



The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries

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ABSTRACT. This article examines a range of potential causal variables of state legitimacy using a globally representative set of 72 countries accounting for 83 percent of the world's population. Major theories of legitimacy determinants are advanced and tested using survey and expert data. Three variables (which measure good governance, democratic rights, and welfare gains) are then chosen from among all strongly correlated variables as being the most plausible basis for a causal theory. The theory is then further tested using 31 pairs of countries with similar income levels and in similar regions, which shows a significant positive correlation between performance and legitimacy. The article concludes with suggestions for further research.

Keywords: • Governance • Legitimacy • Legitimation • Political support • Rights • Universalism • Welfare

Introduction

The causes of state legitimacy are among the central questions of political science. State legitimacy has arguably defined the modern tradition of political philosophy, and it has been central to empirical studies of politics for at least half a century. Until very recently, however, it has been difficult to obtain satisfactory measures of either state legitimacy or of most hypothesized causes. Legitimacy has therefore been the preserve of area knowledge or deductive reasoning, neither of which has provided a suitably general (that is, global) account of legitimacy. Is such a general account possible? If so, what are its contents?

Recent advances in global survey and objective data are allowing researchers to tackle this question for the first time. In another paper, I defend the concept of legitimacy and provide a conceptualization and operationalization of the concept for empirical purposes (Gilley, 2006). In the current article, I explore a list of

hypothesized causes of legitimacy. I find that good governance, democratic rights, and welfare gains provide the most reasonable and robust determinants of legitimacy. In addition, several other social and economic factors (gender equality, economic governance, antiauthoritarian attitudes, and social trust, for example) are important correlates, and probably causes, of legitimacy, although likely mediated by political and economic conditions. In reaching this conclusion, I reject several widely cited sources of legitimacy, among them income equality, regime-conducive attitudes, ethnic homogeneity, and nationalism. Both positive and negative findings should be useful to scholars seeking to understand global patterns of legitimation.

My purpose here is to provide broad descriptive data on cross-national legitimacy and its correlates, and to use this to offer one potential causal theory for further investigation. Cross-national statistics are insufficient for a fully specified model of legitimacy. Yet they are a necessary starting point for such discussions and have thus far been a weak point in the literature on the subject.

I first describe the legitimacy scores derived elsewhere (Gilley, 2006). I then review the existing approaches to cross-national legitimacy and propose a method for investigating the subject. This is followed by a discussion and testing of several socioeconomic and political variables. The results are summarized and plausible causal factors are identified. Lastly, I use paired comparisons of states to see how well the plausible causal factors perform when income and regional variations are eliminated. I conclude with suggestions for further research.

The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a distinct form of political support that concerns evaluations of the state from a public or “common good” perspective (Easton, 1965: 278, 312). Despite long-standing doubts about its coherence or utility (O’Kane, 1993), the concept has survived, even flourished, in both academic work and real-world politics because of its normative basis, and the recurrent importance of normative considerations in political life. I define legitimacy as follows: *a state is more legitimate the more that it is treated by its citizens as rightfully holding and exercising political power.*

This definition contains within it all the substantive elements of the concept itself. It takes all citizens in a state as being the relevant subjects of legitimacy. It takes the state (defined as both processes and institutions as well as norms and ideologies) and how it holds and exercises political power as the relevant object. It takes legitimacy to be a continuous variable, that is, one which admits of degrees. It considers the measurement of legitimacy to depend upon various dimensions of “treatment” by citizens, attitudinal and behavioral, rather than claims by rulers or determinations by outside observers. Last and most important, it embeds the normative orientation of this form of political support into the definition by its use of the term “rightful.”

The precise meaning of rightfulness is the central conceptual challenge of legitimacy. The term is defined by the *Collins Dictionary of the English Language* as meaning “in accordance with what is right, proper, or just,” where “right” means “in accordance with accepted standards of moral or legal behavior, justice, etc.” (Hanks, 1986: 1315 definition 1, 1314 definition 1). Beetham (1991) made a major contribution by clarifying that political rightfulness is made up of three distinct subtypes (legality, justification, and consent), each of which responds to a different aspect of power that is in need of legitimation.

In measuring legitimacy, we have a choice of using constitutive or substitutive indicators, what Bollen and Lennox (1991) call “cause” and “effect” indicators. The former are indicators that together define legitimacy, while the latter are indicators that respond closely to it. Indicators of Beetham’s three subtypes, then, would be constitutive, while hypothesized effects of legitimacy, such as political violence, would be substitutive.

In the other article, I choose the constitutive approach both because of the availability of data and because of the uncertainties about appropriate inter-item correlations for the substitutive approach (Gilley, 2006). I then settle on nine quantitative indicators to measure the subtypes – three for views of legality, four for views of justification, and two for acts of consent. Within the subtypes themselves there is a mixture of constitutive and substitutive indicators. The indicators are summarized in Table 1A of Appendix A. I then select a total of 72 states for which adequate data exist. These countries contain between them 5.1 billion people, or 83 percent of the world’s population in 2001. Just 20 (28 percent) of these countries come from western Europe and the Anglo-American world. Although data are available for more of them, I excluded the smaller states (Iceland, Luxembourg, and so on) in order to ensure a more geographically balanced case selection. Another 22 (31 percent) are from eastern Europe and central Asia. The other 30, or 42 percent of the total, come from Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The diversity of the cases in terms of population, income level, and regime type can be seen from Table 2A of Appendix A.

Lastly, I conceptualize and justify a strategy for aggregation of the data using linear data transformations and theoretical arguments. The chosen aggregation strategy weights justification as 50 percent and legality and consent as 25 percent each of the bottom-line score on a 0–10 scale. The complete list of scores is seen in Table 3A of Appendix A.

Socioeconomic Determinants

The literature on the universal sources of legitimacy, or more general political support for a state (“regime support”), is vast. In his *Systematic Politics*, C.E. Merriam (1945: 31) argued that external security, internal order, general welfare, freedom, and justice were the main ends which empirically led states to enjoy more legitimacy. In the postwar period, sociological accounts of politics added to this list several factors such as social trust, civil society, attitude congruence, and nationalism as plausible hypotheses of legitimacy. Lastly, the rational choice revolution added hypotheses about economic growth and personal financial satisfaction. In order to move quickly to results, we need to make an unavoidably whirlwind tour of this vast terrain.

Much of the literature on legitimacy has focused on how particular social and economic conditions lead people to treat their states as being more legitimate. Indeed, with the rise of sociological and economic perspectives in the 1960s, this realm of factors came to dominate the study of politics, at least until the turn of the century.

Of all the descriptive factors we might consider, *income levels* remain the richest and most robust. The reasons are obvious: as the core claim of modernization theory, growing income is believed to bring a syndrome of changes in economic, social, and political realms that, when seized by conscious minds, leads to better outcomes that generate legitimacy. In particular, higher income translates into

higher *welfare levels* in areas such as health, education, and consumption (United Nations Development Programme, 1996). Among the dimensions of welfare that might be most relevant are *education levels*, since these are both a welfare good as well as a means to better legitimacy judgments. Conversely, a long tradition in comparative politics has argued that “relative deprivation” in welfare, as reflected in measures of *poverty* and *inequality*, is what degrades legitimacy and triggers rebellion (Gurr, 1971; Solimano, 1998). Additionally, it has been argued that *gender inequality* is delegitimizing, especially as incomes rise, not only because of its direct impact on half the population, but also because of its broader dependence on social hierarchy and repression (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

The dynamic interpretation of the hypotheses above would hold that as welfare rises on various dimensions, so too does legitimacy. A large literature in political economy has explored how short- or medium-term fluctuations in *economic growth* can have a profound effect on regime support (Clarke et al., 1993; Finkel et al., 1989). Alternatively, it has been argued that broader measures of *welfare gains* can explain changes in legitimacy (Haggard, 1990; Przeworski, 1991). Within this, *poverty reduction* might be thought to be most important.

Sociopsychological factors have been widely studied as sources of legitimacy. Political psychology studies have shown that feelings of personal self-esteem or *life satisfaction* may be a good predictor of political evaluations – what Lane famously called “the halo effect” (Lane, 1962: 91–2; Radcliff, 2001). A more pecuniary version of life satisfaction is average levels of *personal financial satisfaction*. In this version of rational choice theory, individuals believe states to be legitimate the more that they perceive themselves to be prospering. Specific research in this vein is abundant. There is some evidence that in the decade after communism in eastern Europe and in late authoritarian Taiwan, for example, such “pocketbook” approaches to state legitimacy were widespread (Munro, 2002; Yang, 2005).

In the 1990s, a new literature argued that higher levels of *social trust* or *social capital* were related to greater legitimacy by delivering social cooperation, civic engagement, empathy for fellow citizens, and reciprocity norms (Coleman, 1990; Fukuyama, 1995; Kunioka and Woller, 1999; Putnam, 1993). A strong version of this thesis would hold that greater levels of *national pride* help states to be more legitimate because they can wrap themselves in this national halo effect (Snyder, 2000).

A separate literature has focused on specific political attitudes and their potential role in legitimation. It has been argued that legitimacy is dependent on underlying individual attitudes about *political interest* and efficacy. The more engaged that people are with politics, the more likely they are to see the state as legitimate. Weatherford (1992) found that individuals’ political interest and sense of civic duty in the USA strongly influenced their willingness to participate in the system, which was a close predictor of legitimacy evaluations.

For other scholars, political attitudes that are supportive of the particular regime in power (*regime-conducive attitudes*) are most important. Eckstein referred to this as the “congruence” theory of legitimacy, which grew out of studies of political culture (Almond and Verba, 1980; Eckstein, 1966, 1979). This hypothesis has latterly been challenged by others (Gunther and Montero, 2000). A refined version would hold that *pro-democratic* or *antiauthoritarian attitudes* are conducive to legitimacy irrespective of the nature of the regime in which they are found (Mishler and Rose, 2001a). A pessimistic view of attitudes would hold that they are merely a reflection of *social deference* caused by ideological hegemony, which is the

key cause of legitimacy. On this view, individuals are caught in webs of “false consciousness” or fear concerning the state, webs spun by manipulative elites who seek selfishly to maintain their perquisites (Dettman, 1974; Saward, 1992; Tilly, 1985). What gives rise to legitimacy is not conscious judgment, but unconscious brainwashing.

The brute facts of geography and demography have been seen as important causes of legitimacy variations. Some have argued that larger polities are prone to less legitimacy because of the well-known problem of *population size* (Diamond, 1999: Ch.4; Le Roy, 1995). Another argument holds that *ethnic homogeneity* will enhance legitimacy by making it easier for a state to embody particular ethnic values. If the state was seeking “congruence” with underlying cultural values, then this would be easier if those values were largely homogeneous, such as where they derive from shared ethnic identity (Svrakov, 1979). Much of the ethnic conflict literature has drawn attention to how “plural” and “divided” societies are prone to conflict and instability because of the difficulties of constructing a political system that is seen as legitimate to all parties (Horowitz, 2000; Young, 1976).

Lastly, some regions may be more likely to enjoy legitimate states, and others less likely. Perhaps such *regional effects* are because some regions are heirs to particular cultural values that lend themselves to legitimacy, as Huntington’s (1996) thesis about *western culture* suggests, for example. Others may suffer from deep-rooted divisions between state and society such that legitimacy is always going to suffer – a claim variously made, in particular, by area specialists of the Middle East (Hudson, 1977), Latin America (Horowitz, 1969; Nolan-Ferrell, 2004), Africa (Englebert, 2000), eastern Europe (Ramet, 1999), China (Zhong, 1996), or wider Asia (Alagappa, 1995; Compton, 2000).

Political Determinants

Political factors are the second main group of hypothesized sources of state legitimacy. In recent studies, the importance of political factors has been shown to overwhelm the sorts of socioeconomic factors mentioned above (Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Evans and Whitefield, 1995; Lillbacka, 1999; Miller and Listhaug, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2002; Norris, 1999; Vassilev, 2004). As Diamond summarized: “The growing evidence from many countries and regions suggests that, in forming beliefs about regime legitimacy, citizens weigh independently – and much more heavily – the political performance of the system” (1999: 192).

One baseline way to conceptualize political performance is the ability of the state to continue functioning – what might loosely be called *political stability*. A long tradition in comparative politics has argued that it is the ability of the political system to hold together or remain dominant over rival social organizations in the face of socioeconomic change that is the greatest virtue of any state (Fukuyama, 2005). An alternative formulation of this thesis focuses on the quality of governance offered by political institutions, not just their stability. Several studies have identified the *control of corruption* as an important factor (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Seligson, 2002). Others have found the closely related concept of the *rule of law* to be salient, indeed this hypothesis can be traced back to Weber (Ackerman, 1991). Another Weberian thesis holds that an *effective bureaucracy* can enhance legitimacy (Huntington, 1968), perhaps by improving the credibility and fairness of public policy and aiding economic growth and poverty

alleviation (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Henderson et al., 2003). The same merits have often been attributed to *decentralization* and *federalism* within states (Henderson and Arzaghi, 2005; Jennings, 1998).

Some scholars have placed more weight on the specifically economic dimension of political institutions. The *economic stability* of property rights and financial institutions as well as *market-oriented economic governance* and *private economic ownership* have all been seen as legitimacy enhancing because of their role in both economic freedom and growth (Armijo and Faucher, 2002; Hayek, 1994; Mandelbaum, 2002). It is notable that the hypothesis of market-friendly (or “neoliberal”) economic policy has been challenged by many critics who argue that it is in fact a source of illegitimacy, a critique that is deeply rooted in Marx’s analysis of capitalism (Chua, 2003; Wolfe, 1977).

The notion of *democratic rights* as the key source of legitimacy was the central empirical claim of mainstream, liberal political philosophy in the 20th century (Falk, 1995; Fukuyama, 1992; Rawls, 1993; Shapiro, 2003). This has been accompanied since the late 1970s by a large empirical literature that substantiates the claim (Bendix, 1978; Dahl, 1998; Diamond, 1999). Rose and Mishler, confirming their earlier qualitative work, find in two large studies that civil liberties and political rights rank as the top or near-top sources of political support (Mishler and Rose, 2001b; Rose et al., 1998). Even in the turbulent aftermath of the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, the provision of democratic rights exerted a profound impact on regime support (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1999).

In authoritarian states where the government of the day has “captured” the state, the overlap of government legitimacy and state legitimacy is tautological. However, in democratic states where the two are separate, the overlap is an empirical question. In some instances, it appears that state legitimacy may be greater when *government support* is greater (Rose, 1994; Weatherford, 1987). Others have found that citizens in countries without state capture make a clear separation between the two (Lillbacka, 1999; Muller et al., 1982).

Lastly, in recent years, new movements have drawn attention to the global political performance of each state. To an increasing degree, it has been argued, state legitimacy depends upon how well states fulfill their obligations to the rest of the world. Among these obligations, *foreign economic assistance* (Pogge, 2002) and *environmental governance* may loom the largest (Frickel and Davidson, 2004).

Methods

We have, then, 34 potential causal variables covering a range of political, social, and economic hypotheses concerning state legitimacy. The most common method for handling a large number of variables is to use multiple-regression models to identify the variables that are the strongest predictors of the outcome to be explained. However, multiple regression relies upon a core set of assumptions that are extraordinarily difficult to meet in the case of the variables studied here. In only a few cases would it be possible to ensure that the explanatory variables were chronologically prior to the legitimacy scores. In addition, the deep interrelation (or multi-collinearity) of many of the explanatory variables means that the significance level of the coefficients would be reduced (possibly eliminating some altogether). Lastly, measurement errors in any one variable unpredictably bias the coefficients of other variables. These issues in social inquiry have recently been dealt with at length elsewhere (Brady and Collier, 2004).

The alternative approach is simply to consider the bivariate correlations to legitimacy of each of the variables. However, this leaves open what is arguably at least as important a question for a social scientist, namely, the magnitude of the potential causal relationships (the slope of the regression line). Thus, a middle-range solution is to transform the variables into a common scale and use bivariate regressions to obtain comparable sets of correlations and slope estimates. Beyond that, the selection of particular variables as part of a causal hypothesis will rely both upon the broad ranking of the bivariate relationships as well as supplementary statistical and qualitative investigation. This is the approach I adopt here. (See Appendix B for a discussion of data sources and transformation as well as tests to ensure separation of the explanatory and dependent variables.)

Results

Bivariate regression on transformed scores for each of the 34 variables allows us to reject seven hypotheses of legitimacy. Those variables which fail to show any significant correlation or slope coefficient (stated in terms of their hypothesized positive impact on legitimacy) are:

- Income equality
- Social deference
- Ethnic homogeneity
- Nationalism
- Small population
- Western culture
- Regime-specific attitudes

These negative findings are themselves important, since they allow us to be more definitive: they are not universal legitimacy sources based on the measurements used here. This, of course, does not rule out the possibility (indeed, it is almost certainly true) that in different states during this and other times these factors have been important sources of legitimacy. But as general accounts of state legitimacy for the early 21st century they fail.

By contrast, 28 socioeconomic and political variables have significant slope estimates (at or above the 95 percent level) and varying levels of explained variation. Table 1 summarizes these findings. The variables (26 in total as a result of one grouped variable) are ranked by importance using the product of the closeness (explained variation or the square of the correlation coefficient r) and the magnitude (standardized estimate) of the relationship.

Several conclusions can be made about these findings. For one, there are indeed significant universal correlates, and within them presumably causes, of subjective legitimacy evaluations. This counts as evidence against two claims: that legitimacy has purely local causes that cannot be captured by cross-national concepts or variables (Alagappa, 1995; Schatzberg, 2001) and that there is such heterogeneity within each state on what counts toward legitimacy as to make national aggregates useless (Migdal, 2004). To find out precisely how much variation in legitimacy we can explain through the sorts of universal factors above, we can use a multiple-regression model, which remains a good estimator of overall explained variation despite its problems with coefficient estimates. Using the top nine variables with more than 50 cases each, we get an adjusted r -squared of 0.67.

TABLE 1. *Summary of Bivariate Relationships (Ranked by Importance)*

Explanatory variable (ranked by product of r-squared and coefficient)	R-squared (0 to 1)	Standardized coefficient (0 to 1)	Variable type
Income level	0.47	0.44	Economic
General governance	0.53	0.36	Political
Foreign aid	0.42	0.45	Political
Gender equality	0.47	0.39	Social
Welfare level	0.46	0.37	Economic-social
Economic governance	0.45	0.35	Political-economic
Antiauthoritarian attitudes	0.39	0.38	Social
Political stability	0.43	0.34	Political
National happiness	0.42	0.35	Social
Welfare gains	0.35	0.39	Economic-social
Democratic rights	0.38	0.30	Political
Social trust or social capital	0.29	0.30	Social
Poverty reduction	0.29	0.28	Economic
Support for government	0.26	0.28	Political
Poverty level	0.24	0.26	Economic
Non-Latin American or non-eastern European	0.36	0.16	Social
Economic stability	0.21	0.27	Economic-political
Income growth	0.17	0.29	Economic
National financial satisfaction	0.20	0.22	Economic
Electoral federalism	0.07	0.43	Political
National interest in politics	0.11	0.19	Social
Private ownership	0.13	0.16	Economic-political
Education level	0.11	0.18	Social-economic
Democratic attitudes	0.09	0.16	Social
Environmental sustainability	0.06	0.14	Economic-political
Decentralization	0.06	0.14	Political

When we exclude income levels, the explained variation stays the same. Put another way, universal factors appear able to explain roughly two-thirds of the variation in legitimacy levels across states. Only one-third can be attributed to local or contextual causes. Legitimacy is not a purely local affair.

Of course, some of these factors (social trust or national happiness) are more local in meaning than others (democracy rights or welfare levels). The Latin American and eastern European regional effect is purely local. But that perhaps is only a reminder of the disutility of thinking in terms of the universal–contextual binary. Most causal factors will almost always have both universal and contextual interpretations (Nathan, 2001).

Second, if the social sciences were ever in danger of losing sight of politics, then they should not be any more. The evidence of the importance of political factors is important for the justification of political science, which in recent decades had been in danger of losing sight of politics in the search for general models of social causation. Political variables easily hold their own against social and economic variables when studied in this context. Legitimacy, and with it the study of politics,

cannot be reduced to fixed socioeconomic conditions. It depends as much on what happens within the political realm itself – on leaders, actions, and ideas.

More broadly, the results here amount to an affirmation of the very notion of legitimacy itself, in two respects. First, the results confirm the idea that citizens evaluate their states partly based on some notion of “performance” over which the state might be expected to exert some influence. Second, while economic variables such as personal financial satisfaction and political variables such as government support both prove important, common-interest orientations about governance, rights, and gender equality prove to be even more important. In the end, the “rational choices” made about legitimacy by global citizens are shown to be strongly social and nonmaterial.

Toward a Causal Theory

In order to establish which of the 26 variables can be the basis for a causal theory, we need to rely on both qualitative and statistical arguments. Three of the factors can be dismissed without much ado. The government-support indicator seems to be serving as a tautology of legitimacy levels since half of the cases it covers are authoritarian regimes. We can also rule out the regional effect of being a state in Latin America or eastern Europe because it is by definition nonuniversal, or, better put, it is non-replicable. Both of these variables, in any case, rate in the lower half of all variables. The foreign aid finding is too uncertain to be included because of the small number of cases.

Next, we can eliminate the 10 lowest ranked variables, not because they may not be causal, but because their explanatory power is so limited. Some of these findings are still interesting merely for showing *any* positive relationship to legitimacy levels, because it has been argued that they degrade legitimacy (private ownership) or do not affect it at all (environmental sustainability, education, and political interest). The others are interesting precisely because their explanatory power is so limited despite large scholarly literatures that argue they should be more important (economic growth, financial satisfaction, democratic attitudes, federalism, and decentralization).

Three main social variables (antiauthoritarian attitudes, national happiness, and social trust and social capital) prove to have strong and large ties to legitimacy. They appear to represent quite distinct and equally important dimensions of legitimacy as well, all cross-correlating at only the $r = 0.2$ to $r = 0.4$ range. The question is whether they are largely free-standing or whether they are largely mediated by political or economic conditions. A recent boom in “happiness studies” has identified several free-standing sources of personal happiness, among them religious faith, family life, and personal friendships (Layard, 2005). Alternatively, there is growing evidence that national levels of happiness are closely correlated to political factors such as democratic rights and governance, in addition to welfare gains (Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2001; Radcliff, 2001). We can test which of these explanations correlates better to our happiness scores using national-level aggregates from the World Values Survey for the importance of religion, family, and friends and our own indicators for governance, rights, and welfare gains. This yields the correlations shown in Table 2.

This suggests that the sorts of political and economic performance captured in other variables in Table 1 are more important to happiness than any free-standing social sources. Likewise, antiauthoritarian attitudes and social trust seem

TABLE 2. *Correlates of National Happiness*

Religion	-0.14
Family	0.25
Friends	0.44
Rights	0.44
Governance	0.58
Welfare Gains	0.65

inexplicable apart from the political variables that might be more important causes of the acceptance of political community that they represent, such as good governance (both correlated at around $r = 0.55$) and rights protection (both around $r = 0.30$). Despite the large literature on antiauthoritarian attitudes in democratic transitions and on social trust in democratic deepening, one must assume that they are mainly by-products of other legitimacy-enhancing measures (Van Deth, 2000).

Lastly, I want to put aside income levels (GDP per capita), not because it tells us too little about causal factors, but too much. Rolled up into any state's income levels are a syndrome of choices over a whole range of variables for which income levels are only a proxy, from better governance to reduced poverty to enhanced education. For example, we know that higher levels of income lead to more democracy (Boix and Stokes, 2003). That is why when we excluded income from the multiple regression above, we still explained exactly the same proportion of variation in legitimacy differences. The state's mediation of the resources available in a society are crucial to the legitimacy that results, even if the probability of successful mediation becomes higher and higher as income levels rise. We know that national levels of household financial satisfaction are only loosely correlated to national income levels ($r = 0.62$), so it must somehow depend on how those income levels are used that matters. Mishler and Rose (2001a: 311) find that the objective income levels of individual respondents have only a very small impact on their support for a regime. Likewise, in the 1999–2002 World Values Survey, people who belonged to self-described low-income households were only slightly less inclined to express themselves as “very” or “rather” satisfied with democratic development in their country than those in middle- or high-income families (48 percent versus 49 percent and 52 percent, respectively). That implies that the close macro-level correlation between income and legitimacy is *not* a result of those income levels, but of other factors at work which are associated with higher income. Nonetheless, we will return below to consider whether holding income levels constant affects the explanatory power of the chosen variables.

Governance, Rights, and Welfare

This leaves us with nine variables that may plausibly be taken as causal of legitimacy in the sense of factors that are the critical intervening variables that lead to higher levels of legitimacy. They can be grouped under three conceptual headings: governance, rights, and welfare. Since poverty levels and gains are part of the definition of welfare levels and gains, and since they perform less well, I will exclude them. We then have seven variables with correlations (average inter-item correlation for the governance group) among group members indicated as follows:

1. Governance: general governance, economic governance, and political stability ($r = 0.83$).
2. Rights: gender equality and democratic rights ($r = 0.80$).
3. Welfare: welfare level and welfare gains ($r = 0.68$).

General governance (a composite of the rule of law, control of corruption, and government effectiveness) clearly has a large, even overarching, importance in global citizen evaluations of the legitimacy of states. Its strength furnishes evidence in support of the recent boom in governance studies. In addition, the strength of the economic governance variable suggests that properly managed market reforms have enhanced, not diminished, the legitimacy of states, even in Latin America (Armijo and Faucher, 2002). For the sake of parsimony, we can let the general governance variable represent the two closely related, but lower ranked, variables of economic governance and political stability. Moreover, there is a concern about reverse causality in the case of political stability, which has generally been considered an effect rather than a cause of legitimacy (Huntington, 1971: 314). Nonetheless, any proper qualitative account of legitimacy would have to consider its importance as a cause as well as an effect. Hobbes's belief that the greatest merit of a state was in providing security and stability for its citizens, whose highest interest was self-preservation, finds support here.

Human rights, as expressed in gender equality and civic freedoms, are also a powerful determinant of legitimacy, consistent with a recent wave of research cited earlier. In particular, gender equality may be a critical cause of successful democracy (Fish, 2002) and thus has a greater claim to inclusion as a critical causal variable than the other social variables. Nonetheless, it is already included in both the democratic rights and welfare gains indicators and is to some extent an outcome of such variables. I will therefore use the democratic rights variable to represent this and other rights issues.

In choosing between welfare levels and welfare gains, I exclude the former because of their high correlation to income levels ($r = 0.96$). While it is plausible to consider welfare levels as common-good enhancing, the welfare level indicator is too close to income levels which serve as proxies for a host of other variables. By using welfare gains rather than welfare levels, we also make the story of welfare a dynamic one rather than a static one. This is to be preferred because it allows for the notion of some kind of "performance" that states at all levels of development can aspire to achieve. If legitimacy is about satisfying rising expectations, then the dynamic story must matter more than the static one – thus Japan and Uganda have roughly the same standardized score of 5.6 out of 10.0 on welfare gains for the period in question (1990–2002), although Japan's standardized score on welfare levels is much higher (8.8 versus 2.3).

That leaves us with three variables that can form the basis of a causal hypothesis that is both parsimonious and robust. General governance, democratic rights, and welfare gains are three distinct, politically manipulatable, and strongly correlated factors, all of which have a good claim to being major causes of legitimacy in a cross-national setting.

Perhaps this is no surprise. In fact, perhaps it is a disappointment. After all, this list of substantive ends of government is not very different from those set out by Merriam in 1945, or those set out by many scholars since then. But a few reasons can be given for why this finding is interesting beyond the points already raised: that we have found important universal correlates; that many oft-stated factors fail

to find support here; and that politics and politically mediated social and economic outcomes seem to matter most to legitimacy.

For one, it is notable that democratic rights, while certainly qualifying as one of the most important causes of legitimacy, turn out to be roughly on par with welfare gains, and both of these are far less important than good governance. This clashes with standard liberal treatments of legitimacy that give overall priority to democratic rights. Second, broad and socio-tropic indicators of state effectiveness and material advance, not narrow or egocentric ones, perform best of all. Pecuniary rational choice approaches to legitimacy, whatever their success in particular studies, do not work well at a general level.

Model Discussion

How important are these three variables when taken together? The standard test of this is to use multiple regression. When we include these three variables, we find that democratic rights and welfare gains drop out, leaving only good governance. However, the closeness of these three variables ($\alpha = 0.87$) and causal arguments about welfare gains and democratic rights mean that the predictive model created by multiple regression cannot be taken as the causal story. As an alternative, we construct a composite variable from them. Given the strength and magnitude of the general governance correlation, it should have added weight in the composite variable. Based on their explained variation, a rough weighting of 40 percent for general governance and 30 percent for each of welfare gains and democratic rights is used to construct a composite variable. Regressing this variable against the legitimacy scores for the 63 cases for which we have all three variables yields a coefficient of 0.44 (see Table 3), notably higher than for governance by itself. Explained variation for the composite variable is 58 percent, and in a multiple-regression framework this rises to 59 percent (see Table 3).


As expected, the correlation between our performance composite and GDP per capita is high, at $r = 0.90$. I have already argued that income levels are mediated by the state and are thus not a plausible causal variable, or are a background rather than critical causal variable. One way to test this is to do a multiple regression using two explanatory variables: our composite performance variable and GDP per capita. When we do this, income levels fall out as a significant variable, leaving only our composite variable. The inclusion of income levels does not improve explained variation either. The slope of the regression line, however, falls from 0.44 to 0.38, indicative of the lesser magnitude of the performance variable taken by itself (similar declines would be expected for the other variables in the bivariate cases above).

TABLE 3. *Performance Variables Using Weighted Legitimacy Scores*

Key variable	R-squared (0 to 1)	Standardized coefficient (0 to 1)
General governance	0.53	0.36
Welfare gains	0.35	0.39
Democratic rights	0.38	0.30
Combined	0.58–0.59*	0.44**

Note: * Range of explained variation from aggregate-variable and multiple-regression models.

** Based on aggregate variable with governance weighted at 40 percent and others at 30 percent each.

FIGURE 1. *Legitimacy and Performance**Notes:*

Country Clusters:

- A: Uganda, B: Egypt, C: Indonesia
 D: Columbia, E: Macedonia
 F: Hungary, G: Czech Republic, H: Greece, I: Poland
 J: Belgium, K: Germany, L: Taiwan
 M: Austria, N: Finland
 O: Switzerland, P: New Zealand

The close link between our combined variable and legitimacy can be seen from the scatter plot shown in Figure 1 (which uses income gains for the nine states that lack welfare gains data, the two variables being correlated at $r = 0.75$).

It is notable that there is a modest degree of heteroskedasticity (0.11 or 11 percent) in this model, meaning that 11 percent of the errors are not random, but depend on where a state falls on the line itself. In other words, good performance on these variables appears to be sufficient, but not necessary, for a state to enjoy some modest degree of legitimacy. If we exclude the 21 rich, western countries (including Japan) from the study, we find that explained variation for the model falls to 0.16 ($r = 0.40$), although the coefficient remains large at 0.30 (t-score 3.0). In other words, while the magnitude of the relationship between performance and legitimacy remains mostly intact when we exclude rich countries, the variability of the relationship increases drastically.

At lower performance levels (mostly poor countries), we have what might be called a “zone of hope.” Here low income levels trap states in low performance that leads to low legitimacy. Even if they mediate the available resources as well as

they can (that is, along or slightly above the regression line), they will still suffer from low legitimacy (at least in a relative sense). There is hope, however, as shown by the great variability here. Some countries (Azerbaijan, China, South Africa, the Philippines, and Tanzania) find additional means to generate legitimacy and lie well above the regression line, at modest to high legitimacy levels.

Conversely, there is no corresponding “zone of despair” among high-performance countries (mostly rich ones), notwithstanding a steady stream of warnings about “malaise” or “legitimacy crisis” among them. For the most part, good performance leads to good legitimacy in these states, with little variability to speak of.

What this reminds us of is that in some states there are plausible causal pathways to legitimacy that do not involve these three variables. That is merely to restate that, as a general statement, perhaps a third or more of variation is entirely particular to each country. As income levels rise, however, legitimacy may be closely reliant on performance of this sort.

What does this imply about the frequent invocation of nationalistic, religious, or ideological symbols by states in order to enhance their legitimacy? As a general rule across states, it implies that such actions are at best an inefficient use of resources and at worst misguided. Nationalistic agitation in Zimbabwe and state religious zealotry in India in the 1990s do not appear to have enhanced the legitimacy of these states above their predicted scores. Nonetheless, this is only a general statement reflecting the fact that universal factors explain roughly two-thirds of legitimacy variation. The remaining one-third of variation is significant and that proportion increases as we move into developing countries. In addition, the magnitude of the impact of such factors might be enormous in some states. Certainly, the nationalistic fervor in China in the 1990s that was successfully embraced (even created) by the state partly explains China’s outlier status.

Cases: Paired Comparisons

An alternative approach to the study of the performance variables is to create pairs of countries with similar income levels and from similar regions. Eliminating income and regional differences in this way allows us to see how well our performance variables do on their own, without introducing the problems of regression controls. Table 1C of Appendix C contains 31 pairs of countries, as many as could be reasonably paired, accounting for 62 of the 72 countries studied (using income gains for seven pairs where welfare gains data are missing).

To test how well these controlled pairs perform, we can calculate how well their performance differences correlate to legitimacy differences. As above, we weight governance as 40 percent of performance and democratic rights and welfare gains as 30 percent each. We then calculate the difference between the performance scores for each of the 31 pairs. These differences are then correlated to the legitimacy differences between the pairs. The result is a correlation coefficient of $r = 0.55$. In other words, performance differences for equally wealthy countries in the same region account for 30 percent of the variation in legitimacy differences between those countries, even though we would expect purely contextual factors to be overwhelmingly important in such controlled pairs. In terms of cases, the performance gap is in the same direction as the legitimacy gap in 19 of the 25 pairs (slightly more than three-quarters) for which both gaps are at least 0.1 points.

Given that we acknowledge a large amount of unexplained variation in legitimacy (34 percent), these comparisons are only suggestive and it may be that the differences are in some cases explained by other things – surely in evidence in the outsized Pakistan–Bangladesh legitimacy gap, for example. But what is surprising is how often the paired comparisons confirm the correlative story even when controlling for income levels. The two major exceptions to this hypothesis of legitimation are India–Indonesia and Albania–Ukraine.

In general, then, the chosen variables here perform well in giving us an idea of the kinds of things that global citizens care about in evaluating the goodness of their states. This suggests that the macro-findings are sufficiently robust to allow for more detailed comparisons. In particular, shortcomings in democratic rights are often outdone by superior performance in welfare gains and governance. This is particularly evident in Belarus over Russia and China over the Philippines. In other pairings (for example, Tanzania–Nigeria, Iran–Algeria, Czech–Hungary, and Sweden–Finland), the countries end in almost a dead heat: the mixed performance comparisons of the three variables suggest why that may be the case.

Conclusion

To return to our initial question, the results here furnish evidence that we are finally in a position to undertake cross-national research into the sources of legitimacy. Sorting out the claims of various contending factors is bound to require interpretive argument. Rather than the procrustean assumptions of multiple regression, I used here the much less demanding assumptions of linear data transformation coupled with qualitative arguments and paired cases.

A plausible account thus holds that the better that states do in providing quality governance, democratic rights, and welfare gains, the more they will be able to enjoy the support of their citizens.

Of course, no full account of the legitimacy of states could end with the statistical explorations taken up here. Both case studies and normative accounts are necessary in order to show that the account offered here is suitably robust. Our purpose has been much less ambitious. It has been to explore the broad patterns of correlation between legitimacy and a host of hypothesized causes. This has allowed us to rule out many factors and to get a sense of which others matter more. With more studies and debate, political science will be able to move toward a general account of legitimacy, one of the most elusive, but important questions of the field.

Appendix A: Legitimacy MeasurementTABLE 1. *Indicators Used*

Legitimacy Subtype	Indicator	Source
Views of Legality	Evaluation of state respect for individual human rights	World Values Survey, 1999–2002, Question 173
	Confidence in police	World Values Survey, 1999–2002, Question 152
	Confidence in civil service	World Values Survey, 1999–2002, Question 156
Views of Justification	Satisfaction with democratic development	World Values Survey, 1999–2002, Question 168
	Evaluation of current political system	World Values Survey, 1999–2002, Question 163A
	Satisfaction with operation of democracy	GlobalBarometer regional surveys, 2001–2; EuroBarometer, 2001; EuroCandidate, 2002
	Use of violence in civil protest	World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators IV, 1996–2000
Acts of Consent	Voter turnout	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1996–2002
	Quasi-voluntary taxes	International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Yearbook, 1996–2002

TABLE 2. *Range of 72 Cases by Quintile*

Indicator	First	Second	Third	Fourth	Fifth
Population (millions, 2001)	1.4–4.5	5.2–10.1	10.3–29.6	30.7–69.1	69.3–1,285.2
GDP/Capita (US\$ PPP 2001)	\$520–\$3,520	\$3,600–\$6,110	\$6,890–\$10,170	\$11,290–\$24,180	\$24,430–\$34,320
Regime Type (Freedom House, Political Liberties, 1999)	7–4	4–3	3–1	1–1	1–1

TABLE 3: *Legitimacy Scores (0 to 10)*

Country	Score	Country	Score	Country	Score
Denmark	7.62	Philippines	5.66	Moldova	4.33
Norway	7.61	Japan	5.62	El Salvador	4.27
Netherlands	7.13	Bangladesh	5.58	Latvia	4.16
Canada	7.03	Nigeria	5.56	Bulgaria	4.07
Austria	7.00	South Korea	5.45	Argentina	4.03
Finland	6.98	Czech Republic	5.28	Ukraine	4.02
Sweden	6.93	Morocco	5.25	Romania	3.92
USA	6.82	France	5.24	Serbia	3.89
Azerbaijan	6.78	Poland	5.23	Zimbabwe	3.82
Germany	6.68	Greece	5.22	Mexico	3.55
Belgium	6.64	Hungary	5.21	Bosnia-	
Taiwan	6.62	Brazil	5.19	Herzegovina	3.54
China	6.58	Indonesia	5.05	Turkey	3.39
Ireland	6.48	Uganda	5.05	Albania	3.27
Portugal	6.39	Egypt	5.01	Lithuania	3.22
Australia	6.38	Jordan	4.99	Peru	3.13
Spain	6.28	Slovenia	4.93	Macedonia	2.97
Britain	6.28	Estonia	4.88	Colombia	2.95
South Africa	6.24	Iran	4.72	Georgia	2.90
Uruguay	5.94	Venezuela	4.66	Dominican	
Italy	5.90	Slovakia	4.62	Republic	2.86
Chile	5.81	Croatia	4.62	Armenia	2.83
New Zealand	5.69	Algeria	4.48	Pakistan	2.41
Switzerland	5.68	India	4.46	Russia	2.27
Tanzania	5.67	Belarus	4.41		

Appendix B: Data Sources and Calculations

Data Sources

Antiauthoritarian attitudes: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Average of Questions V154 and V163 concerning strong leadership and opposition to a democratic system.

Decentralization: IMF Government Finance Statistics. Share of central government in total government current expenditure, mostly for 1998.

Democratic attitudes: World Values Survey, 1999–2000. Average of Questions V163 and V157 concerning democracy as better than any other regime and democracy as desirable.

Democratic rights: Freedom House civil liberties score, 1999–2000.

Economic governance: Economic Freedom Index for 2000, Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2004).

Economic stability: IMF International Financial Statistics. Average from 1996 to 2000 (five years) of the “contract-intensive money” indicator, defined as the proportion of broad money (M2) not held in currency outside banks (Clague et al., 1999).

Education levels: log value of the 2001 Education Index, United Nations Development Program.

Environmental sustainability: Environmental Sustainability Index for 2005, mainly referring to 1995–2003 data (Esty et al., 2005).

Ethnic homogeneity: Fearon’s (2003) Cultural Diversity Index.

- Federalism: Database of Political Institutions, 1998 (Beck et al., 2001). Scored for whether state or provincial legislatures and executives are elected. A broader measure used was the Federalism Index for 1995 (Henderson and Arzaghi, 2005).
- Foreign aid: Commitment to Development Index for 2003, which refers mainly to data from 2000 to 2002 (recalculated using a new approach adopted for the 2004 scores) (Roodman, 2004).
- Gender equality: Gender Empowerment Measure, 2004 (referring mainly to 1999–2002 data), United Nations Development Program.
- General governance: World Bank Institute governance indicators for government effectiveness, control of corruption, and the rule of law in 2000 (Kaufmann et al., 2003).
- Government support: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Question Q174 concerning satisfaction with “those in national office.”
- Income equality: share of income or expenditure held by the poorest one-fifth of the population. World Bank (available at www.developmentgoals.org). Data mostly for the period 1997–2001.
- Income growth: annual real growth in GDP per capita in local currency terms between 1990 and 2001. World Development Report. Rates are discounted up to a maximum of 50 percent to take account of the greater growth potential of poorer countries by using the following formula:
- $$\text{Discount} = 1 - 0.5 * ((\text{richest country income} - \text{target country income}) \div \text{richest country income})$$
- Income level: GDP per capita in purchasing-power-equivalent US dollars for 2001. World Development Report.
- National financial satisfaction: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Question V64 concerning personal financial satisfaction.
- National happiness: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Question A172 concerning personal happiness.
- National interest in politics: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Question V133 concerning interest in politics.
- Nationalism: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Question G006 concerning pride in one’s nationality.
- Non-Latin American or non-eastern European: see Regional below.
- Political stability: World Bank Institute Governance Indicators, 2000, Political Stability (Kaufmann et al., 2003).
- Population: National Population, 2001, United Nations Development Program.
- Poverty level: log of under-one infant mortality rate in 2001, World Development Report. Infant mortality rates are considered to be a better proxy for poverty levels than income-based poverty estimates (Finch, 2003; Wang, 2003).
- Poverty reduction: percentage change in log value of the under-one infant mortality rate, 1970–2000, World Development Report.
- Private ownership: share in gross investment of the government or government-owned companies. Economic Freedom Index for 2000, Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2004).
- Regime-specific attitudes: democratic attitudes measured as above. Authoritarian attitudes are simply 10 minus the transformed score for antiauthoritarian attitudes measured as above. I separate the cases into 24 authoritarian regimes (with a Freedom House political liberties rating of 4–7 for 2000) and 48 democratic regimes (a rating of 1–3).
- Regional: I use a dummy variable for each of the six regions (Asia, Africa, Latin America, post-communist Europe, the Middle East, and Anglo-America and western Europe) and control for income levels. This shows similar negative impacts for Latin America and post-communist Europe, but no positive or negative impacts for the other regions. I then produce a single regional-effects estimate by assigning a common dummy variable to states in either Latin America or post-communist Europe.
- Social capital: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Questions concerning time spent with friends and civic groups.

Social deference: World Values Survey, 1999–2000. Question C006 concerning whether one should always follow one’s superior’s instructions.

Social trust: World Values Survey, 1999–2002. Question 25 concerning trust in others.

Welfare gains: percentage change between 1990 and 2002 in the logit value of the Human Development Index calculated by the United Nations Development Program.

Welfare level: Human Development Index, 2000, United Nations Development Program. Logit value.

Western culture: see Regional above.

Transformations

In order to achieve comparability among the independent variables, I transform all of them into a 0–10 scale using means and standard deviations and approximate normal distributions (a multiple of 2.5 in most cases):

$$\text{Transformed Score} = 5 + [(\text{Raw Score} - \text{Mean}) / \text{Standard Deviation}] * \text{Multiple}$$

This gives us the “standardized coefficients.” Using such transformed scores eliminates any connection between the data and underlying cardinal meanings and moves us into the realm only of cross-national comparison. To have an additional point of whatever variable is to say that a country has comparatively moved up the cross-national scale, even if the absolute level of the given variable may have gone down, remained the same, or gone up. However, it is always possible to return to the raw data to get a rough cardinal estimate of the meaning of a one-point rise in the variable, holding constant the values for other countries.

Data Separation

It is important to note the conceptual as well as empirical distinction between the plausible causal variables tested here and the variables used to construct our legitimacy scores. There are four cases where this might appear. In all four cases, the constitutive and causal variables are conceptually distinct. They are also sufficiently empirically distinct, as reflected in tolerance values of more than 50 percent in all cases, as follows:

- Political violence (constitutive) and political stability (causal), where $r = 0.68$
- Views of human rights (constitutive) and rule of law (causal), where $r = 0.55$
- Views of civil service (constitutive) and government effectiveness (causal), where $r = -0.02$
- Election turnout (constitutive) and democratic rights (causal), where $r = -0.26$

Appendix C: Paired Cases

TABLE 1C. *Paired Comparisons of States*

Country	Income Level	Democ. Rights	Welf. Gain	Govern-ance	Overall Perform.	Perform. Gap	Legit. Gap	Legit.
Tanzania	\$520	3.04	1.91	2.61	2.53	0.41	5.67	-0.11
Nigeria	\$850	4.92	3.39	1.11	2.94		5.56	
Bangladesh	\$1,610	3.04	5.14	2.43	3.43	-0.93	5.58	-3.17
Pakistan	\$1,890	1.15	3.96	2.40	2.50		2.41	
Uganda	\$1,490	1.15	5.28	2.50	2.93	-1.99	5.05	-1.23
Zimbabwe	\$2,280	1.15	0.00	1.49	0.94		3.82	
Moldova	\$2,150	3.04	0.00	1.82	1.64	0.77	4.33	-0.44
Serbia/ Yugoslavia	\$2,370	1.15	5.13	1.31	2.41		3.89	
Georgia	\$2,560	3.04	0.27	2.28	1.90	1.31	2.90	-0.07
Armenia	\$2,650	3.04	4.88	2.10	3.22		2.83	
India	\$2,840	4.92	5.03	3.94	4.56	-1.41	4.46	0.59
Indonesia	\$2,940	3.04	5.06	1.81	3.15		5.05	
Egypt	\$3,520	0.00	5.10	4.31	3.25	1.02	5.01	0.25
Morocco	\$3,600	3.04	5.03	4.64	4.27		5.25	
Philippines	\$3,840	4.92	3.98	3.19	3.94	-0.40	5.66	0.91
China	\$4,020	0.00	7.01	3.61	3.54		6.58	
Albania	\$3,680	1.15	6.11	2.12	3.03	-1.22	3.27	0.75
Ukraine	\$4,350	3.04	0.57	1.81	1.81		4.02	
Peru	\$4,570	3.04	4.52	3.18	3.54	0.87	3.13	1.14
El Salvador	\$5,260	4.92	5.34	3.34	4.41		4.27	
Romania	\$5,830	6.80	3.56	2.86	4.25	0.02	3.92	-0.38
Bosnia-Herze.	\$5,970	1.15	10.00	2.33	4.28		3.54	
Iran	\$6,000	0.00	5.81	2.92	2.91	-0.27	4.72	-0.24
Algeria	\$6,090	1.15	4.88	2.07	2.64		4.48	
Macedonia	\$6,110	4.92	2.90	2.86	3.49	0.19	2.97	1.11
Bulgaria	\$6,890	4.92	2.53	3.62	3.68		4.07	
Colombia	\$7,040	3.04	4.67	2.76	3.42	0.57	2.95	2.24
Brazil	\$7,360	3.04	5.34	3.68	3.99		5.19	
Russia	\$7,100	1.15	0.70	1.78	1.27	0.36	2.27	2.14
Belarus	\$7,620	0.00	2.48	2.20	1.62		4.41	
Latvia	\$7,730	6.80	3.34	4.50	4.84	0.20	4.16	-0.94
Lithuania	\$8,470	6.80	3.68	4.76	5.05		3.22	
Uruguay	\$8,400	6.80	4.34	5.83	5.67	-1.91	5.94	-2.39
Mexico	\$8,430	3.04	4.67	3.64	3.77		3.55	
Croatia	\$9,170	3.04	3.93	4.25	3.79	2.04	4.62	0.61
Poland	\$9,450	6.80	5.61	5.27	5.83		5.23	
Chile	\$9,190	6.80	5.81	7.64	6.84	-2.12	5.81	-1.79
Argentina	\$11,320	4.92	5.37	4.07	4.72		4.03	

Country	Income Level	Democ. Rights	Welf. Gain	Govern-ance	Overall Perform.	Perform. Gap	Legit.	Legit. Gap
Estonia	\$10,170	6.80	5.37	6.15	6.11	-0.63	4.88	-0.26
Slovakia	\$11,960	6.80	5.21	4.71	5.49		4.62	
Hungary	\$12,340	6.80	5.46	6.09	6.12	-0.51	5.21	0.07
Czech	\$14,720	6.80	4.63	5.45	5.61		5.28	
South Korea	\$15,090	6.80	7.35	5.47	6.43	0.51	5.45	1.17
Taiwan	\$22,155	6.80	7.93	6.30	6.94		6.62	
Greece	\$17,440	4.92	5.56	6.00	5.54	1.93	5.22	1.17
Portugal	\$18,150	8.69	6.69	7.15	7.48		6.39	
New Zealand	\$19,160	8.69	7.80	9.04	8.56	0.35	5.69	0.69
Australia	\$25,370	8.69	8.92	9.08	8.92		6.38	
Spain	\$20,150	6.80	6.56	8.19	7.29	-0.23	6.28	-1.04
France	\$23,990	6.80	6.32	7.80	7.06		5.24	
Sweden	\$24,180	8.69	8.73	9.37	8.97	-0.38	6.93	0.05
Finland	\$24,430	8.69	7.00	9.71	8.59		6.98	
Germany	\$25,350	6.80	6.75	8.81	7.59	0.83	6.68	0.32
Austria	\$26,730	8.69	7.37	9.00	8.42		7.00	
Belgium	\$25,520	6.80	8.08	7.89	7.62	0.99	6.64	0.49
Netherlands	\$27,190	8.69	7.25	9.56	8.61		7.13	
Denmark	\$29,000	8.69	6.78	9.37	8.39	0.48	7.62	-0.01
Norway	\$29,620	8.69	8.96	8.93	8.87		7.61	
Britain	\$24,160	6.80	8.32	9.32	8.26	0.57	6.28	0.20
Ireland	\$32,410	8.69	9.12	8.73	8.83		6.48	
Canada	\$27,130	8.69	4.96	9.44	7.87	0.07	7.03	-0.21
USA	\$34,320	8.69	6.09	8.78	7.94		6.82	

Note. All scores on 0 (Worst) to 10 (Best); For Welfare Gains, figures in italics are income growth scores.

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