

Deutsch 302 • Wintersemester 2014
Sitzung Nr. 17 • 04.03. • Tagesordnung • assignment & deadlines

Vorige Sitzung: Vokabeln

nearby - in der Nähe; nahe + noun	deswegen - for that reason	Allesfresser - omnivore
hochnasig - stuck up	herablassend - condescending	Menschenfresser - cannibal
pretentious - angeberisch, pompös	bury - begraben (put into the earth); vergraben (hide by burying)	Begräbnis - funeral / burial (blunt term)
Beerdigung - interment	Bestattung - burial (elegant term)	Totenfeier - wake, memorial
Gegenstand - body (physical object)	Körper - body (alive)	Leiche - body/ corpse (also Austrian: wake)
strike - streiken (labor)	körperlich - bodily, corporeal, corporal	Jause - party (Austrian)
strike - Schlag (hit)	strike (delete) - streichen	streichen - stroke (caress); streicheln - pet
common - allgemein (general)	common - gemein (vulgar, widespread)	

Unterlagen u. Grafiken [Zahlen in () beziehen sich auf meine Datenbanksammlung]

Kursbeschreibung

7 Todsünden

Materialien zum Thema Gesundheit, Versicherung, Behinderungen

Schlüsselwort/begriff des Tages / der Woche

entfällt heute

Schwerpunkte (Zeichenerklärung)

- SmallTalk: Nach Wunsch, aber hoffentlich mit unseren Themen verbunden.
- Übung: wie geht es wem?
- Weiter über Unfälle, usw. – eigene Unfälle, Verletzungen, Narben.
- Debriefing: 1) How to express an action that is almost starting but may or may not lead to something else ("I was fixin' to write my homework when..."). 3) How to place one action right after another ("I had just eaten [done et] breakfast when...")
- Unsere Anekdoten über Unfälle usw. wieder erzählen: "Ich wollte gerade...", "Ich war gerade dabei..."
- Debriefing: How to talk about alternative realities - 1) the easy way (what I did [not] do); 2) the hard way (what I might / should /could [n't] have done)
- Und jetzt auf dem abstrakten Niveau: Gesundheit, Sicherheit, Erfolg? Was für eine Rolle spielt das in unseren Zukunftsplänen, und in welcher Bedeutung? Dazu einige Alltagstexte
- Ein bisschen Knigge vielleicht
- SpeakEasy-Sachen: 1) neue Kartenarten; Google-Doc Datei ("Mutter" / "Happy Mother's Day") - die Grußtexte und ihre Probleme / Feiertage und ihre Probleme); 2) Welche Fehler begeht SpeakEasy: im allgemeinen; fehlerhafte Waren / Verpackungen usw
- Interessante Berufe mit Website: Straßenfeger; Scheinwerferfeger

- interessante Belege mit website: Straßmeyer, Schönsteinmeyer

- Vielleicht: ein Stück "Arbeiterliteratur" (Max von der Grün)
- Blast from the past: "Ungeheur BMW"; and the highbrow version by Kafka (one of the absolutely perfect sentences in German literature)
- Wrap up: The next two weeks of the course, maybe even beyond that (topics, assignments, reading/listening - see schedule for outline).

Aufgabe(n) (assignment & deadlines)

- Wrap up: Wir belegen einen Unfall, eine Krankheit, einen Gesundheitszustand, damit wir zeigen können, dass wir Geld von der Krankenkasse bekommen können, oder damit der Chef uns von der Arbeit entschuldigt.

Vorbereitung auf die nächste(n) Stunde(n)

- Explore issues of bureaucracy, practical law, dealing with personal problems by **

Vorschau auf die nächste(n) Aufgabe(n) und Sitzung(en)

- Reading (English) about educational standards, with a reflection in English about your own education in specific subject areas.
- Writing about injuries / illnesses / medical conditions
- Karl Valentin: "Beim Arzt"

Bagehot | Wooing Mrs Merkel

David Cameron can charm a German. But his Europe policy is a mess



ACENTURY ago Britain made a new enemy, Germany, on the back of its *entente cordiale* with an old one, France. The pre-existing order of friendship has since been resumed, however—as manifest in the contrasting receptions David Cameron, the prime minister, has given his French and German counterparts.

When François Hollande visited London a month ago he was treated to a drink in a pub followed by a grilling over his romantic life by Fleet Street hacks. It was hard to tell which one France's president, who is not a pub man, enjoyed less. Angela Merkel, who visited on February 27th as *The Economist* went to press, was rather better catered for. She was due to address both houses of Parliament—a rare honour for a visiting leader, bestowed at Mr Cameron's suggestion—then go to Buckingham Palace for tea with the queen.

The disparity is not hard to understand. The notion that France and Germany rule together in Europe lies dead in the wreckage of the euro-zone crisis. Mrs Merkel is now Europe's paramount chief. So if Mr Cameron is to get anywhere with his Europe policy—a pledge to renegotiate Britain's membership of the EU before holding an in-out referendum—he needs her help. Ever since announcing his gambit early last year, the Tory prime minister has been buttering up Mrs Merkel. She has been to stay at his country retreat, Chequers, and he at hers, Schloss Meseberg. Tory spinners miss no opportunity to spread tales of the two leaders' mutual affection; the German chancellor is said to consider the pink-cheeked Mr Cameron as her “naughty nephew”. But affection and alignment are not the same.

On a trip to Berlin ahead of Mrs Merkel's visit, your columnist garnered a sobering sense of what Germany might actually be willing to undertake to save Mr Cameron's rosy face. It will do almost everything in its power, because in one regard the wishful Tories are right: most German officials are extremely anxious that Britain should not leave the European Union.

They see it as a like-minded agitator for competitiveness and against the bureaucrats who presume to tell Europeans what receptacles olive oil should be kept in. They respect it as the only European power, other than Germany itself, to have consistently paid more in to EU coffers than it takes out. There is a sense, too, of a deeper affinity, wrought by aspects of common culture and mu-

tual regard for America. Most Germans speak English; fewer study French every year. “We are all Anglophiles here,” says a senior official in the foreign ministry.

Yet he is an ardent European federalist, which reveals Mr Cameron's problem. However much Germany wants to keep Britain in the EU, and even though it agrees with most British criticisms of the club, it cannot countenance any compromise of the basic tenets, including ever-closer union and free movement of labour, that Mr Cameron objects to.

This is the context in which Mrs Merkel's much-rehashed comment last year, that competences can travel from Brussels to national capitals as well as vice versa, should be seen. The chancellor was inviting the sort of discussion of subsidiarity that is the bratwurst and apples of Germany's federal democracy. She was not arguing that the EU's remit should be trimmed.

Britain could nonetheless secure a much lesser diminution, perhaps to gain freedom from some aspect of EU labour or social law. This is because the logic of Mr Cameron's gambit—that reform of the euro zone will require changes to the EU treaties and therefore an opportunity for Britain to crowbar in freedoms for itself—just about holds. Germany wants treaty change; some in Berlin speculate that, if the Tories win re-election next year, it could happen in late 2015 or early 2016. Yet any revision would have to be modest and is becoming less likely, for several reasons.

The euro-zone crisis has cooled, easing the pressure for reform. Euroscepticism is on the march, making it hard to win plebiscites on major treaty change in those countries, such as France and Ireland, that would require them. Aside from charming Mrs Merkel, moreover, Mr Cameron has done hardly anything to press his case for change. He has not said what powers he wants back and has offended erstwhile friends, such as Poland, by inveighing against immigration from the east. Even in Anglophile Germany, which is facing its own anti-immigration backlash, this grates. Mr Cameron is considered weak and not terribly serious. Nobody in the German capital doubts that his referendum pledge was mostly intended to buy off the Eurosceptics in his own party. The fact that this has failed—as witnessed by a recent Eurosceptic decree signed by almost 100 Tory MPs—is now obvious. “We were very naive”, an embarrassed aide of Mr Cameron's admits.

Germany won't go to the wall

All of this highlights the central nonsense of Mr Cameron's Europe strategy. A vital part of Britain's foreign policy has been made a hostage to an uncertain, ill-tempered process of multilateral negotiation, conducted at a time when most EU members—including Germany—have bigger things to think about. Whatever modest change Mr Cameron might secure would not impress Eurosceptic Tories. Given the racket they generate, it is possible that Mr Cameron's renegotiation ploy has actually made it likelier that Britons will vote to quit the union than if he had simply promised them a vote on Britain's existing membership terms.

The Germans rightly consider such things beyond their powers of divination. And, it must be said, they may end up taking a rather more equanimous view of the British question than many Tories expect. Just behind the restored Reichstag, in Berlin, are buildings still pocked with the thumb-sized scars of second-world-war machine-gun fire. Living with such architecture would encourage anyone to take a detached and overarching view of the deliriums of day-to-day politics. Britain's raving Europe debate badly needs that kind of perspective. ■

Greece's troubles

The troika is back

ATHENS

The stand-off between the government and international lenders continues

THE scene is familiar: burly Greek bodyguards hustle a trio of foreign bureaucrats into the finance ministry through a side entrance to avoid a cluster of anti-austerity protesters shouting "troika go home". Hours later tight-lipped representatives of the troika—the European Commission, IMF and European Central Bank (ECB)—head back to their hotel while ministry officials spin their version of the talks: heroic Greek resistance to "excessive" demands made by the country's international creditors.

After almost six months of talks the stand-off is still unresolved. Greece has implemented only about half the measures it signed up to last summer, say European Union (EU) officials. The troika returned to Athens on February 24th, intending to reach a deal that could be approved at a meeting of the euro-zone finance ministers on March 10th. That would unlock another sizeable tranche of bail-out funding, enabling Greece to repay €9.3 billion (\$12.8 billion) of bonds maturing in May, and start planning a return to international financial markets with a modest bond issue later this year.

Disputes over liberalising the market for fresh milk and allowing supermarkets to sell non-prescription drugs underline how the fragile coalition government led by Antonis Samaras, the centre-right prime minister, is held hostage by interest groups. Other disagreements grab fewer headlines but could do more harm to Greece's chances of an economic turnaround this year. According to the central bank, stress tests on four big Greek lenders showed they will need about €6 billion in fresh capital to stay solvent. But the IMF has come up with a mind-boggling €20 billion estimate for recapitalising the banks, implying that Greece will be unable to avoid a third international bail-out. (The ECB will perform its own stress tests later this year.)

Yet the outlook is not all gloomy. The country's recession slowed last year, with the economy shrinking by 3.7% compared with the troika's forecast of 4%. Finance ministry officials seem confident that Eurostat, the European Commission's statistical arm, will confirm an unprecedented primary budget surplus (before interest payments) of €1.5 billion in 2013.

Another record year for tourism is forecast, driven by a recovery in the EU and more bookings from Russian and Chinese visitors. After months of tough negotia-

tions with the Greek state gas utility, Russia's Gazprom has agreed to cut natural-gas prices by around 15%, backdated to last July. This should result in price cuts of around 12% for hard-pressed Greek consumers.

Mr Samaras still holds a lead as "most suitable prime minister" over Alexis Tsipras, the radical opposition leader, according to opinion polls. Yet his New Democracy party consistently lags a few points behind the Syriza party under Mr Tsipras. The centre-right has lost voters to Golden Dawn, a neo-Nazi party, whose leaders are in jail accused of running a criminal gang. At the same time, Syriza is attracting a

steady stream of former supporters of the PanHellenic Socialist Movement, the junior partner in the governing coalition.

Elections in May for the European Parliament, regional governors and local mayors will show how popular Mr Tsipras is with voters. Syriza officials are already eyeing the presidential vote next March, when Mr Tsipras may have a chance to trigger a general election if parliament fails to elect a new president to replace Karolos Papoulias. With the governing coalition almost 30 votes short of the required three-fifths majority, Syriza's moment may come at that point. ■

Germany's Wulff scandal

Overzealous

BERLIN

An acquittal makes Germans reflect on their prosecutors

IN HIS journey from hubris to downfall and now redemption, Christian Wulff is a tragic Sophoclean character for many Germans. A former premier of Lower Saxony, Mr Wulff became Germany's president in the summer of 2010. With his second wife, Bettina, he cut a glamorous figure. Then *Bild*, a tabloid, began hounding him. Mr Wulff reacted like a cornered animal, forfeiting the dignity of his office. When prosecutors in Lower Saxony began investigating him for corruption in February 2012, he had to resign. Germany's press and public gloated.

Their mood has turned. In the legal cultures of Anglo-Saxon countries prosecutors are understood to be adversaries of equally partial defence attorneys, overseen by neutral judges. But in Germany's system, prosecutors must look for the truth, not just convictions. This means that they must explore exculpatory scenarios.



Not crying Wulff

Mr Wulff's prosecutor, Clemens Eimterbäumer, and his boss, the attorney-general of Lower Saxony, Frank Lüttig, increasingly seemed to lose a sense of proportion. At the time Mr Wulff resigned, Mr Lüttig worked for Bernd Busemann, who was the state's justice minister and a known political enemy of Mr Wulff's. Mr Eimterbäumer's investigation kept expanding, to reach a cost of €4m (\$5.5m). He called dozens of witnesses, rummaged through 30,000 pages of documents as well as 45 bank accounts and eight offices, houses or flats.

And yet his case kept shrivelling. Visibly irritated by the often petty evidence, Frank Rosenow, the judge, threw out the main charges. What remained was the sum of €770. This was the amount that David Groenewold, a film producer, paid for a hotel when the Wulff family visited the Oktoberfest in Munich in 2008. Mr Wulff later asked the boss of Siemens, an industrial giant, whether he might support one of Mr Groenewold's films. To Mr Eimterbäumer, Mr Wulff was thereby "taking advantage" of his office and committing a crime.

On February 27th Mr Rosenow declared Mr Wulff not guilty of that charge as well. For Mr Wulff, this was a victory at last. His wife and many friends have abandoned him, and he is a shadow of the person he once was. But he can now rebuild his life. He will apparently join a law firm, with a brief to introduce Turkish and Arabic companies to business in Germany.

The most gratifying turn for him may be that the same public that gloated at his downfall is now celebrating with him. The consensus is that he paid more than he owed for his shortcomings. As all rose in a Hanover courtroom this week, the accused, if any, were the prosecutors.