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
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# CONFLICT, ALIENATION, AND THE HOPE OF PEACE: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN MILITARISED CYPRUS

Harry Anastasiou

In 1960 the Cyprus Republic was established as a single, ethnically mixed bicomunal state, with a single flag and an army numbering merely 2000 men. Today, Cyprus is geographically, ethnically and communally divided, with foreign troops on its soil, with all the male members of the population trained as soldiers and equipped with all powerful, up to date weapons. An island of half a million inhabitants, Cyprus stands divided since 1974 into *de facto* two states, one legal and one illegal, and with four flags; the Cyprus Republic flag and the Greek flag in the Greek south and the Turkish flag with the flag of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in the Turkish occupied north. And for more than thirty years, the island has been under the direct supervision of the peace-keeping forces of the United Nations. Briefly, this is the tragedy of Cyprus.

For more than forty years, the history of this island has lived through successive and varied conflictual relationships, even through relationships of violence. In view of this irrefutable reality, it is essential to reflect and acknowledge that as inhabitants of the island, we have all been inevitably formed in and through this history of many and different conflicts. As individuals and as political groups, as communities and as a culture, we have been haunted and stigmatised, one way or another, by this protracted, never-ending confrontation with "the others", whoever they may be, the right, the left, the Greeks or the Turks.

It must also be noted that following the violent events of 1974, the various intra-communal conflictual relationships, especially among the Greek-Cypriots, has been subsumed and reconstituted around the henceforth major axis of Greek-Cypriot community on the one hand and Turkish-Cypriot community and the Turkish army on the other. And by implication, due to the Turkish military invasion and the pain it induced, the adversarial attitude was generalised, especially through the nationalist prototypes, to one of universal animosity between Greeks and Turks. On both sides, the same nationalism which originally created the problem comes after the fact, and finds justification in the very historical events which itself created. It validates, in other words, the nationalist stereotype that enmity between Greeks and Turks constitutes a diachronic, invariable and existential fact, an immutable

and eternal phenomenon. This stance, or better, this perspective, whether it originates from Turk or Greek, leads to the same outcome. It precludes, *in advance*, the prospect for peace and reconciliation. And under these conditions, the search for a "solution" is transformed into a vain, time-consuming preoccupation. Under the nationalist rubric, even if "the solution" is found on the diplomatic plain, whatever it may be, even the most ideal, it becomes historically unfeasible, even most dangerous.

On account of the general impact of nationalism on public culture, the mentality of "us and them" has been shaped not so much by the historical experiences of peaceful coexistence and symbiosis, which have indeed existed, but, rather, exclusively from the events of hostility and violence. The kind of events which the nationalist spirit, wherever it comes from, onesidedly and selectively prefers and utilises in constituting its historical hermeneutic, in which the values of man and civilisation become determined by conflictual prototypes (Anderson 1991, p.6; Kitromilides 1990). And this is the mentality which has tended to become an inseparable dimension of the process of socialisation in the established culture of Cypriot society, in its entirety, inclusive of both communities.

By the nature of things, if peace is to be sought and pursued in Cyprus, it is imperative to begin with a diagnosis of the dynamics of conflict as they pertain to both the adversarial attitude itself, and the hostile interactive relationship between the two communities.

What is of utmost significance as a starting point for peace in Cyprus is the acknowledgement that each community has its own experience of injustice and subsequently and by implication its own sense of justice. The difference between the two, hinges on the fact that the traumatic experiences that each side has reaped from the conflict refer to and derive from different events, incidents and historical periods. For the Turkish-Cypriots, the painful memories concentrate mainly on the period 1963-1974. Their recollection concerns the constraining underdeveloped life in their enclaves, which encompassed just 3% of the territory of Cyprus, the defeats in the bloody conflicts with the Greek-Cypriots, with a loss of human life staggering in the eyes of the Turkish-Cypriots as a numerical minority. It concerns the missing persons (483 Turkish-Cypriots over 32 Greek-Cypriots in 1964) and generally the feelings that they were living under conditions of perpetual siege (Volkan 1979, pp 18-25, 119).

For the Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, the experience of injustice originates mainly from the more concentrated, but inundating events of 1974, with the Greek Junta's *coup d'etat* and the Turkish military intervention. The tragic memories refer to the unprecedented loss of human life, to the mass uprooting from their homes, from one moment to the next, to the unrepeatably destruction of property, to the refugees and the 1619 missing persons. Most significant is also the fact that the pain and injustice that resulted from the *coup d'etat*, with all the mixed feelings of confusion and guilt over the civil bloodshed, were unconsciously transferred and

fused with the pain induced by Turkey's "Attila" operation. While with the recent re-emergence of nationalism, this transference was attempted by certain nationalist groups almost consciously, as a substitute for their guilt in initiating the civil violence among the Greek community.

The differentiated traumatic experience of the two communities, through entirely different points of reference are not only restricted to the different historical periods to which each side remains selectively and prejudicially bound. They relate and concur also in the same historical periods and events, but in relation to different needs and concerns of each community. Presently, for example, the Turkish-Cypriots', (while feeling secure with the presence of Turkish troops on the island), attention is primarily focused on the unbearable weight of their deteriorating economy. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriots, while prospering in the economic domain to the point where economic survival is not at all an issue in daily life, are preoccupied with the pain and the injustice regarding their occupied lands.

Through all these contradictions and ambiguities which reign in the perceptions, priorities and needs of the two communities, there appears yet another dimension of the alienation incubated in the history of protracted conflict. It concerns the selective reference and interpretation of history on the part of each side. This tendency, while germinating within and by the psychology of conflict, is embraced, completed, culturally patterned and intensified by a nationalist mentality (Gelner 1983, pp. 48-49; Hobsbawn 1990, pp. 76-77; Anderson 1991, pp. 202-206). Each side amplifies and projects univocally its own experience of pain and injustice, while diminishing and burying in the depths of the unconscious, its own guilt and its own responsibility for all that has occurred and have been perpetrated in history.

It is thus not at all surprising that the Turkish-Cypriots try to entrench their sense of justice and the corresponding arguments by referring exclusively to the period prior to 1974, while entirely ignoring the awesome consequences resulting from Turkey's military invasion (Denktash 1982). But also conversely, it is not surprising that the Greek-Cypriots, while attempting to render a historical interpretation of the Cyprus problem, focus for their own sense of justice on the period of 1974 and thereafter, without any substantial reference to the specific historical events of the 1960s. Here, we encounter two diametrically opposed, historical perspectives and memories, which have created and sustained an insurmountable problem of communication between the two communities, posing thereby a major obstacle to peace (Papadakis 1994, pp. 401-409).

#### The Dialectic of Non-communication

Consequently, yet another outcome of the relationship of protracted conflict which has been inherited is the alienation which results from the inability of the two communities to communicate within a framework of common points of reference. The interactions between the two sides, through a history of antagonism and incidents of violence, have differentiated into exactly opposite patterns the

experiences, the perceptions and the existential structure of meaning from which each side interprets the various events and behaviours, be they their own or the other side's. This dynamic leads with almost mathematical precision to an essential form of alienation which institutionalises psychologically, intellectually and culturally a dialectic of non-communication between the two communities. This form of alienation derives from the fact that the meanings which each side attributes to the various events are diametrically opposite to those attributed by the other. This condition is pervasive, permeating everything, whether they be events, or institutions, or speeches, or political decisions, news reports, or historical analyses, etc.

For example, when the Greek-Cypriots claim the right of the refugees to return to their homes, (which surely constitutes a human right), the Turkish-Cypriots interpret it as an attempt by the Greek-Cypriots to take everything for themselves and throw them to the streets, helpless and without shelter. Their fear of such a prospect is such that it overshadows their ability to acknowledge that the Greek-Cypriots claim does in fact concern human rights. On the other hand, when the Turkish-Cypriots demand recognition of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", the Greek-Cypriots attribute it exclusively to an arrogant imposition of the *status quo* through the might of arms, to a flagrant violation of justice. Without however the Greek-Cypriots reflecting on the fact that behind the Turkish-Cypriots claim for state recognition, which in and of itself is illegitimate, lies a past traumatic experience of existential fear which triggers a deep need for security and collective identity. It is precisely this feeling that has been usurped for years by Turkish nationalism and Turkey, which in turn feeds and sustains Greek nationalism by provoking the latter to countervailing reactions.

The dialectic of non-communication also holds true in the flying of the Turkish and Greek flags by the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities respectively. Whereas from an objective historical vantage point, the two flags have undermined and continue to undermine the state sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic, subjectively for each community, the symbolism of the flags summarises and represents meanings and experiences directly opposite to those attributed to them by the other side. For the Greek-Cypriots, and especially for extreme nationalists the Greek flag constitutes a symbol of ethnic pride, glory, grandeur, collective identity, etc. The equivalent national symbol of the Turkish-Cypriots, that is the Turkish flag, is viewed by the Greek-Cypriots as a symbol of shame, barbarism and darkness. Since 1974 in particular, the Turkish flag contains for the Greek-Cypriots the meanings of invasion and occupation, of missing persons, of illegality, of injustice, of violence, of partition and of part of Cyprus.

For the Turkish-Cypriots however, the Turkish flag embodies a symbol of collective protection, of salvation and support from the motherland. It refers to the guarantee of their physical security by the all-powerful Turkish state and is a reminder of the condition which entrenches the collective identity of the Turkish-

Cypriots. In the eye of the Turkish-Cypriots, the Greek flag, on the other hand, is a symbol of domination, degradation, oppression, siege and violence. It represents for them their negative experiences of the 1960s, the backwardness, the perpetual enslavement, the uncertainty, the missing persons, the union of Cyprus with Greece. All these meaning patterns of the two sides, which come into conflict around the national symbols, derive from a series of diachronic associations of subjective historical memories on the one hand and of nationalist stereotypes on the other.

The fact that the national flag of each community is the flag of another country, distinct from Cyprus, complicates the meanings even further. For each side, its national flag turns out to be a symbol of unacceptable claims over the island by another state which simultaneously supports the unacceptable positions of the corresponding Cypriot community. Ever since the rise of nationalism on the island, even after independence and more so in 1974 and thereafter, the Greek-Cypriots viewed the flying of the flag of Turkey by the Turkish-Cypriots as an abominable symbol of foreign intervention. And this is exactly how the Turkish-Cypriots viewed the flying of the flag of Greece by the Greek-Cypriots community, as an extension of the sovereignty of Greece over the island of Cyprus. These interpretations are held tacitly but intensely by the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities, revealing thereby the impasse in communication which results from the national symbols.

At a deeper level this dialectic of non-communication betrays a form of hypocrisy which is normally born within the schismatic psychological make-up of nationalism and the personality which expresses it. Namely, while the flag of "my own" ethnic group constitutes a necessary, rightful and inalienable symbol of national pride and justification, the flag of the "other" ethnic group is seen as an unacceptable phenomenon, a symbol of abomination and high-handedness.

Each community sees its own national flag within an absolutely positive perspective of idealised meanings. For the other community, this same flag functions as a symbol of conflict, injustice, violence and evil. However, the crucial point is that the relationship between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, in their communication through the national symbols, is not determined by the meanings that each side attributes to its own flag, but to the meanings which each side attributes to the flag of the other side. Through the national symbols, we thereby encounter a type of communicative interaction where each community receives from the other meanings and messages that each perceives and understands conditions for genuine communication. When we grasp the national symbols, not in isolation and in the abstract, but in the context of the relationship of the two communities, we see the national flags functioning as symbols of conflict, threat and militarism. This concrete reality, which supersedes any abstractly attributed meanings, was once revealed in an innocent observation of a six year old, who upon seeing his national flag in a military parade, turned to his father and said,

"look, the flag of war"!

Here, the dialectic of non-communication between the two communities, through a metastasis, is transformed into communication of animosity. This condition which is created by the interactive psychodynamics of meaning around the national symbols is reinforced by the fact that consensual symbols of common experiences, of a shared history and of peaceful coexistence between Greek-Cypriots with Turkish-Cypriots are essentially non-existent. Even the flag of the Cyprus Republic, as a symbol of bicomunal symbiosis and partnership, remains without substance in the nationalist historical experience and culture of the two communities, precisely because in the last analysis it was never supported by a genuine predisposition for peace and common visions. On the other hand, after 1983, the flag of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" has even less reality and substance than the flag of the Cyprus Republic, not to mention the further complication that it carries non international recognition.

Moreover, the propaganda which is assembled and disseminated by the means of mass communication transforms the above mentioned experiences, perceptions and interpretations from suggestive tendencies and implicit references to crystallised stereotypes and explicit meanings which integrate and condition public culture (Ellul 1965, pp. 34-38). Needless to say, this is the general dynamic of the specific content (McLuhan 1964, pp. 24, 32; Meyrowitz 1985). Under these conditions, the old stereotypes of nationalism, which are yet again in fury, are revived partly because in the up-to-date systems of mass communication they find a perfect alibi by which they become entrenched and proliferate. Apparently, nationalism finds its own stereotypical and impersonal structure of thought congruous with the modus operandi of the mass means of communication.

The fact that the two communities no longer have direct contact, through interpersonal relationships, restricts the entire spectrum of communication to the abstract level of the mass media. The end result being, that communication occurs solely in the form of an impersonal exchange of stereotypes, through what by now have become standardised, mutual accusations, characterisations, victimisation and a rhetoric based on exaggerated, and often unfounded nationalist assumptions. And all this takes place outside of any framework of authentic dialogue, the kind that is mainly attained through direct interpersonal communication. It is a fact that in mass communication people are exposed to a plethora of information, mass communication of itself is devoid of the capacity to build personalities transcending the culture of stereotypes and to foster essential attitudinal changes in the direction of peace.

The specific language which is standardised in and through the means of mass communication, especially with the re-emergence of nationalism, is the one which conditions the content of public culture. Consequently, the way of thinking which is interwoven with this kind of language binds, and often muzzles, anyone who enters the public realm. In the Greek-Cypriot community this condition occurs mostly

spontaneously, and at times with a more or less subtle form of state intervention, or even without intervention, depending on who is in government. More so than not censorship in the Greek-Cypriot community direct supervision and intervention by the administrative authorities is more intense and reinforcing. Hence, while in the case of the Turkish-Cypriots, nationalism in the media culture is a direct extension of centralised statism, in the case of the Greek-Cypriots, nationalism in the media occurs as a "free" enterprising mass culture, which in turn reflects, as well as conditions, political life. It is in this framework that the dynamics of conflict prompt the Turkish-Cypriots to feel that their authoritarian style of administration in the Turkish statist tradition is justified as a means of collective survival and protection from the overwhelming effects of the nationalist, hellenic culture of the Greek majority. While the Greek-Cypriots, in the very same framework of conflictual interaction argue that the Turkish regime of the north undermines democracy which, in their view, is the prerogative of their government as the sole legitimate administration of the island.

Free, private broadcasting is not a reality in the Turkish-Cypriot community. But the rising number of private radio and television stations in the 1990s in the Greek-Cypriot community did not necessarily generate greater diversity and pluralism in public opinion, regarding perceptions and perspectives on the Cyprus question. On the contrary, the overall effect was an intensification of nationalistic messages, stereotypes and programmes. Along with the more explicit techno-professional and commercial criteria governing the mode of functioning of the mass media, nationalism as an implicit criterion on the level of content, begun to operate as the lowest common denominator in terms of which the broadcasting agencies conduct their free-enterprising market competition. This is particularly evident when considering the fact that many political journalists, a lot of whom combine amateurism with excessive zeal, go about their work thinking that offering competitive service in the interest of their country amounts to covering events in the most "patriotic" of spirits.

This dynamic interplay between competing mass media triggers cycles of interactions, which tend to generate amplifications of nationalist images and a drive towards a crystallising consolidation of nationalist stereotypes. Nationalism, in effect, colours to a lighter or heavier degree, explicitly or implicitly, from the most extreme church-owned media to the milder semi-public agencies. In this regard, the critical insight that the "freedom" of the mass media need not necessarily lead to a democratisation of public opinion is particularly confirmed when open competition among the media is undertaken in terms of a general nationalism, which more than any other image typifies public culture (Ellul 1965, pp. 232-235).

In any case, the standardisation of communication between the two communities through the mass media and the nationalist stereotypes leads also to a unique form of alienation in self-communication. It concerns the fact that the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots have each created for the most part two languages. One

is a nationalistically predetermined public language, and the other is a personal, private language. This is a condition which normally appears in social groups which live and communicate in and through systems of mass propaganda (Ellul 1965, p. 207).

However, concerning the matter of peace, the essential in this dualism is that while in the public language and culture are projected the expected nationalist, monolithic stereotypes, in the private word and thought there often exists genuine soul-seeking, agony, self-reflection, acknowledgements of faults and a longing for peace. But the messages of private thinking, which are far more sensitive and consenting compared to those of the public word, never reach the other community, precisely because they are eclipsed and annihilated by the public word. What is interesting, but also tragic for the issue of peace, is that whatever positive experiences of symbiosis and peaceful co-existence between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots may have been inherited, they are restricted to people's private and personal memory. While, due to the impact of nationalism, these personal memories are essentially absent from the public and formal collective memory which is reflected in Cypriot general culture. For true to the esoteric logic of nationalism, the part of public culture which refers to the relationship between Greeks and Turks is constituted abstractly, utilising solely the negative "material" of history. This holds true for the public culture of both ethnic communities in Cyprus. The difference lies in the fact that in the Greek-Cypriot community censorship occurs as private thought is processed more indirectly through the power of public, nationalist thought, whereas in the Turkish-Cypriot community it is imposed in a more direct and authoritarian way by the nationalist régime of the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish administration.

An imminent danger which is already in sight, derives from the fact that with the proliferation of electronic means, the messages and images of the mass media are beginning to saturate society. As the abstract culture of mass communication surpasses the stage of mere information and becomes established as a comprehensive and all-inclusive mental environment, the dynamic of this resultant public culture will have the tendency to swallow and eradicate private and personal opinion, thought and inner independence (Ellul 1965, pp. 165, 169-171; Meyrowitz 1985, p. 16). And if the public culture of mass communication becomes identified, among other things, with the reign of nationalist stereotypes, then the possibilities for communication, and consequently for mutual understanding, between the two communities will radically disappear. And along with this, peace will appear as an untenable reality, as an illusory goal.

This issue of mass culture is particularly crucial for the post-1974 generation of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, as it involves youths who stand historically suspended between two realities. On the one hand, while they have no personal experience of the violence of the past, they also had no positive experience of symbiosis with their counterpart in the other community. But on the other hand,

they stand open, exposed and susceptible to a nationalist oriented mass culture, not to mention mass education, in relation to which the new generation has no way of conducting its personal reality-test.

All the above indicates that reinforced and direct interpersonal contact between the two communities constitutes one of the most essential elements and catalysts for improving the conditions and possibilities for communication. This however has never been pursued publicly, formally and systematically. With the exception of some marginal political groups, its task has been left for the most part to the private initiative of citizens. To those who are always left exposed to the reactionary criticisms of nationalists from whom the leadership of the two communities never managed to become decisively disengaged. All those who fiercely object to interpersonal contact, either indirectly through a portion of Greek-Cypriot public opinion, or more directly through intervention from the Turkish-Cypriot administration, understand, perhaps, the positive power of interpersonal contact. For certainly, the enhancement and entrenchment of positive contacts would leave the most nationalistically inclined person in each community exposed to their own insufficiency through their enslavement to permanent animosity.

#### The Preservation of the Conflictual Relationship

Yet another factor of alienation lies in the fact that the conflictual relationship between the two communities has become institutionalised and is maintained both as an experience and as a value in the prevailing establishment of Cypriot society. The Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots continuously, and in a variety of ways, invest materially and psychologically in sustaining the conflict. Already, since decades ago, they have invested human lives and blood. Today they continue to invest millions in armaments. Moreover, they invest knowledge, energy, time and the most formative years of all their youths, who are obliged to do compulsory military service. Education, the means of mass communication, most political speeches, even cultural expressions, all these, are oriented to the pain and the injustice, but also to the consolidation and the reproduction of the conflictual relationship between the two communities, and beyond, between the two respective nations. The pain and grief of the past, while certainly touching the human dimension of the problem, are assimilated and transformed by nationalism into a justification for prolonging and intensifying animosity and the authoritarian type of attitude, especially in the collective mentality of the younger generations. Increasingly, the manner in which the mass media process and project the Cyprus problem, tends to convert the search for justice into a catalyst for enhancing an aggressive, violent and militarist spirit. This reinforces not so much the physical, but the invisible psychological wall which divides the two communities.

Especially with the re-emergence of nationalism in the 1990s, one observes that conflictual prototypes, extreme warlike speeches, and perceptions begin to permeate Cypriot culture, distancing yet further the worlds of the two communities.

This is particularly evident in the repeated paralysis, and often absolute impasse, experiences on the formal political plane, which is not solely due to factors within the diplomatic sphere. All along, the orientation of society as a whole tended towards conflict while awaiting for a handful of politicians to find a solution. Ironically, the current relapse of explicit nationalism is occurring at a time which the confluence of certain international events, particularly vis-à-vis the European Union, seem to favour the reaching of a political settlement.

The spirit of nationalism presents, possibly, the most comprehensive and complete perspective of the adversarial mentality. For in the absence of restraining exogenous factors, it naturally leads to absolute confrontation between the two communities, as it intensifies suspicion and anger through its inherent irrationalities. Due to its narcissistic and utopian nature, nationalism creates an insurmountable contradiction between the public culture it influences on the one hand, and the diplomatic effort on the other. In essence, it concerns the radical discrepancy between ideology, or better, myth and reality.

For example, while in formal politics the Greek-Cypriots espouse a bizonal, bi-communal federation, extreme nationalism declares that all of Cyprus is Greek. In politics the Greek-Cypriots claim that they desire the restoration of the Cyprus Republic, but nationalism exhibits symbols and slogans which undermine and nullify the independent state status of Cyprus. While in diplomacy it is asserted that the sole objective is the settlement of the problem through negotiations, nationalism and the culture it represents utters triumphant words in warmongering speeches and in documentaries on ethnic "epics" depicting idealised military virtues, even with the sanction of the Orthodox Church. There is a determined pursuit of gaining entry into the European Union, but nationalism is preconditioned by visions of a monoethnic state. The term "union" and related words, have since 1974 been dropped from the formal political vocabulary of the Greek-Cypriots. Nationalism between, shapes and conditions behaviour in such a way as to give the impression that Cyprus is but a province of Greece. In formal politics there is an appeal to "human rights" for each and every citizen, but in the nationalist mentality pervades a chauvinistic and xenophobic tendency which rejects, in advance, the "other", which happens to be culturally different. There is a conscious pursuit of aligning social institutions to the European model, while nationalism enhances ethnocentric and monoethnic public education.

#### **The Comprehensiveness and Transcendence of the Spirit of Peace**

In contrast to the collective narcissism and absolute egocentrism of the nationalist mentality, the spirit of peace follows the comprehensive approach to the phenomenon of human conflict, in a manner that embraces impartially all the antitheses and ambiguities of the problem. The spirit of peace transposes the historical events into a new perspective, with the courage to reorder and redefine the injustices and the violence, whatever their origin, while simultaneously

acknowledging the need for justice for any and all concerned. This transposition presupposes a transcendent stance, within a hard, and certainly painful realism, simultaneously intertwined with an all-embracing compassion founded on inner spiritual strength (King 1982, pp. 9, 15-16). Moreover, it also entails a coming to consciousness of the fact that protracted animosity and conflict with "the other" is directly linked to inner tensions and conflicts within one's very own self (Sandole 1993, p. 16). This understanding outlines a new form of struggle which requires far more existential courage than the type which is propagated by the idealised, militarist prototypes of nationalism. And this is precisely because the struggle in the spirit of peace battles not only one, but two enemies. One is the evil and the injustice that has been induced by the "the other", by the side of the opponent. The other enemy is the evil and the injustice that has been committed by oneself, by one's own group. In the battle for peace therefore, one front is outside and the other front is within oneself, where one has no face to confront one's own hatred, one's own instinct for vengeance, one's own fanaticism, one's own nationalism.

What does this form of struggle for peace mean in practice for Cyprus? If the Greek-Cypriots in the spirit of peace, are to oppose the illegal Turkish-Cypriot state and the régime of occupation in the north, they must at the same time convince all concerned by word, actions, deeds and especially by attitude, that the Turkish-Cypriots are exposed to no physical danger from the Greek-Cypriots. Further, though the Greek-Cypriots may not recognise the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", they may recognise unreservedly the existence of the Turkish-Cypriot community, with the common but also different cultural elements which characterise it in relation to the Greek-Cypriots. Similarly, if the Greek-Cypriots are concerned to preserve their cultural heritage, (which ought not be confused with the perpetuation of nationalism), they must be simultaneously concerned as a community and especially as civil society, with the conservation of the cultural heritage of all the ethnic groups of Cyprus, including that of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The preservation of cultural heritages cannot in essence be achieved through antagonistic relations, precisely because the conflictual nature of the antagonistic spirit falsifies civilisation. For as it ushers into civilisation primitive drives, aggressive instincts, mass excitations, militarism, chauvinism and the fanatical personality, it proceeds to exalt them, establishing them as socially acceptable virtues. This transformation of destructive primitive urges to accredited popular values has always been a constitutive part of the legacy of every kind of nationalism.

Again, within the meaning of the struggle for peace, if the Greek-Cypriots are to enhance the human rights of their own community at those junctures where they have been undermined, where Greek-Cypriots have been pained and have lamented, they must also support the human rights of the Turkish-Cypriots respectively, precisely at those points where, in their own unique historical experience, they too have been hurt and have lamented, both as individuals and as

a collective. This posture constitutes one of the imperative requirements for any person or movement worthy of struggling for peace if the Greek-Cypriots genuinely aim at the reunification of the island, they ought to strive to reconnect with the Turkish-Cypriot community through a renewed relationship of peace and tolerance. In other words, the peace-maker must cross the "green line" first within himself, if he desires to cross it geographically, let alone if he hopes for its dissolution altogether. Here is precisely where the vanity of nationalism hinges, in that while it demands a political solution, it does not seek peace, and while it feeds hatred, it wants reunification. A position doomed to failure, since it inevitably discloses an indiscriminate and provocative insincerity, the result of which can only be the further reinforcement of tension and conflict. Peace requires a spirit capable of cultivating psycho-human living-space in relation to "the other". It entails a struggle for the capacity to include "the other" as an element in one's own psyche, in one's language, in one's attitude. It requires that one gives the "other" a place in one's existential space and experience, in contrast to the absolutism of nationalism, which, on all levels, excludes and targets "the other" and "the different". Particularly in light of the globalization process of the pending 21st century, this issue is of crucial significance. For under the new conditions which are emerging internationally, the continuity of different societies and cultures, not excluding Greek and Turkish, will increasingly depend, not so much on the capacity for survival from within, but on the potential for symbiosis with the other.

Finally, it is only through the spirit of peace that the Greek-Cypriots may offer the Turkish-Cypriots an authentic way out from their guilt, which unconsciously and often consciously haunts them, as well as from their fears and insecurities, which condition them into their introverted defensiveness. But also on the political plane, it is solely in and through the same mode of peace that the Greek-Cypriots may offer the Turkish-Cypriots, not only formally and diplomatically, but also realistically, the historical possibility of disengaging themselves from their radical dependency on an illegal state and on the military might of Turkey. Beyond this, the development of a public mentality of peace strips naked all those who conceal ulterior motives, and dissolves every pretext which third parties may exploit to the detriment of Cyprus. And the repercussions of this renewing dialectical relationship which emerges from the deliberations of peace, will no doubt be enormous in benefits for the Turkish-Cypriot and the Greek-Cypriot communities alike. This is so, because only in the all-embracing spirit of peace can the adversarial relationships, the authoritarian personality and conflict-habituated culture commence entering the process of essential transformation. We are referring to a process similar to what has begun, but certainly has not been completed, in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and that between blacks and whites in South Africa. Moreover, it is this all-embracing peace mentality which starts bridging the two contradictory perceptions of history and the two subjective experiences of what constitutes justice, which confusingly reign in protracted conflictual relationships. Even more essential, is that in this manner, only the spirit of peace is capable of dissociating the human pain of the past and

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legitimate human needs from their exploitation by nationalism with its related extremism and aggressiveness.

A fundamental issue for reflection for all those who are engaged in the struggle to transcend the chasm created by conflict, hatred, violence and suspicion, concerns the link between peace and justice. The most common, that without the realisation of justice there can be no peace. According to this view, the principle condition for achieving peace is the reparation of the evil that has been done, the restoration of the conditions of life as they were. This approach however is always insufficient. In and of itself it never arrives at peace. Outside of the sphere of influence of the will for peace, justice remains at a level of partial and deficient restoration, but at all times stays far from fulfilment as a condition for peace.

Concerning the Cyprus problem, the rendering of justice, even to the greatest possible extent, leaves enormous gaps. For instance, the Cypriot refugee may repossess his home, and the lost properties may be compensated for. But the original way of life, and the dreams associated with it, that have been lost with the passage of time can never be returned, no matter what form of justice is pursued. The fate of many missing persons, from both communities, may be verified, but the numerous innocent people who lost their lives, from both communities, will always remain in the memory of pain. How can one render justice to a family that has lost not only its livelihood, but also its loved ones? Or to a mother who has lost her child, whether Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot? How does one offer justice to a woman that lost her husband? With money? With symbols? With marble statues? Nothing in this mutable world can substitute the loss in all these matters. And precisely at this juncture, justice is mute! Here, both as a possibility and as the avenue to peace, justice is always insufficient. Though necessary within the limits of practical capabilities, it is nevertheless always inadequate in arriving at peace by its own intrinsic means. For, following every historical episode of conflict and violence between adversaries, there results a residue of injustice, that justice, in and of itself, can never redeem. It is the wound which leaves its mark, as it were, no matter how well it heals.

One of the key reasons for this insufficiency derives from the fact that protracted conflictual relationships between rival groups, especially as they pass through incidents of violence, polarise and break up justice. They fragment and dislocate it. Violence always creates a mounting accumulation of irreparable injustices, no matter how necessary the use of violence may appear in the light of momentary historical circumstances. And herein lies the illusion of war as an option.

In protracted conflict with episodes of violence, justice is never entirely with one or the other side. What normally occurs is that in its meaning, justice is interpreted from within the uniqueness of the pain of each side. In Cyprus too, the sense of justice for each community is directly intertwined with, and thus exclusively defined by each one's own traumatic experiences. And it is precisely due to this reason that in any relationship of hostility and conflict justice becomes thoroughly subjectivized.

In other words, the pain and anguish which results from the conflict leads each person and each side to a monopolistic perception of justice, by claiming justice solely in reference to their own experience of loss and suffering. And the greater the suffering the greater the subjectivization of justice, which inevitably results in diametrically opposed positions on what is fair and acceptable. Put simply, the logic of this dynamic functions as follows: "I am hurting and I am suffering. Since I am hurting and suffering, it means that I have been treated wrongly. And since I have been treated wrongly, justice is on my side. And since justice is on my side, then wrongdoing and therefore injustice lies with "the other", with the side of the enemy!" It is in this manner that any history of hateful rivalry between people leads precisely to opposing and contradictory perceptions of justice. Here is revealed yet another aspect of alienation in the relationship of conflict, in that justice assumes an entirely subjective form and meaning. A fact which both enhances and in turn becomes enhanced by non-communication, suspicion and anger, generating frustration.

Most difficult, but also most necessary for peace in Cyprus, is the acknowledgement that in the long history of conflict between the two communities, from the 1950s to 1974 and thereafter, the culprit and the victim alternate, both in the overall pattern of events emerging from the different historical periods, and in the very cycles of the events themselves within each historical period. The tapestry of the history of violence and of ritualised vengeance, on not only the guilty but also on the innocent, is woven in turn and simultaneously by each of the communities and their respective "motherlands". Thus understood, the quest for justice cannot be pursued as a one-sided affair, nor can justice of itself rectify the evils committed.

The suggestion thereby is that peace, as mentality and as will, leads and transcends justice, while it simultaneously grounds it and completes it. The key to the matter lies in the profound fact that peace opens up the possibilities of life, vitality and creativity far beyond the benefits of retribution or of the defeat of the "enemy". This priority of peace is imperative because only in the spirit of peace, as a way of life and as an invaluable principle of life-optimisation can Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots alike generate the inner strength and rationale to shoulder the residue of the pain and the anguish of the past, which justice alone is incapable of rectifying. But even the restoration of any justice that is objectively possible and viable, such as the justice that is normally sought by formal political diplomacy, even this justice, can attain realisation solely in the spirit and process of peace and reconciliation. In fact it is often the absence of even schemes of fair solutions that appear from a rational point of view as most viable and practical. Conversely, it is the spirit and will for peace that prevents the implementation point of view as most viable and practical. Conversely, in the spirit and perspective of peace, even the most difficult and delicate of resolution schemes may attain implementation and be sustained to fruition.

All of the above hold true precisely because the mentality of and for peace brings the two interpretations of history and the two perceptions of justice within a

single, unified field of thought, in a manner which commences the bridging process. Once this process sets in, the persuasive will for peace, manifested simultaneously through individual and collective means of expression, could substantially contribute in reducing suspicion and building confidence and trust. Be it initiated by political decision, and a subsequent institutionalisation of the process, or by a general socio-cultural momentum for change, it is only in and through this peace-generating process, that Cypriot Greeks and Turks may become liberated from their fear of each other. And it is only then that they may be rendered free from the anxiety and nervousness by which each side holds stubbornly and desperately onto its own weapons, be they military, legal, economic or ideological and psychological as in nationalistic militarism.

In the last analysis, when all the arguments have been given, when all the pressures have been applied, when all the political schemes have been suggested, when all is said and done, it all comes down to a fundamental inner decision, a decision more of the heart than of the mind, where in the end one stakes everything on either choosing the road of conflict or on choosing the road of peace. Though rarely addressed explicitly, this kind of decision is of utmost gravity in both a deeply personal and a general collective way, as it constitutes one of the central conditions determining whether the future will be closing down in further animosity or opening up in revitalising hope.

#### The Price for Peace

The nationalist mind always incites us to take risks of extreme measure, of giving everything in the engaging conflict with "the enemy"; our energy, our wealth, our thoughts, our stamina, our will. And in times of violence or war, it invokes us to offer, as a matter of sacred duty, our very lives, and even more so, the lives of our children. But we ought to ask ourselves: If for rivalry and for war, with all their ambiguous results and tragic side effects, we are to be ready, according to nationalism, to give everything, for peace, what are we ready to offer? What price, what boldness, what courage, what sacrifice is peace worth? It is said that in wars, the Greeks have created epics. For peace is it capable to create epic history? Heroes of war we have in great abundance. but are we capable of nurturing and giving rise to heroes of peace? For the likely event of war we see numerous preparations, investments, scenarios and exercises. For peace, what pre-education do we have, what investments, what preparation, what knowledge? The suffering and anguish of war we generally seem to accept. But can we shoulder the pain for peace? As peace also has its price and its sacrifices. The difference lies in that while the pain of war is a pain of despair and of inner void, the pain for peace is one of profound existential meaning, it is a pain of rebirth, life-giving, akin to that of a woman in labour. All these issues raise fundamental questions as to who we are and what we have become as human beings through our socialisation into the adversarial mentality of a conflict-habituated culture. They raise questions as to

what we have become, not in our stated priorities, but our lived priorities and values.

In the last analysis, irrespective of the particular form the political solution will take to be mutually acceptable and genuinely viable, the reunification of Cyprus, in effect, passes through peace-making and peace-building between the two communities. One of the chief irrationalities of nationalism, which repeatedly drives history to a *cul-de-sac*, is that it always tends to seek political solution to the conflict without seeking peace and reconciliation. The politics of diplomacy for solving the problem is validated and rendered credible only when it is framed by a spirit of peace, expressed in word, in deed, in social life, in disposition, in culture. A political solution cannot be elaborated exclusively through diplomatic cleverness, nor through fiery nationalist speeches, nor through exhibitions and parades of "victorious" armies. Any genuine solution that would coincide with peace has to be processed through the means and the mind of peace.

The struggle for peace is one of striving for in-depth mutual understanding, beyond and beneath the surface of sated political positions. It is a straining, embracing effort to reconnect with one another through the mode of "relational empathy" (Broome 1993, p. 103). It is a striving for mutual repentance and forgiveness, as the sole means of effectively healing the wounds of the past, of transcending those primitive instincts of reactionary militarism and vengefulness which always lead to new tragedies. It concerns the necessity for inner catharsis from the historical accumulation of numerous evils and sufferings (Fitzgibbons 1986, pp. 629-633; Montville 1993, pp. 117-121). It concerns the cultivation of a peace-loving personality and of a peace-oriented culture, as both a precondition and a finality, for the transformation of society from an order of conflict to an order of peace.

There is much which separates Greek-Cypriots from Turkish-Cypriots. But what we have in common is our tragedy, mutual pain, existential agony and the perpetuating historical dead end. And here is also the starting point from which we ought to initiate the struggle for peace, the humanisation of our relationship, in that we are partners, bound together to a common history of pain and suffering. We must therefore, orient this inevitable partnership to a new realm, that of peace, which is the only one that leads to genuine justification, to existential emancipation and the edification of authentic freedom.

Concluding, it ought to be noted that the restoration of peace simultaneously entails, also, the restoration of the individual, or better of the concrete person, of our very self. For the man who lives in animosity and hatred through a conflictual relationship is also the man who lives a schism within his own soul. He lives a dichotomous life, divided between that part of his self which is human, which pains, which desires, which longs for fulfilment, and that part of his self which feeds on vengeance, fanaticism and aggression. In this perspective, the man who wages war against the enemy, is also waging war against his very self! Thereby, peace

and restoration in our relationship with "the enemy", simultaneously means peace and restoration with and within our own self. It means freedom from the cancerous growths of antagonism, conflict, violence and animosity.

There exists an ancient saying which gives a vivid rendition of the human condition in which evil ways and the predisposition for animosity is perpetuated from generation to generation. It states: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge"! The antidote to this existential impasse is the spiritual and cultural turn towards peace, as the authentic precondition of freedom.

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