douglas-wildavsky-1982.html
Douglas, M., and Aaron Wildavsky (1982). Risk and Culture: An essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers. Berkeley, University of California Press.
We have to act as if we understand risk - which we do not
disagreement on what dangers are (nuclear, carcinogens, environmental pollution, etc)
public policy - 4 types of risks
foreign affairs
crime
pollution
economic collapse
governance, public, and elit don't agree on risk types
what do we need to know to understand risks <!-- understand the structure -->
There is no definition of "acceptable risk" that everyone agrees on.
four problems <!-- very similar to the problem typology, but just rotated around -->
consent
solution: calculate
solution: researchcontested
solution: coercion and discussion
solution ???
<!-- information problems that that people think can be solved by research and education, usually seems to means educating someone else to agree with you -->
Cultural theory of risk
cultural bias is inherent in all institutions
given clusters of values and beliefs
what can we do about it
current phenomenon of being so accutely aware of risk
pg 17 - voluntary vs. involuntary risks
pg 18 - bundles of risks that come with rewards can't be called involuntary
pg 22 - quoting Jon Elster "the uncertainty argument for the principle of action as if the worst will happen is much more solid" - uncertainty signifies that the one knows the kind of things that might happen but not the probability of their occurrence
irreversibility - if it can't be changed back
Chapter 2 -
modern people are supposed to rely on science and technology to understand risks - but is that true?
as modernists we should be able to address risk in a purely objective way
pg 32 in the modern world "Technology plus statistics have enriched the idea of normal bad luck by adding the question of what ought to be normal."
Chapter 3 - Scientists disagree
pg 49 double edge sword of science "generating new ignorance with new knowledge"
ability to detect minute amounts of a compound can also increase what is unexplained
example of complaint from American Water Works about EPA's new regulations
"hard evidence" was lacking because of the costs of doing the research
treatment was cheaper than definitively proving that there were dangerous chemicals in the water
one idea was to impose standards on just a few big cities that would essentially redistribute the risk and save more lives (but let others be harmed)
how could they handle THM - EPA wanted to clean this up, there was a national increase in the number of cases of bladder cancer, and if THM was a problem the cases might not show up for 25 years
pg 62 - in a conference about the atmosphere Margaret Mead says essentially that "Left to their own devices, in other words, human beings will take more risks than are good for them. But it is hard for scientists to get others to attend to future dangers if they cannot agree on what will be dangerous." <!-- quoting the authors not Mead -->
"The illustrious participants were divided into two factions, one stressing that the world ecosystem had worked for millions of years, accommodating large changes, so we are best off leaving it alone, and the others saying that it was so complicated that even small changes could have great importance." <!-- nature is robust vs. nature is fragile -->
<!-- similar to hubbub when Lovelock's Gaia was used as an excuse for dumping pollution -->
pg 64 - where scientific facts are agreed upon and where values are close, scientific activism can play a big role, but if values diverge, such as issues of risk,
pg 67 - Chapter 4 Assessment is biased
risk- averse and risk-takers
benefits of growth need to be weighed against some accidental losses
risk averse say that human life is priceless
revealed preferences are based on observations of risks people take
expressed prefrences are based on what they say (in surveys, etc)
cost benefits ratio
Chapter V: The Center is complacent
deciding about risk are thought (by others) to be solved if you have better probability information
"We we demur. First, probabilism is a partly a feature of the world and partly a feature of a certain kind of thinking about the world that works well. Second, probilities are calculated from data...
Third, choice between important issues has moral implications"
Choice demands judgement
"Nothing influences the estimate of probabilites more than the sense of future time.
straight extension of the present
but there are variations
<!-- even if it's straight extension, is it compounding -->
pg 90 - Western social systems of two types; bureaucracy vs. the market
people who live in these different social environments internalize these values and it effects their personality
also distinct views of risk
hierarchy - "all parts are oriented towards the whole", bigger parts contain smaller parts
avoids adopting a single goal, because that might exclude some sub-units
individualism - "market and sustained profit-seeking"
pg 94 - discussing the problem that hierarchies have with surprises (such as Peal Harbor)
"No such hierarchy can perceive the unexpected. No amount of improved labeling or better spelling out of the instructions will help this kind of perceiver take political information aborad. The faulty in perception has nothing to do with the way the message was packaged. It is inherent in the institutional structure."
hierarchists believe - "humans are more fallible thatn instituions; ..... people need good regulations"
pg 95 - Individualistic market - "Utility theory was devised to explain the behavior of individuals operatin in an entirely individualistic society.
individuals need autonomy to make good choices
pg 96 - need an exchange system and trust that it is fair
"fear of any threat to the exchange system. These are deep fears, corresponding to the hierarchist's firrs for the life of his organization."
hier and ind both fear some threat to their organizations
risk portfolios - assets and values they use to handle risk
individualist - bad luck for some individuals
hierarchist - maintenance of whole system above the individual
both of these views are from the center of the political spectrum
pg
pg 102 Chapter VI The border is alarmed
sectarian, or small highly hierarchical groups such as religious sects
voluntary sects, either become authoritarian or egalitarian and fraternal
pg 115 - fraternal sects - refer to Mancur Olson "Logic of Collective Action"
"Olson's theory is about the production of public goods,
dilemmas of voluntary groups
pg 122 - risk portfolios
center - time is continuous with the present
pg 126 Chapter VII The border fears for nature
description of Sierra Club, David Brower and Friends of the Earth
pg 138 grid and group analysis
sectarian = egalitarian
pg 139 - rank some environmental groups for group and grid
Sierra Club is hierarchical, FOE is egalitarian
pg 182 - "The sectarian border is a kind of permanent opposition that has no intention of governing, disapproves of government, and develops no capacity for exercising power." <!-- sounds like Rabble -->
pg 186 - Risk is a collective construct
"The idea that public perception of risk and its acceptable levels are collective constructs, a bit like language and a bit like aesthetic judgement, is hard to take.
pg 187 - agreeing on which risks are most worrisome, not directly made but depends on social institutions
downturn in market worries individualists (before anyone else)
weakening law and order worries hierarchists
small changes in pollution upset sectarian branches of environmental movement
pg 193 - confusion about risk is due to "The wrong division between the reality of the external world and the gropings of the human psyche have allocated real knowledge to the physical sciences and illusions and mistakes to the field of psychology. Causality in the extrnal world is generally treated as radically distinct from the results of perception." <!-- see Gibson and Reed -->
pg 194 - "inappropriateness of dividing the problem between objectively calculated physical risks and subjectively biased individual perceptions>"
195 - preparing for risks decreases the damage from those particular risks but may increase the susceptability of the society to other, surprise catastrophes because all the research is tied up in addressing the percieved risks
pg 196 - striving for stability can lead to worse outcomes because there were no disturbances
"Resilience in the capacity to use change to better cope with the unknown; it is learnign to bounce back. "
CS Hollings - anticipation (striving for steady state) and resilience
managing risk through anticipation by emphasizing uniformity can make the eventual situation worse