-definition of their role vis-à-vis the Sheriff's Department. If the city manager is the city's chief representative to the LASD, his or her role-definition and attitudes are effective filters that largely determine how the city will relate to the LASD and what the department in turn will perceive as the desires of the city. And, as stated above, the LASD is expected to meet the needs of decisionmakers important to the contract relationship.

The city managers interviewed were supportive of the contract relationship, expressing high levels of over-all satisfaction and giving the department high marks in a variety of areas. The general support offered to the contract plan by city managers is indicated by their response to the statement, "Over-all, I evaluate our city's relationship with the LASD as being very good." On a scale from zero to ten (strong disagreement to strong agreement), the mean score of respondents was 9.1 (std. dev. = 1.3), indicating very high general support of the contract plan. On questionnaire items directed toward eliciting evaluations of specific dimensions of the services provided by the LASD, responses were also supportive of the relationship, but not as strongly. For example, on the same scale, the statement, "The LASD is very responsive to our needs," received an average score of 8.2 (s.d. = 1.7) and the statement, "Contracting from the LASD is more efficient than having a city police department," elicited an average response of 7.3 (s.d. = 2.5).

²⁴ John C. Ries, *Executives in the American Political System* (Belmont, California: Dickenson Press, 1969).

only). The comparisons made are based upon an "expected" arrest rate. In each city, arrest rates (per 100,000 population) were divided by the rate of seven major offenses (per 10,000 population in 1970/71). The resulting ratios may be interpreted as a rough measure of police services, with comparatively higher ratios indicating better services in the sense that more "arrests per offense" have been made.

The results tend to reject the null hypothesis and support the research hypothesis; ratios of arrests per offense are higher in contract cities than in unincorporated areas in 41 of the 72 possible comparisons. Moreover, the tendency toward more arrests in the contract cities strengthens over time. In fiscal 1960/61, for example, arrest/offense ratios were higher in only 5 of 20 possible comparisons, indicating rejection of the research hypothesis. After that year, however, the pattern reverses and strengthens over time, with contract cities having higher arrest/offense ratios in 11 of 20 comparisons in 1963/64, 15 of 20 in 1967/68, and 10 of 12 in 1970/71.²³

Too much can be made of these findings; several factors that affect arrest rates have not been controlled for in this analysis. For example, the arrest rates in Santa Fe Springs are based upon the resident population of that city, but because of its extensive industrial and commercial development its working population is considerably larger than its resident population. This, however, should find greater expression in traffic citations than in the arrest statistics used here and need not explain, for example, the high arrest rates of juveniles on disorderly-conduct charges. Our data support the conclusion that arrest rates are higher in contract cities than in the unincorporated area served by the Norwalk station, even when controlled for a measure of expected crime,

²³ Although not of interest in this analysis, a trend toward higher arrest rates per 100,000 population is also occurring. In fiscal 1970/71, statutes covering drunk and curfew violations were removed from the books, and it appears that the other arrest categories were used to make arrests that would have previously been made under those codes. Even so, the arrest rates for fiscal 1970/71 appear to be considerably higher than those for previous years. The emphasis upon law and order prevalent in the last few years may be being translated into higher arrest rates, and greater increases in the areas with higher Mexican-American populations may reflect the deterioration of relations between the LASD and elements of those communities. Since 1969 there have been increased public demonstrations in Mexican-American areas, two "riot-like" confrontations with the LASD, and the killing of newsman Reuben Salazar by a LASD deputy. See Appendix (p. 584) for the absolute arrest figures corresponding to Table 2.

One explanation for the high over-all support of the LASD mixed with lower support of specific dimensions of service is that many city managers prefer not to have their own police departments. One of the most widely shared folk-rules of the city-manager profession holds that in any conflict with a police chief the city manager loses his or her job. Similarly, city managers often express the view that police personnel generate more frequent and difficult personnel problems than do other city employees. Under the contract relationship, city managers largely avoid both of these areas of possible trouble. Such a rationale might explain a mean response of only 3.8 (s.d. = 3.7) to the statement, "If cost were no obstacle, our city should have its own police department." And the statement, "When a city has its own police department there are more personnel problems than when contracting," received an average response of 9.2 (s.d. = 0.9), indicating stronger agreement than that given in general support of the contract relationship. Thus, one of the principal reasons for city managers to support the contract arrangement arises not out of the services rendered but out of the problems avoided.

In most instances, city managers of contract cities make little effort to affect the policies of the LASD. They handle complaints on the basis of individual occurrences, entering the process with the orientation of finding out whether a deputy was right or wrong in a particular action and only rarely moving beyond this to questions of policy. For example, each city manager was asked to describe his interaction with the Sheriff's Department in the areas of traffic-law enforcement, handling of juvenile offenders, marijuana and pill use by young people, citizens under the influence of alcohol, and aggressiveness of patrol personnel. City managers suggest where radar patrols are to be set up or traffic enforcement units might patrol—usually in response to complaints they have received. In the other areas, however, the almost unanimous pattern is to leave "policy" up to the LASD and to investigate the complaints that come in upon an individual basis. The normal routine is to ask the LASD to investigate the incident, and its report is ordinarily accepted without question.

If city managers are as important to the contract relationship as has been argued, further exploration of their role is clearly in order. The following brief analysis proceeds in two stages: first,

detailing the types of contact reported by city managers concerning the LASD and, second, exploring orientations toward law enforcement held by the city managers. Each interviewee was asked to report how frequently different *types of requests or inquiries* came to him and how frequently different *kinds of citizens* contacted him concerning the LASD. Table 3 shows the results.

The most striking aspect of these responses is the low level of requests and inquiries which these city managers report receiving. None of the items identified comes up frequently enough to reach even the midpoint between "none" and "very frequent." Moreover, very few come from outside the city organization; the most frequent source of input to the city manager is "other city officials," often city councilmen (some responding to citizens who come to them), but most often the full-time city employees. Extended discussion of these points with the interviewees reinforces

Table 3. CITY MANAGER CONTACTS CONCERNING THE LASD
Considering all requests and inquiries which come to you from citizens (or groups) concerning the LASD, how frequent are each of the following topics?
(0 = none; 10 = very frequent)

	Mean	Standard Deviation
Cost related	1.57	2.59
Commending a deputy	2.93	2.02
General service level	4.43	2.21
Complains about LASD personnel	2.71	1.90
Requests for special services	2.43	2.31
Report a crime	2.21	1.58
Request that a deputy be replaced	0.57	0.65
Request that a deputy's assignment be extended	1.43	1.78
Still considering all inquiring and requests which come to you concerning the LASD, how frequently do the following types of citizens contact you?		
Homeowners' groups	1.93	2.95
Other city officials	5.78	2.78
Individual businessmen	2.71	2.27
School officials	1.78	1.89
Church groups	0.50	0.76
Businessmen's groups	1.43	1.70
Individual citizens	3.64	2.50
Political organizations	0.15	0.38
Ad hoc "issue" groups	1.21	2.01
Youth organizations	1.07	1.49
Youth gangs	0.43	0.94
Minority groups	2.14	2.57

these interpretations, making them even stronger than suggested by the responses shown in Table 3. Few citizens or groups approach the city manager concerning the services of the LASD. Two city managers who are exceptions to this general pattern, reporting more frequent contacts from citizens and citizen groups, work in cities with large Mexican-American populations and a reported history of difficulties between members of that community and the LASD. Others, working in cities of like characteristics do not report such contact, however; this suggests that the role defined by the city manager serves as an important screen in this relationship, inviting or inhibiting contacts concerning the LASD.

A set of items concerning the city manager's attitudes toward several dimensions of law-enforcement policy provide some clues as to how they are likely to structure relationships between citizens and the LASD (Table 4).

Responses to the statements listed do not reveal a pattern of unanimity, but they do suggest that city managers generally support the values the LASD attempts to represent, particularly in regard to uniform, countywide law enforcement and regional approaches. Significant also is the considerable disagreement with the statement that juvenile offenders should not be arrested if arrest is avoidable; these managers do not hesitate to rely upon arrest and upon the Youth Authority to handle juveniles. This contrasts with the pattern sometimes expected in suburbs that have their own police departments but is in keeping with Wil-

Table 4. CITY MANAGERS' ATTITUDES ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
(0 = disagree strongly; 10 = agree strongly)

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard Deviation</i>
Law-enforcement policies should be uniform for all areas of the county	7.29	3.24
Regional law enforcement is a good idea	6.14	3.70
Juvenile offenders should never be arrested if there is a way to avoid arrest	3.78	2.97
What this country needs is less coddling of protesters	5.15	2.64
The police should have more influence over law-enforcement policies	4.46	2.22
Police waste too much time on victimless crimes	4.15	3.02

son's findings about the impact of professionalism upon the handling of juvenile delinquents by police departments.²⁵ These respondents do not, however, feel that police should have more influence over law-enforcement policy. They are apparently quite satisfied with the status quo in this area; this makes them unlikely challengers to the operations of the LASD and in almost all cases encourages them to define their role as a reactive agent, awaiting stimuli from their communities, which apparently rarely arrive. Their attitudes, moreover, probably act to discourage citizen input, making the city managers restrictive filters between community and LASD.

To recapitulate, four arguments have been advanced in this section. First, the general evaluation of the Contract Services Plan by city managers is positive, although the plan may be supported as much for the problems it reduces for city managers as for the services it provides for citizens. Second, "policy" is seen as appropriately defined by the LASD. Third, because he is the principal link between city and Sheriff's Department, the city manager/administrator is a crucial screen through which each party to the contractual arrangement must interact. And finally, the strong evidence that citizens in most of the contract cities do not supply major inputs to the city managers concerning the LASD suggests that the latter's role-definition and attitudes play an important and independent role in determining the relationship between city and LASD. Within the apparently broad limits set by the citizens and council, the manager structures this relationship.

Mutual Dependencies Lead to Limited Accountability

The initial exploration of the potential impacts of the Contract Services Plan upon the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department revolved around a theoretical examination of organizational attempts to deal with external dependencies. The contract relationship poses a clear dependency relationship for the LASD; without the call to provide services to the contract cities, the department would

²⁵ Wilson, fn. 18, pp. 200-227; also James Q. Wilson, "The Police and the Delinquent in Two Cities," in J. Q. Wilson, ed., *City Politics and Public Policy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968).

be hard put to to defend its present size. The hypothesis that attempts to cope with external dependency would increase accountability to external, subcounty political interests was therefore advanced. Aspects of the operations of the LASD and dimensions of perceptions and evaluations by city managers of contract cities having been discussed, attention can now be given to an evaluation of the adequacy of this model and hypothesis. Without rejecting the hypothesis, it is argued that limited accountability has emerged. By making the dependencies mutual, that is, by giving the contract cities reason to support the Contract Services Plan, the LASD has reduced the potential impact of the arrangement upon itself, thereby limiting its accountability.

Historically, the chief mechanism used in order to make the dependencies mutual has been favorable pricing of the contract services. The existence of a subsidy, through which taxes collected by the county in cities providing their own police services help pay for municipal-type services (primarily law enforcement) by the county in unincorporated and contract city areas, has been documented by Shoup and Rosett and by the Booz, Allen and Hamilton report.²⁶ The former provide graphic evidence of the impact of this subsidy:

Because the sheriff's charges for contract law enforcement are based on such a restricted concept of the marginal cost of providing the service, the contract cities pay, on a per capita basis, much less for police protection than do the independent cities of Los Angeles County. During 1967-68, the 30 contract law enforcement cities spent \$9.40 per person (employee benefits included) while the 47 independent cities spent more than \$21.00 per person (employee benefits excluded). If employee benefits are included, the expenditure for police protection in independent cities is approximately \$25.20 per capita. If we exclude Los Angeles and Long Beach as being too large to be comparable to the contract cities, the cost of police protection in the remaining independent cities is \$16.40 per capita, or 75% greater than the cost in contract cities. This relatively low expenditure for police protection may be one reason why 21 of the 30 contract cities levy no

²⁶ Shoup and Rosett, *ftn. 6*; Booz, Allen and Hamilton, *ftn. 13*.

municipal property tax, whereas only one of the 47 independent cities is without a municipal property tax.²⁷

As a result of these analyses, the contract price of services from the LASD has been increased, greatly reducing the subsidy. The various stratagems adopted by the LASD to continue advantageous pricing of its services were described earlier, but the previously great attractiveness of the subsidized prices has been largely eroded. In response to the query whether their city had ever discussed establishing its own police department, virtually every city manager interviewed responded in the affirmative, unanimously citing the increased prices as the principal impetus to these explorations. Although the degree of seriousness of these efforts varied considerably, the consensus was that some slight cost advantage still existed in contracting with the LASD as opposed to establishing proprietary police departments; the capital costs of building physical facilities and purchasing needed equipment appeared to be the main drawbacks.

As a variant on the price dimension, one difficulty with estimating the costs of establishing a city police department is control of future increases in the cost of services. When a city has its own police department, increased expenditures are often annual rituals which the manager and council find hard to deny. In contrast, holding the line on increased expenditures in the contract relationship is vastly easier; no organizational-political force exists within the city to push for increased pay for its members or for increased expenditures in its functional area. Indeed, under the contract arrangement, some cities have reduced their police expenditures in absolute terms from year to year. The amount of dollars budgeted for contracting with the LASD becomes almost a residual category; whatever is left after everything else has been paid for is given to the county, and the LASD provides whatever services it can justify upon this basis. Because the LASD stands ready to bring backup deputies into an area if trouble erupts, the city obtains at least the minimum of service necessary to maintain relative order. In one city of 35,000, for example, the city council, unwilling to levy a property tax, has so reduced the amount paid to the county for LASD services that the sheriff provides only a single one-man car around the clock to "police" the city. Ad-

²⁷ Shoup and Rosett, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

Contracting → less pressure for expenditure increases

joining contract cities have expressed displeasure at having to pay for patrol units that are called into this city to provide back-up.

For our analysis, the important characteristic of the contract is not whether "adequate" police services are provided, but what effect it has upon the contract city. Mutual dependence is established between the LASD and the contract city. Vastly more discretion over the city's expenditures for law enforcement exists under the contract system, and even if dollar costs were to be equal, the potential for increased discretionary control over activities and expenditures is an extremely valuable commodity. Thus mutual dependence emerges not only because of some economic subsidy provided but because of organizational factors that make the Lakewood Plan attractive to city councils and city managers.

Budgetary discretion is clearly one of the most important of the organizational factors that make the Contract Services Plan attractive to cities. Two other factors were previously discussed: City managers find the absence of a police chief and the reduced personnel problems attractive, and a less obvious but important advantage accrues to cities imbued with the ethic of "professionalized, businesslike" local government.

One component of this ethic has been efficiency, and the LASD may make some claims in this area, particularly in the case of smaller suburbs;²⁸ another component, however, is depersonalized, uniform services provided in the same manner to all citizens.²⁹ In this light, the LASD is quite attractive: As a large organization, it seeks to implement countywide norms of service and rotates personnel to reduce attachment to any one community. City managers were discovered to value uniform policies quite highly, and their responses to the statement, "LASD personnel know 'who counts' in this city and treat them accordingly," sheds more light on this dimension of the relationship: The mean response was 3.2 (s.d. = 2.8), indicating general disagreement, and several interviewees volunteered that it was good that the LASD did not give preferential treatment to some citizens. Thus, the contract relationship also offers the depoliticization of the po-

²⁸ Shoup and Rosett, *op. cit.*; Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 61 (December 1967), pp. 953-970.

²⁹ Wilson, *ftn.* 18.

lice function, making it more of a professional service about which the citizens need worry little. To those who wish to reduce the impact of politics upon local government this is a not unimportant benefit.

Public-Policy Implications

Exploration of the public-policy implications emerging from this analysis can be facilitated by discussion of five questions. Derived from viewing the Lakewood Plan progressively as: (1) an alternative for the delivery of police services, between the more common large and the small, independent departments, (2) capturing relevant features of two-tiered structures of metropolitan governance; and (3) incorporating features judged desirable by public choice advocates, the five questions are:

1. *Are Services Different Than They Would be if Provided by Either of the Two Alternatives: A Large Department or a Small, Independent Department?*

The available evidence suggests several areas in which service provided to contract cities under the Lakewood Plan differ from those that would be available under the alternatives. As a first example, manning levels appear to be lower under the Contract Plan than they would be under either alternative. In the data compiled by Shoup and Rosett, police services cost an average of \$16.40 per capita for independent cities in fiscal 1967/68, whereas the contract cities spent an average of only \$9.40 per capita.³⁰ Although the example of a city of 35,000 with a single one-man car around the clock is extreme, the general pattern reflected in appropriations to law enforcement carries over into manning levels, which are generally lower in contract cities. Part of the explanation of this phenomenon certainly lies in the separation of decision concerning the production and consumption of services, to be explored under Question 4.

As another difference in services, the contract cities reap the benefits of highly specialized units that the LASD, as a large department, can more easily provide than could smaller police departments.

³⁰ Shoup and Rosett, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

partments. On the other hand, this benefit accrues not only to contract cities, since the Sheriff's Department routinely extends similar, specialized service to small, independent cities.

Finally, it must be recognized that the Lakewood Plan reduces the choices among possible alternative styles of police services. Thus, contract cities give up one of the options they would have if they maintained their own police departments. Services provided to the contract cities are more uniform in style than would be expected if each had its proprietary police department. Without judging the ultimate desirability of such uniformity, it can be seen that uniform services may not equally fit the needs of all residents of the county. For example, in the case of one small city with a high proportion of Mexican-American residents the desire for services that differed from the norm of the LASD led to termination of the contract relationship and self-provision of police services, at a substantially higher cost. In fiscal 1959/60, that city spent \$35,243 on contract services from the LASD and in the following fiscal year, \$62,226 in direct expenses on its own police department plus an additional \$32,151 on related capital outlays.

2. *What are the Relationships Between Areawide Governmental Structures and the Smaller Units?*

Two areas are analyzed to answer this question: service levels and price of services. Decisions about service levels, that is, the number of patrol units to be assigned to any contract city, are typically made by bargaining between the contract city and the LASD. The city administrator/manager and the station captain serving his area are the principals in this relationship, with the city council ordinarily playing a ratification role. The contract cities clearly appear to have the strong position in the relationship, with their definition of "what the city can afford" serving as the limit within which units must be purchased. The station captain possesses considerable initiative in suggesting service levels and, probably more important, in introducing new services into the package purchased.

The prices attached to the services of the sheriff are determined through a process best described as political. Initially, the prices charged were negotiated between the county and the contract cities, with the county having the major role. Over time, how-

ever, the process has changed to the point where other actors have assumed increased importance. Included here is the sporadic, but undying, pressure from the independent cities to have prices increased in order to remove an alleged subsidy to the contract cities. Stimulated in large part by their complaints, county grand juries have been drawn into the process, investigating and proposing modifications in the costing formulas used by the county. Similarly, both sides seek advantageous legislation at the state level. Research by academicians has had an impact, the Shoup and Rossett study being the preeminent example. Finally, the consultant report of Booz, Allen and Hamilton had a major impact upon the determination of prices.

3. *Are Opportunities for Citizen Participation Opened?*

The opportunities for citizen participation appear to be greater than they would be in the absence of the plan. As a graphic illustration of the difference, the citizens of unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County, numbering one and one-half times those in contract cities, are represented by only 5 elected officials (the county supervisors), while those of the thirty contract cities have 150 councilmen and 30 city managers whom they can contact regarding the Sheriff's Department. City managers report but little contact from citizens concerning the LASD, but county supervisors would be expected to receive even less, in proportion to the populations they represent.³¹ Citizens are far more likely to know personally city councilmen and city managers than supervisors, and the psychological costs of calling City Hall should be substantially lower than those of calling "downtown" to the county offices.

If citizens feel that the services of the LASD need change and they cannot receive satisfaction from the city councilmen and manager of their city, the task of organizing politically to pressure or campaign against these individuals is monumentally easier than tackling a member of the Board of Supervisors. This is an extremely important point, for although no evidence suggests enough disaffection with services provided by the LASD to make this a campaign issue in contract cities, the existence of the Con-

³¹ A survey of citizens in Santa Clara County, California, revealed that 6.8 percent had contacted their city manager, 10.1 percent a city councilman, and 5.7 percent a county supervisor, concerning some problem or request (RAND survey in Santa Clara County, November-December 1972. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, unpublished).

tract Services Plan results in the establishment of multiple possible organizing points; citizens could make use of the governmental structures of cities to interact with the LASD or to terminate the relationship.

On the other hand, the capability of participating in this manner remains an unexploited potential. Moreover, given the system of mutual dependencies that has been established between contract cities and the sheriff, a tendency would exist for elites to limit participation to the same issues that presently concern the manager and councilmen. Thus, price concerns would be likely to be seen as appropriate foci for participation, but policy questions would be resisted (by the manager and council) as being the province of the LASD. The potential exists, however, for citizens to break out of such restraints more easily than if the city government did not offer an organizational vehicle. For cities too small to justify self-provision of police services, the contract arrangement is welcome; in its absence, citizens would find themselves members of much larger political aggregations.

4. *Are Decision Processes Concerning the Services Provided by Local Governments Changed as a Result of Separating Decisions Concerning Production (Made by the County), From Those Concerning Consumption (Made by Contract Cities)?*

Although no direct evidence of the decisionmaking processes in independent cities concerning law enforcement services is reported here, the pattern found in contract cities certainly differs from common descriptions of the process in those that provide their own police services. This is nowhere more evident than in the process of budgetmaking, in which we have seen that city managers and councilmen are able to treat expenditures on law enforcement almost as a residual category, assigning to this area whatever funds are left over after other designations. In contrast, in cities with proprietary departments (police and other municipal functions), department heads usually participate in the budget formulation from the outset, often providing the very first inputs in the form of their requests.³² Annual requests for increased, or at least stable, appropriations are the normal consequence of

³² John P. Crecine, *Governmental Problem Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Budgeting* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1969).

Contracting → ability to treat police expenditures as a residual category.

this process. The experience of some contract cities in actually reducing absolutely the amount of moneys spent on police services is virtually unthinkable in the context of independent cities, especially in an era of increased popular concern about law and order.

As stated several times, a tradeoff has occurred, however. The scope of decisionmaking over the provision of police services has been reduced. Decisionmaking options have increased in the realm of cost control and been largely destroyed in the area of police policy. Cities neither have the control of personnel nor the ability to use other resources to influence the manner in which police services are rendered.

5. *Are Alternative "Bundles" of Governmental Services and Taxes Made More Varied by the Plan, Thereby Increasing the Range of Alternatives Available for Residential Choices by Citizens?*

The Lakewood Plan has some possible affect on the variation in bundles of services and taxes from which citizens can choose. It has allowed the incorporation of smaller population aggregates than would be possible in its absence, and there is a greater likelihood that these populations will be more homogeneous than in larger units, thereby encouraging services specifically designed for them. On the other hand, the producer of services has incentives to standardize services. In the case of police services, the range of variations in style of service has been reduced. As a consequence, decisions about quantity and cost are easier to make, whereas those concerning policy are foreclosed.

On the revenue side of the process, the plan has had greater effect. By allowing cities to keep expenditures in some categories to a low level, the revenues needed to finance operations have often been reduced. As a consequence, many of the contract cities levy no municipal property tax. This factor could affect the residential choice of any citizen, but it seems to have found its greatest appeal to industrial and commercial concerns, often staunch opponents of any attempt to impose a municipal property tax.

Conclusions and Evaluation. Three themes run through the discussions of the five questions that serve as an organizing structure of an evaluation of the Lakewood Plan: First, mutual de-

dependencies characterize the relationship between the contract cities and the county. Second, and more specifically, contract cities have traded increased control over the quantity of services provided for decreased control over determination of what services are rendered. And third, the governmental structures of the contract cities are potential organizing points through which citizens can exercise greater influence over the policies of the LASD; but these structures are used very infrequently. (Three cities have terminated the contract provision of police services, indicating an inability of the LASD to meet their needs and the potential for the extreme option of terminating the contract by other cities.)

Summary

The most important conclusion of this study concerns the specification of the mutual dependencies between the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and the contract cities and an exploration of the consequences of this relationship upon the provision of law-enforcement services in Los Angeles County. This aspect of the Lakewood Plan was previously unexplored and has several important consequences:

First, the benefits derived by the city councils and city managers of contract cities suggest that the Plan will continue in existence after its "economic" and "service" benefits are exhausted. Organizational and political benefits accrue largely to elite members, with the lowered tax rate being the principal benefit apparently received by the mass of citizens. The expectation emerges, then, that elite members will continue to support the Lakewood Plan even after termination of the contract is encouraged by calculations of the costs of self-provision of police services or determination that the city's population desires a pattern (style) of policing different than that provided by the LASD.

Second, mutual dependencies have led to limited accountability. By meeting certain needs of the contract cities (cost and organizational factors), the Sheriff's Department has emerged with its core values intact. Policymaking remains the prerogative of the department; to a very large extent, the LASD can carry out its

functions in any manner it sees fit, without interference from the contract cities. The goal of regionalization is advanced, enabling the department to operate over a larger geographical area. Similarly, the value of professionalism remains unchallenged; the contract relationship involves interaction with professional city managers who largely defer to the professional judgment of the LASD.

Third, within the context of the value system of the LASD and the city managers of contract cities (at a minimum; no information on the value systems of citizens is available), the contract cities receive better services than do the residents of unincorporated areas served by the LASD. Interviews with LASD personnel revealed that they tried to provide their best services to the contract cities; the city managers largely concurred in the judgment that the department provides excellent services; and the analysis of arrest statistics shows the expected results for a legalistic-style department: In the areas where it seeks to do better, more arrests are made.

Fourth, and a factor important enough that it has been a major theme of the argument presented, contract cities have chosen increased control over the quantity of police services provided, at the cost of decreased influence over the type of services rendered. The most significant consequence of this is that there is not the normal variation in styles of police services. Instead, each city receives what the LASD provides, a style of police services closely resembling what Wilson has called the legalistic style. This may match well with the desires of the citizens of these cities and does match well with the expressed desires of the city managers interviewed. It does, however, reduce the variation that might otherwise be expected; in the three cities that have chosen to cease contracting for the sheriff's services, this factor apparently played a role in the decision. The area of greatest potential for this factor to become a point of contention and to threaten the Contract Services Plan is probably in the suburbs with high concentrations of Mexican-Americans; relationships between these communities and the LASD have become more strained in the last two years, and sentiment could mount to end the purchase of the sheriff's services.

An evaluation of the desirability of this model for the pro-

vision of police services can only be tentative; the most important missing data are citizen evaluations of the arrangement. The Lakewood Plan clearly appears to be preferable to large departments, however. Although not major in impact upon policy, the contract arrangement has opened the department to influences of the subareas it serves. Moreover, the existence of the city governmental structures provides citizens with an important organizing possibility should they become seriously disaffected with the county's services; no such alternative exists for citizens served by large departments. In contrast to the situation in smaller departments, the plan offers the important advantage of greater control over quantity of police services provided to an area. The summary evaluation is that the Contract Services Plan should be given consideration as a model for the organization of police services in other metropolitan areas.

APPENDIX

ARRESTS IN AREAS SERVED BY THE NORWALK SHERIFF'S STATION
(per 100,000 population)

(per 100,000 population)					
Area	Disorderly Conduct		Drunk	Drunk	Curfew Violations
	Adults	Juveniles	Driving		
Fiscal 1960/61					
Unincorporated	39	55	174	252	53
La Mirada	8	22	71	196	44
Norwalk	25	18	270	556	128
Pico Rivera	36	10	195	587	63
Santa Fe Springs	36	18	348	875	128
Fiscal 1963/64					
Unincorporated	19	17	40	186	35
La Mirada	22	16	48	133	80
Norwalk	18	28	107	376	57
Pico Rivera	26	14	63	398	85
San Fe Springs	36	61	214	819	122
Fiscal 1967/68					
Unincorporated	25	28	99	232	54
La Mirada	41	82	168	360	225
Norwalk	49	28	415	621	99
Pico Rivera	43	32	247	765	74
Santa Fe Springs	75	75	701	1184	137
Fiscal 1970/71					
Unincorporated	422	99	181	—	—
La Mirada	466	100	288	—	—
Norwalk	677	228	580	—	—
Pico Rivera	820	382	495	—	—
San Fe Springs	2024	760	1015	—	—

PUBLIC POLICY

VOL. XXI

FALL 1973

No. 4

Contents

- Defining Area Distress in Unemployment
T. NICOLAUS TIDEMAN 441
- Manipulating International Commodity
Markets: Brazilian Coffee Policy
1906 to 1962
STEPHEN D. KRASNER 493
- The High Cost of Graduate Education
in the Military
ERIC A. HANUSHEK 525
- The Impact of Contract Services Arrange-
ments on the Los Angeles Sheriff's
Department and Law-Enforcement
Agencies in Los Angeles County
JOHN J. KIRLIN 553
- Development Assistance: The View from
Bretton Woods
HANS O. SCHMITT 585
- Airline Overbooking Strategies and
Bumping Procedures
HAROLD BIERMAN, JR.
AND L. JOSEPH THOMAS 601