A dilapidated liquor store stands at the corner of 17th and Center in West Oakland. With its plastic sign cracked and yellowed, its paint pockmarked and peeling away in long lesions from the store’s warped clapboard siding, it could be a clichéd metaphor for the decay of America’s “inner cities” during the postindustrial era (figure 5.1). But it is also representative of the disproportionate number of liquor stores in urban communities of color. Establishments such as these often serve as the sole food retailer in areas that planners and food justice activists have come to call “food deserts.”

A recent report to Congress by the USDA Economic Research Service defines *food desert* as an area “with limited access to affordable and nutritious food, particularly such an area composed of predominately lower income neighborhoods and communities” (USDA 2009). A number of articles and reports over the last few years have attempted to characterize and identify food deserts in the United States, Canada, Britain, and Australia. Most have concluded that in the United States, food deserts disproportionately impact people of color (Smoyer-Tomic, Spence, and Amrhein 2006; Beaulac, Kristjansson, and Cummins 2009). While many studies have drawn spatial or statistical correlations or both between race and the absence of supermarkets (Raja, Ma, and Yadav 2008; Lee and Lim 2009; Zenk et al. 2005), researchers have also found that small corner stores and ethnic grocers are abundant in these food deserts (Short, Guthman, and Raskin 2007; Raja, Ma, and Yadav 2008). Nevertheless, fresh and nutritious produce is rarely available at these small stores, and the type of food generally tends to be of poorer quality and less healthy, high in sugars and saturated fats (Cummins and MacIntyre 2002).

Food access in Oakland’s food deserts falls under a similar rubric. The socioeconomic terrain demarcating poverty and affluence in this Bay
Area city of 423,000 (2010 estimate) roughly follows the contours of its physical geography of flatlands and hills (figure 5.2). Census data reveal that the vast majority of Oakland’s people of color live in the flatlands (figure 5.3). Between a quarter and a third of people in the flatlands live below the poverty line; median income is 25 percent lower than the citywide average. The flatlands host the lowest percentage of homeownership and the lowest levels of educational attainment. Unemployment here is roughly twice the citywide rate. Crime and public health statistics overlap in a more or less identical fashion. In predominantly black flatlands neighborhoods, such as West Oakland and Central East Oakland, these statistics are even bleaker.

It is precisely in these flatlands neighborhoods that the city’s food deserts can also be found. And it is here that food justice movements have taken root. Yet to better understand Oakland’s food deserts and to recognize the emancipatory potential of the initiatives that have emerged as a solution, it is helpful first to understand the forces that have hewn the urban landscape into a crude mosaic of parks and pollution, privilege
and poverty, Whole Foods and whole food deserts. Few studies move beyond a geospatial or statistical inventory of food deserts to unearth these historical processes. In this chapter I focus on the structural role of capital (with an implied capital “C”) in order to emphasize the extent to which capital defines the urban environment. Driving down MacArthur or International Boulevards “in the cuts” of the Oakland flatlands provides a glimpse into how capital’s dynamic cycles—its ebbs and flows—have shaped both the built environment and the social relations woven through it, leaving an almost entirely treeless and worn landscape of used car dealerships, taco trucks, liquor stores, dilapidated storefronts, and the occasional chainlinked vacant lot.

Figure 5.2
Oakland, California, and its major districts. Flatlands neighborhoods are shaded. Map by the author
Chapter 5

Figure 5.3
Oakland’s racialized socioeconomic landscape. The Oakland hills are home to the majority of the city’s white (non-Latino) population, while the majority of people of color reside in the flatlands (bottom). Poverty is also concentrated in the flatlands (bottom). Maps by the author. Source: U.S. Census, 2000 (SF-3)
Understanding the historical and structural roots of this urban landscape is fundamental to understanding the individual and collective agency that adapts to or resists its development. With this in mind, I tap existing histories of Oakland and urbanization in California, demographic and economic data, and current “grey literature” (e.g., planning, economic, and public health reports) to broadly trace the historical geography of Oakland’s flatlands during the periods of industrialization and deindustrialization, roughly from the turn of the century to the “neoliberal turn” of the 1980s. I draw on theoretical insights from the growing field of urban political ecology to shed light on the structural processes that have restricted access to healthy food for residents of the flatlands, arguing that a combination of industrial location, residential development, city planning, and racist mortgage lending unevenly developed the city’s landscape and concentrated the impacts of capital devaluation within the flatlands, a process I refer to as “demarcated devaluation” and which ultimately created the city’s food deserts.

Root Structure: Devaluation of Urban Capital

To understand Oakland’s food deserts, the related diet-related illnesses impacting flatlands residents, and the food justice initiatives that have arisen in response, an analysis of the historical processes that have unevenly shaped the city’s socioecological landscape is a necessary first step. Environmental sociologists, political ecologists, and urban geographers have described the material transformation, or “metabolism,” of the biophysical environment and human populations by political economic processes such as capitalism (Foster 1999; Gandy 2003; Heynen, Kaika, and Swyngedouw 2006). David Harvey (2006) stresses the interconnected nature of society and environment; understanding one cannot be done without understanding its relation to the other:

On the ecological side . . . we have to understand how the accumulation of capital works through ecosystemic processes, re-shaping them and disturbing them as it goes. Energy flows, shifts in material balances, environmental transformations (some of them irreversible) have to be brought thoroughly within the picture. But the social side cannot be evaded as somehow radically different from its ecological integument. . . . The circulation of money and capital have to be construed as ecological variables every bit as important as the circulation of air and water. (88)

Such an analysis necessarily takes place at multiple levels. In his analysis of urban hunger in Milwaukee, Nik Heynen (2006) underscores the
importance of looking across scales to understand the connections between hunger and its causes. The physical experience of hunger, malnutrition, or the body’s biochemical metabolic process cannot be treated as disconnected from the larger-scale processes determining the availability of food. Indeed, the chain of causality spans several levels of scale, from the individual to the household, from neighborhood to municipality, and from national to global. Viewing socioecological change this way certainly complicates analysis (and demands a certain level of interdisciplinarity) but may ultimately offer a fuller, if not more nuanced, understanding of the links among ecology, public health, and social change.

The web of social and political relations driving and shaping these changes is complex and multidimensional. Nevertheless, at the risk of being seen as an economic determinist, I want to focus on one process that is fundamental to the transformation of the urban landscape and creation of food deserts: the devaluation of certain types of capital. It undergirds the structural processes of uneven development and the social disruption that emerges in response. Nowhere is this process so readily apparent as in postindustrial cities such as Oakland. Cities are ground zero of humans’ transformative power, where the influx of capital is visibly inscribed on the landscape in the form of buildings and infrastructure, as roads, bridges, power lines, rail lines, sewers. During historical moments of capital overaccumulation following economic booms, surplus capital is invested in this kind of fixed or immobile capital, transforming the urban environment. During economic downturns, as capital retreats from urban industrial zones, the postindustrial city nevertheless retains its industrial character, albeit devalued, dilapidated, and scarred by pollution, often to such a great degree that it precludes future investment. Rents fall, unemployment rises. Both labor and fixed capital are devalued. Harvey (2001) writes, “The geographical landscape which fixed and immobile capital comprises is both a crowning glory of past capital development and a prison which inhibits the further progress of accumulation” (247). These zones left fallow inside the city by capital’s retreat belong to what Richard Walker (1978) has called “a lumpengeography of capital,” or “a permanent reserve of stagnant places” awaiting new investment once land and labor values have been sufficiently devalued.

From this perspective, the contemporary cityscape is a map of previous cycles of capital accumulation and devaluation, a palimpsest of building, decay, and renewal. The walls of this prison of fixed capital...
are often clearly delineated by planning, policy, property taxes, and political boundaries. These buttresses and ramparts, whether or not they were crafted with intention, effectively demarcate and quarantine devaluation to prevent its impacts from bleeding over, both metaphorically and materially. As environmental justice literature reveals, this process of demarcated devaluation has been highly racialized historically through zoning, redlining, and neighborhood covenants (Matsuoka 2003; Maantay 2002; Self 2003; Morello-Frosch 2002; Boone et al. 2009).

Human populations viscerally experience these ebbs and flows of capital. As countless cases in the era of deindustrialization illustrate, capital devaluation has historically been the harbinger of social upheaval in the form of migration, poverty, hunger, crime, and declining public health. Given the extent to which the urban landscape is shaped by capital and its crises of accumulation, urban social struggles against the socioeconomic upheaval that follows are interwoven with struggles for a more equitable environment. Perhaps less obvious to many mainstream environmentalists, struggles to protect or clean up the urban environment are equally as entwined within struggles for social justice; as Swyngedouw and Heynen (2003) point out, “processes of socio-ecological change are . . . never socially or ecologically neutral” (911). Understanding the food justice movement in Oakland and elsewhere therefore depends on understanding the structural forces, generally, and capital devaluation more specifically, that gave rise to the movement in the first place. Applying this analytical framework, I devote the remainder of this chapter to outlining Oakland’s twentieth-century history of industrialization and deindustrialization, demarcated devaluation, and the consequent creation of the city’s food deserts.

An Industrial Garden Grows

In reference to her childhood home of Oakland, Gertrude Stein famously wrote, “there is no there there.” While these words have been used to belittle Oakland for the seventy years that have passed since their publication, they remain poignant when taken in their original context. Stein had returned to the city decades later and was unable to recognize the childhood home of her memories in the vast expanse of new housing sprawling eastward from downtown (Rhomberg 2004). The transformative power that had effaced the “there” of Stein’s turn-of-the-century childhood home continued to reshape Oakland as industrial and residential capital flowed and ebbed throughout the rest of the twentieth century.
Advertising Oakland as a “city of homes,” speculators from the mid-nineteenth century onward hoped to cash in on its proximity to San Francisco’s bustling commercial center (Scott [1959] 1985). The promise of the seemingly paradoxical union of Arcadia and Utopia that was the aesthetic hallmark of California development—pastoral landscapes embodied within an ordered, neighborhood logic (McClung 2000)—fueled a vibrant housing sector in Oakland, drawing the wealthy merchant class to the Oakland hills and foothills. A booster for housing in Oakland's lower foothills in 1911 advertised “home sites from which [to] look down on the cities about the bay . . . far removed from the dirt and turmoil of the work-a-day world” (Scott [1959] 1985; Bagwell 1982).

At the same time, completion of the transcontinental railroad and construction of its terminus in Oakland in 1869 accelerated the expansion of industry from San Francisco to the East Bay; the arrival of iron works, canneries, cotton and lumber mills, breweries, and carriage factories fueled further industrial agglomeration around the rail terminals in West Oakland and the estuary waterfront at the southern edge of downtown (Bagwell 1982; Walker 2001). A 1910 promotional booklet published by the Oakland Chamber of Commerce features a world map with all shipping lines leading to “Oakland Opposite the Golden Gate, The Logical Port and Industrial Center of the Pacific Coast” (Scott [1959] 1985).

Worker housing emerged primarily in West Oakland, between the downtown business district and the rail and shipping terminus. The displacement of San Francisco residents following the 1906 earthquake was a boon for Oakland, bringing in a new workforce and new demands for housing. With population and industry growing at a rapid pace and aided by the extension of horse-drawn and electric streetcar lines, Oakland expanded to the north and east, annexing previously autonomous communities such as Temescal, Brooklyn, Fruitvale, Melrose, and Elmhurst by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century (Groth 2004; Bagwell 1982; Scott [1959] 1985).

World War I saw a massive influx of military capital into Oakland. Automotive manufacturers such as the Durant Motor Company, Hall-Scott Motor Company, Chevrolet, and General Motors expanded considerably during these years, earning Oakland the moniker “Detroit of the West.” Shipbuilding dominated the port, and employed upward of 40,000 in 1920. Drawn by the promise of jobs, new workers, many of them African Americans and immigrants, flooded in by the thousands.
Wartime industrialization and the boom that continued through the 1920s saw the expansion Oakland's residential development alongside the construction of new factories eastward into the orchards and pastures of the annexed townships (Ma 2000; Walker 2001; Bagwell 1982). Integrating the pragmatism of locating industry where land was available with the reformist planning vision of Ebenezer Howard and Lewis Mumford, planners and developers in Oakland (as in Southern California) embraced the paradigm of the “industrial garden”: the dispersal of industry away from the mixed-use downtown core but closely tied to nearby, semiautonomous residential neighborhoods. In these industrial garden suburbs, factory workers would return home by bus or rail to a neighborhood of small, single-family homes, each with a yard or garden. Proponents pushed “garden living” in these quiet and tranquil respite far—but not too far—from the factory grind as a cure to the social and health risks already well documented in the mixed-use urban slums of the Northeast, Chicago, and to a lesser extent in the older downtown cores of San Francisco, Oakland, and Los Angeles (Self 2003; Hise 1997, 2001). Urban and rural modes of survival came together here, as workers clocked out and headed home to tend vegetables, chickens, and goats in their yards (Nicolaides 2001; Johnson 1993). As Mike Davis (1997) writes, the industrial garden was “a new kind of industrial society where Ford and Darwin, engineering and nature, were combined in a eugenic formula that eliminated the root causes of class conflict and inefficient production” (358); in essence, by keeping the worker happy, productivity could increase while nipping a restive labor movement at the bud.

During the New Deal the vast expanse of small homes that had cropped up as part of the industrial garden expanded rapidly. Beginning in 1934, a flood of highly subsidized, low-interest mortgage loans from the newly created Federal Housing Administration (FHA) fed the growing suburbs; East Oakland soon filled in with suburban developments of small, Mediterranean-style single-family homes. As in other California industrial centers, developers consolidated land purchase, subdivision, construction, and sales in order to maximize efficiency and minimize costs. Vast tracts of small houses, mostly prefabricated or built from kits with nearly identical floor plans, created an economy of scale that dovetailed nicely with the contemporary planning vision of neighborhood cohesion, mixed use, and garden cities to create quintessential industrial gardens. In order to expand homeownership, housing production had to be reorganized into a quasi-Fordist system of on-site assembly of prefab components to perfect the “minimum house”: a small, single-family
home constructed as cheaply as possible but comfortable and unique enough to satisfy the dream of home ownership (Hise 1997). The newly subdivided suburban landscape was rapidly filled in with these small, single-family homes erected virtually overnight.

However, the federally subsidized dream of homeownership in the industrial garden was not available to everyone. The social idealism of Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities and Lewis Mumford’s inclusive “ecotopian” regions undergirded the vision of many suburban planners. Nevertheless, the pragmatism of industrial location, the whims of individual developers, and the rising power of racist homeowners’ organizations soon elided their utopian vision. People of color rarely qualified for FHA loans because these were to be applied only to newly constructed homes and, contrary to Howard’s vision of universalist garden cities that welcomed and nourished all workers, new home developments in the suburban industrial gardens were racially exclusive. Until 1948 racial covenants established by developers and homeowners’ associations prevented people of color from moving in and disturbing social divisions seen as “natural” (Hise 2001; Self 2003; Sugrue 2005). Even after the Supreme Court made racial covenants illegal via *Shelley v. Kraemer* in 1948, such obstacles remained in practice. Contractors were rarely able to secure loans for construction for nonwhites in a “Caucasians only” neighborhood and realtors feared “the wrath of white homeowners” (Sugrue 2005).

The racialized demarcation of urban space taking place between the wars was not new in California. For decades the labor movement in California had already laid the groundwork for the formation of a virulent form of white class-consciousness via their aggressive exclusion of Asian, Latino, and African American workers (Daniels [1959] 1977; Saxton 1971; McWilliams [1949] 1999). Easy access for whites to low-cost, single-family homes in close proximity to East Oakland’s factories simply fueled racist and exclusionary sentiments by creating a sense of bootstrap entitlement, where hard work alone was seen as the key to material success. Homeownership thus helped heterogeneous European and Euro-American populations of workers consolidate as a spatially and racially homogenized labor force of “whites,” geographically distinct from the radicalism of recent European immigrants and African Americans in West and North Oakland and along the estuary. Suburbanization of industry and housing was thus a way to escape from the working class and “to attract a better brand of labor, removed from the ‘bad moral atmosphere’ of the inner city, and promising the
stability of homeownership for the ‘better class’ of workers” (Walker 1981, 400).

As new workers flooded into Oakland during World War II, housing was scarce. Trying to defuse tensions between blacks and southern white migrants, the Oakland Housing Authority located black-only housing projects in West Oakland and corresponding projects for whites in East Oakland. Most of these housing projects were located in industrial areas on landfill and adjacent to railroads. The black population of Oakland grew nearly sixfold in Alameda County between 1940 and 1950, but African Americans were rarely allowed to rent outside of West Oakland due to racial covenants and similar barriers to renting in the new industrial gardens. Ramshackle dwellings in West Oakland were converted and subdivided to accommodate the new migrants. In the postwar years the razing of temporary wartime migrant housing in the East Bay only increased the housing squeeze. In 1940, 15 percent of West Oakland’s housing units were overcrowded; the percentage doubled a decade later (Johnson 1993).

The practice of bank redlining also stopped the flow of mortgage and property investment capital into parts of the city where people of color resided. Working with banks and local realtors, the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) and its parent organization, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, developed Residential Security Maps and Surveys that divided cities into ranked sections. Most African American neighborhoods were ranked “D–Fourth Grade” for “hazardous” and colored red on the maps. Homes in these areas rarely qualified for loans. Meanwhile white neighborhoods were ranked higher if they had racial covenants that offered “protection from adverse influences” such as “infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups” (Sugrue 2005; Maantay 2002). While discriminatory lending existed before the creation of these maps, they helped to reify the delineation between rich and poor, between whites and people of color. Even after redlining was prohibited under the 1968 Fair Housing Act, it continued in a self-reproducing, de facto manner due to a complex of factors, from zoning and housing prices to the spatialized legacy of denied loan applications (Kantor and Nyusten 1982), as well as the relocation of home insurance agencies to the suburbs (Squires, Velez, and Taueber 1991).

A 1937 HOLC Residential Security Map of Oakland (figure 5.4) and associated report reveals the spatial logic of redlining. The area reports for most flatlands neighborhoods warned potential investors of “detrimental influences,” notably the “infiltration” of “lower grades” such as “Negros,” “Orientals,” “shopkeepers,” “lower classes,” “relief
families,” and “foreign born.” On Oakland’s north–south axis, neighborhoods west of Grove Street (now Martin Luther King Jr. Way) all appear as Grade D. This redline separated blacks from whites, effectively ghettoizing North and West Oakland.\textsuperscript{13} East 14th Street (now International Blvd.) served as the east–west redline in East Oakland through the 1950s, limiting blacks to a few blocks adjacent to the industrial zones. Oakland’s Asian population was effectively quarantined, as well, from the late nineteenth century until 1920. Chinatown, south of downtown and west of Lake Merritt, received a D rating (HOLC Area D-11) due to the “predominance of Orientals,” an “indication of future slum condition” (HOLC 1937). By the 1930s, some Asians were able to move to blue-collar neighborhoods along San Pablo Avenue in West Oakland and into the San Antonio district, precisely the “infiltration” that the HOLC Area Reports used to redline a neighborhood.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5_4.png}
\caption{The 1937 Home Owner’s Loan Corporation Residential Security Map for Oakland. “Redlined” neighborhoods (Class D) appear here as dark grey. Along with the adjacent Class C areas (which appear yellow in the original map), these delineations continue to define Oakland’s flatlands neighborhoods. Source: T-RACES: a Testbed for the Redlining Archives of California’s Exclusionary Spaces. Available at <http://salt.unc.edu/T-RACES> (accessed June 9, 2010)}
\end{figure}
Like the Chinese, the presence of any “low class foreign born” laborers was enough for HOLC to paint a neighborhood red. The Area Report for the Jingletown neighborhood (Area No. D-15), home to a largely Portuguese millworker population, was also classed as “hazardous” due to “Detrimental influences: Odors from industries; heterogeneous mixtures of old two-story homes and old one-story cottages (latter predominating). Predominance of foreign inhabitants, infiltration of Negroes and Orientals. . . . This area lies below east [sic] Fourteenth Street (below the tracks) and is poorly regarded; semi-slum area. There are only a few Negroes and Orientals, but the low class foreign element is large (HOLC 1937).”

By the late 1930s, large swaths of the flatlands, the first of the industrial garden neighborhoods constructed during the interwar boom years, had already been rated “Yellow” for “C–Third Grade” or “Declining,” the result of “decreasing desirability” due to aging homes and “infiltration” by “lower grade elements.” One such area was the Fruitvale district, where a large Mexican population had developed much earlier to work in the adjacent canneries and orchards (Ma 2000; Self 2003). By the late 1930s, the ten- to twenty-year-old worker cottages in HOLC Areas C-19, C-20, and C-26 were no longer “highly regarded by mortgage institution officials” due to the “threat of infiltration by lower grades,” “proximity to areas infiltrated [sic] by Negroes,” and the growing population of “foreign born” and “Latin races” who already comprised up to 20 percent of the district at the time (HOLC 1937). The mere arrival of blacks, however, seemed to be enough to tip the risk scale from yellow to red. A large part of the adjacent San Antonio district (Area D-10) received a D grade: “This area is similar to C-19 in appearance but infiltration of Negroes necessitates hazardous rating” (Ibid.).

Redlining and yellowlining, along with racial covenants and federal housing subsidies, stewarded and demarcated a highly racialized urban landscape of prosperity and neglect for much of Oakland’s industrial boom years and after. The Oakland hills and most of East Oakland’s industrial garden suburbs remained predominantly white and affluent, while West Oakland, Chinatown, and the slightly more dilapidated East Oakland neighborhoods adjacent to E. 14th Street (San Antonio and Fruitvale) were left high and dry as investment waned. Like West Oakland’s housing stock, labor—human capital—was also devalued as an influx of postwar migrants saturated the labor market, joining the ranks of the unemployed.¹⁴ As Massey and Denton (1993) argue, segregation bred “hypersegregation,” the emergence of “ghetto culture,” and the decline (and flight) of the black middle class, cleaving an even greater
economic rift between West Oakland and the East Oakland garden suburbs, migrants and old timers, blacks and whites, industrial growth and senescence.

Demarcated Desertification

If industrial relocation and FHA-funded residential development were the source of capital flows that irrigated East Oakland’s industrial garden from the 1920s to the 1940s, homeowners associations, zoning, and redlining were the dikes that initially prevented this capital from flowing back toward West Oakland, and then effectively quarantined its devaluation to the few areas where people of color were allowed to live. New capital continued to flow in. Between January 1945 and December 1947 roughly $300 million was spent on the expansion of new industrial plants in the Bay Area (Whitaker 1992). Within the city itself, however, devalued fixed capital—a landscape of aging housing stock and obsolete factories (exemplified in figure 5.5)—left little room for new industry to take root.

Figure 5.5
Abandoned ironworks, Elmhurst (East Oakland), one of more than a hundred factories that stopped production between the 1950s and 1980s. Photo by the author, February 2008
A highly coordinated growth machine of industry, developers, boosters, and white laborers driven by the promise of homeownership and jobs diverted this latest flow of capital to the greenfields of the newly incorporated industrial suburbs—San Leandro, Hayward, Fremont, San Lorenzo, Newark, Union City, Milpitas—that flanked the East Bay between Oakland and San Jose. Vast tracts of agricultural land were incorporated into these pro-business municipalities, zoned as industrial, and sold for prices below industrial land prices in Oakland. National companies such as General Motors and Caterpillar built branch plants on these fertile greenfields, and defense contracts showered the new industrial suburbs with federal capital, ensuring rapid growth. As the data in table 5.1 illustrate, manufacturing nearly doubled in Alameda County (outside of Oakland) between 1948 and 1967. Here at the urban edge of the new suburbs, industry was given a tabula rasa. In essence, these new suburban municipalities provided a more favorable business climate, spatially removed from the pressure cooker of the urban center’s working class and the grip of recalcitrant city politicians (Walker 1981; Self 2003). In the words of the Bay Area Council, which helped drive industrial suburbanization, suburban employees were “more loyal, more cooperative, more productive workers than those in big cities” (cited in Johnson 1993, 212). The implicit (and at times explicit) message to future investors was that this suburban workforce was largely white.
Just as in East Oakland during the interwar years, industry and housing in the new suburbs went hand in hand, part of a concerted planning effort to disperse industry and the suburban residential developments that followed in its stead. These industrial shifts and the prosperity of the postwar era further fertilized the American dream of homeownership. Large-scale housing developments in the urban periphery and the expansion of automobile ownership cultivated suburban development and white flight, draining urban areas of their tax base. Just as the industrial garden of East Oakland was watered with a strong mix of industrial and residential capital during the World War I and 1920s boom years, and with capital available through FHA loans in the 1930s and 1940s, the new industrial garden suburbs grew rapidly in the post-World War II era as a result of this same combination of industrial capital and federal housing subsidies. As Oakland deindustrialized and new factories sprouted in the suburbs, working-class white Oaklanders followed, lured by homeownership and proximity to jobs, just as they had done in the previous wave of interwar and wartime suburbanization. Between 1949 and 1951 only 600 units among the 75,000 constructed in the Bay Area were open to blacks (Johnson 1993). Upwardly mobile whites left the East Oakland flats to join the downtown ruling elite in their Oakland foothills and hillside neighborhoods, taking their cash with them. In Elmhurst, for example, white residents made up 82 percent of the neighborhood’s population in 1960 and median income was $6,154, only about 2 percent lower than the citywide median income; a decade later whites made up only slightly more than a third, while on the other side of the city boundary in San Leandro, people of color were excluded. Median income in Elmhurst dropped to 10 percent lower than that of the city (Whitaker 1992).

As capital was channeled into the industrial suburbs, it began to dry up inside the city’s boundaries, leaving the once-verdant urban economy parched of tax revenue. By the mid 1960s, the number of manufacturers within Oakland had begun its steady decline. Between this downward trajectory and the steady growth of manufacturing in the new industrial suburbs, Oakland’s share of Alameda County’s industrial productivity dropped from more than half to less than a third in the four decades following World War II (cf. table 5.1). More than 130 factories shut their doors and nearly 10,000 manufacturing jobs were lost by 1977. Unemployment skyrocketed as a result. The unemployment rate in 1964 was 11 percent but for blacks was almost twice that high. Business ownership was absentee for the most part; by 1978, only 25 percent of
businesses in East Oakland were locally owned (Henze, Kirshner, and Lillow 1979).

This trend continued in the 1980s as jobs shifted from the traditional manufacturing and warehousing sectors to a service-based industry. The Bay Area on the whole benefited from a boom during this period, with a 15 percent growth in jobs between 1981 and 1986. Oakland, however, reaped little in the way of this regional bounty; employment grew only by 1.5 percent during these same years. The flatlands bore the brunt of job loss during this period. West Oakland and Fruitvale lost 8 to 10 percent of jobs. In the Elmhurst and San Antonio districts, employment decreased by roughly a third (Landis and Guhathakurta 1989).

As East Oakland’s industrial garden withered, housing became available to upwardly mobile people of color for the first time. The Oakland border with San Leandro truly became a color line. Just as East Oakland’s industrial garden communities had excluded people of color via racial covenants, new housing developments in places like San Leandro and San Lorenzo excluded people of color using racial covenants and informal “gentlemen’s agreements” between realtors and homeowners’ associations. Creating a class alliance with developers, increasingly conservative white homeowners in the new suburbs helped to exert political pressure to further confine devaluation to the Oakland flatlands. Proposition 14, a 1964 ballot initiative sponsored the California Real Estate Association and supported by 65 percent of voters statewide, essentially overturned the federal Fair Housing Act, passed the year before. In 1978 this same alliance was able to pass the infamous Proposition 13, which severely limited cities’ ability to raise property taxes. The resulting decrease in property taxes took a toll on Oakland’s already impoverished flatlands, as inflow of revenue was squeezed by more than $14 million, leading to facilities closures and cuts to public services (Rhomberg 2004; Self 2003).

As earlier in the century, Oakland’s demographic shifts in the era of deindustrialization were not simply black and white, but multihued. Changing immigration policies in 1965 allowed a greater influx of Latinos into Oakland, primarily into the already heavily Mexican Fruitvale district. Many of the new arrivals worked in low-end service jobs in the industrial suburbs to the south (Hondagneau-Sotelo 1994). By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the impoverished flatlands became a major center of refugee resettlement for Salvadoran, Guatemalan, Khmer, Lao, Hmong, Khmu, Mien, and Vietnamese fleeing the Cold War’s bloody battlefields in Central America and Southeast Asia. Resettlement programs in poor areas of East Oakland kept the majority of these
immigrants poor, adding to an already large and devalued pool of cheap labor for the postindustrial economy (Ong 2003). Social networks provided entry into formal market niches and a vibrant, yet self-exploiting, informal economy, much of it centered in Chinatown, San Antonio, and Fruitvale (Marech 2002).

As the former industrial garden dried up, some new capital (in the form of federal urban redevelopment and freeway construction) did flow into the economically parched urban landscape, yet the promised jobs and opportunities never emerged. To the contrary, urban redevelopment ultimately displaced thousands of residents from their homes. Several of the most “blighted” areas were razed under the aegis of urban renewal. Thousands were displaced and forced to relocate. Single-family homes and duplexes were subdivided to accommodate those displaced, adding an additional strain on the dilapidated housing stock. Redlining prevented or dissuaded any new investment for housing repair. Housing in the East Oakland flatlands eventually became dilapidated, as well, due in part to a large number of absentee landlords who were homeowners who had followed the industrial garden to the suburbs, or speculators who bought their devalued property at fire sale prices. By 1978 more than two-thirds of East Oakland’s single-family homes and apartments with more than five units were owned by absentee landlords (Henze, Kirshner, and Lillow 1979). Rents grew for increasingly decrepit housing, driving up vacancy rates to the point where the City of Oakland declared a “state of emergency” in April 1974 in response to the high number of vacant and abandoned housing units in East Oakland. These 1,200 empty units were seen as a result of the “blighting influence” of E. 14th Street, the major artery running the length of East Oakland. More than half of the structures assessed in the 1972 Elmhurst Redevelopment Project were categorized as containing “building deficiencies.” By the late 1980s, almost a third of vacant houses in the flatlands were considered in “poor” condition by the City of Oakland’s Office of Community Development (Whitaker 1992).

As this chapter demonstrates, the devaluation of capital in Oakland was contained in the flatlands via racist policy and practice. The construction of major transportation corridors through the flatlands also helped to materially reinforce these existing spatial and socioeconomic divisions in Oakland, as in other postindustrial American cities, physically demarcating the boundaries between investment and abandonment, rich and poor, whites and people of color. Plans for the Nimitz, MacArthur, and Grove-Shafter Freeways were approved in 1958 by the
all-white Oakland city council (Self 2003). The Grove Shafter (California Route 24/Interstate 980), which was placed immediately adjacent to the old Grove Street redline, effectively severed West Oakland from downtown. The MacArthur (Interstate 580) divided the flatlands from the hills. The Nimitz (Interstate 880), which parallels the MacArthur, was sited through the city’s industrial corridor along the city’s southwestern edge, roughly separating the majority of factories and warehouses and access to the estuary from the flatlands residential areas. Other construction projects were sited in devalued flatlands neighborhoods where land values were low and the political power of the community marginal. The Cypress Freeway was constructed right through the middle of West Oakland, razing hundreds of homes and displacing thousands of residents. The Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, which began in 1964, had a similar impact on the flatlands. In most of the flatlands, the BART tracks were placed above ground to reduce costs. Construction of the BART line between downtown and the trans-Bay tunnel destroyed 7th Street in West Oakland, the cultural and economic center of Oakland’s African American community, and displaced several hundred families, many of whom moved to East Oakland where they were faced with rents two to three times as high as what they paid in West Oakland (Whitaker 1992). Small businesses (including grocers) also felt the impact of redevelopment as their clientele was displaced.

The port and its rail lines, the freeways, the Bay Bridge, and the BART were constructed to link Oakland to the region and to position it as a major transportation hub for the economically vibrant Bay Area. But as Self (2003) argues, capital and people flowed above West Oakland on freeway overpasses and BART tracks, channeled to San Francisco’s enduring commercial center and Oakland’s growing industrial suburbs. These conduits of capital served as physical boundaries of devaluation of existing fixed capital in the flatlands, material structures demarcating what zoning and redlining succeeded in doing invisibly on paper. Not only did the benefits of the freeway and BART system—the hallmarks of urban modernity—bypass the flatlands, their construction was marked by dispossession and displacement of Oakland’s flatlands residents.

Retail in the Red

As capital devaluation become more and more contained in the flatlands, the city’s retail landscape changed dramatically. A depressed flatlands economy made it difficult to retain major retailers, including supermar-
kets. For example, when the new Eastmont Mall, built on the site of the former East Oakland GM factory, held its grand opening in November 1970, it beckoned customers with the promise of unlimited parking and two major department stores, a four-plex movie theater, and food court. By the 1980s, however, falling purchasing power and an increase in drug dealing and related violent crime around the mall led to a major decline in retail sales. During the 1990s both department stores closed, as did the mall’s Safeway supermarket. With the mall’s anchor stores gone, business occupancy dropped to only 30 percent (Oakland Tribune 2007). By 1987 only four department stores continued to operate within the city limits (Rhomberg 2004).

This pattern of capital flight and devaluation transformed food access during the era of deindustrialization in the Oakland flatlands and in U.S. “inner cities” on the whole. Across the country, food retail had been gradually changing since first the arrival of chain grocery stores prior to World War I and by chain supermarkets in the 1930s. After World War II, supermarkets (both chain and independent) dominated the lion’s share of food retail. Driven by the entry of women into the workforce, a growing demand for one-stop shopping, automobile culture, and a massive influx of new processed foods derived from subsidized commodities, supermarkets became more and more popular. Shopping centers, a new model of retail often “anchored” by a supermarket, sprouted up in the new white suburbs across America. By 1960 more than two-thirds of groceries were purchased at supermarkets. Unable to compete with the economies of scale enjoyed by supermarkets, many small grocers went out of business. The power of corporate supermarket chains increased during this period as well. Chain supermarkets slowly drove the independent chains out of business, waging “price wars” to secure turf. By 1975 corporate food retailers controlled about two-thirds of the food retail market, draining capital from the local economy and funneling it off to corporate headquarters (Walker 2005; Eisenhauer 2001).

As food retail became concentrated in the aisles of major supermarkets, food access became increasingly dictated by supermarket location. By the 1970s nationwide economic “stagflation” caused supermarket retail to founder. Mergers and leveraged buyouts of competing chains hit less competitive, inner-city markets hard; between 1978 and 1984, Safeway alone closed more than 600 stores in these neighborhoods (Eisenhauer 2001). The boarded-up hulls of failed supermarkets littered the shoals of America’s postindustrial cities; many remained shuttered, others converted to churches, and only some rigged anew as thrift or
dollar stores for consumers with declining purchasing power. While the number of supermarkets in urban areas declined, however, the overall number of supermarkets increased. By the mid 1990s, in urban areas the poorest urban neighborhoods had roughly half the retail supermarket space than did the richest urban neighborhoods (Ibid.).

During the 1980s and 1990s superstores took over the helm of food retail, spatially concentrating food access in locations often only accessible by car. For working class people, falling wages and retail capital’s retreat from postindustrial urban centers meant that cheap food availability was limited to big box stores and fast food joints (Walker 2005; Mamen 2007). A “junk food jungle” took root in the barren stretches of the fresh food desert throughout poor neighborhoods in postindustrial America, capitalizing on the niche left by the retreat of groceries and supermarkets and a demand for food that was easily accessible, convenient, and cheap, sending the incidence of diabetes and obesity skyrocketing (Goldstein et al. 2008). Liquor stores followed a similar successional logic. With the ebb of food retail capital, liquor stores began to serve as the primary source of food provisioning in America’s inner cities, yet prices for their goods were often higher than those found at a supermarket, and fresh fruits and vegetables were unavailable.

As table 5.2 reveals, food retail in the Oakland flatlands paralleled these national trends. Between 1935 and 1987, the total number of grocery stores in Oakland dropped fivefold, from over 1,000 to about 200 while the average number of employees per store increased nearly tenfold. These shifts signal not only the arrival of supermarkets and consequent concentration of the food retail sector, but also the steep decline in service to the city’s growing population, an overall decrease from 36 to 5 stores per 10,000 residents. The decline hit the flatlands even harder. In West Oakland, the number of grocery stores in West Oakland declined from 137 in 1960 to 22 in 1980, due largely to supermarket penetration (Fuller 2004), a drop from nearly 25 percent of all of the city’s stores to just above 10 percent. By the 1990s, many of these same supermarkets that had pushed out the small grocers in the flatlands had also closed their doors in response to falling profits. The Safeway at Eastmont Mall, one of the mall’s anchor stores, closed at this time. In a particularly ironic twist, two of the country’s four leading supermarkets, Safeway and Lucky Stores, were headquartered in Oakland, yet access to quality food in the once bountiful industrial garden of Oakland’s flatlands had evaporated as capital reinvested outside of the city lines. One can conclude from the data in table 5.3 that the rapid growth of
## Table 5.2
Consolidation and decline of grocery stores in Oakland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of grocery stores⁴</th>
<th>Number of paid employees</th>
<th>Employee-to-store ratio</th>
<th>Stores per 10,000 people⁵</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1,913</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>2,349</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴For 1958 to 1987 retail data, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code 541 was used. For 1935, “Grocery stores without meat” and “Combination stores (Grocery stores with meat)” were aggregated; for 1948, grocery stores with and without meat were aggregated. Grocery stores accounted for roughly two-thirds of “Food Stores” (SIC Code 54) for all years.

⁵Calculated using population data from the nearest census year (1940 to 1990).


## Table 5.3
Decline of Oakland’s share of food stores and sales in Alameda County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (%)⁶</th>
<th>Food stores (%)⁷</th>
<th>Sales (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


⁷For 1958 to 1987 retail data, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code 54 was used. For 1935, data for the category “Food Stores” was used; for 1948 data, “Food Group” was used.

the suburbs precipitated the decline of Oakland’s share of food stores, but Oakland’s sales nevertheless began to lag disproportionately due to the declining purchasing power of the city’s population. By the late 1980s, a third of Alameda County’s food stores were located in Oakland, but these accounted for only a quarter of the county’s total food sales.

With the retreat of the supermarkets and closure of small-scale groceries, food retail in the flatlands has been largely left to liquor stores and corner stores that serve as de facto liquor stores. Statistics help to describe a landscape of food access not unlike that of many other food deserts. In 1935 there were more than eight grocery stores for every liquor store in Oakland; by 1977, there were fewer than two. In the flatlands the number of liquor stores per person (three to six stores per 1,000 residents) was two to four times the city average in 2007. There are four times as many fast food restaurants and convenience stores as grocery stores and produce vendors in the East Bay (Spiker, Sorrelgreen, and Williams 2007). No supermarkets serve residents in West Oakland and recent plans for British supermarket giant Tesco to open a West Oakland store have fallen through. A recent survey by a food justice initiative found that in six flatlands neighborhoods, residents reported they have to leave their neighborhoods to find affordable, healthy food (HOPE Collaborative 2009). West Oaklanders have to cross into the redeveloped box store land of neighboring Emeryville to shop at Pak-n-Sav. Similarly, in East Oakland’s Council District 6, no national grocery chain exists. Most East Oaklanders find the best deals across the city border; one focus group participant noted, “Oakland dollars are going to San Leandro” (Ibid., 16). Another noted, “I wish we could have more fresh foods rather than junk food, candy, and soda that we’re all used to eating because that is the only thing around” (Ibid.). Participants said that want more stores that sell healthier foods and better quality produce. Another study highlights residents’ acute awareness of the difference not only in availability, but also of quality: “Yes, there’s a difference in the stores in our area compared to the stores in Montclair or somewhere else [in the Oakland hills]. You know, the vegetables are great up there, everything is so beautiful. And you come down, I think we get ours last off the truck” (Treuhaft, Hamm, and Litjens 2009).

Conclusion

Across the street from the liquor store on 17th Street where we began, the verdure of an urban garden spills through a chainlink fence.
A colorful orange and yellow sign hanging on the gate advertises a community food security project, welcoming passersby into the cultivated chaos of garden vegetation. Flanking the entrance to the garden, a produce stand is stocked with a kaleidoscope of brightly colored peppers, persimmons, chard, and salad greens, sold at cost to the ethnically diverse crowd gathered around the display. When viewed as a metaphor, this actual urban streetscape seems almost contrived—a moral standoff between garden and liquor store, nutrition and intoxication, growth and senescence, stewardship and abandon. As symbols, these two spaces have come to represent opposing forces in the struggle for food justice in the food deserts of the flatlands and elsewhere. But on a material level, these two types of food outlets have very real impacts on urban livelihoods, provisioning low-income communities with quite different types of food—fresh organic produce or highly-processed packaged food—leading to very real differences in nutritional intake and wide-reaching effects on public health.

Over the last five years, several food justice organizations such as People’s Grocery, City Slicker Farms, Village Bottom Farms, Phat Beets Produce, and Planting Justice have taken over vacant lots and underutilized park land in West and North Oakland to provide flatlands residents with fresh produce either via community supported agriculture (CSA), sliding-scale farm stands, or farmers markets. In East Oakland, Oakland Food Connection reintegrates production and consumption by teaching a curriculum that includes urban gardening and cooking classes to educate children about food culture and nutrition. PUEBLO’s Youth Harvest program works with at-risk teenagers to harvest fruit for distribution at senior centers in the Fruitvale and San Antonio neighborhoods. Several of the organizations help Oaklanders build gardens in their yards and provide mentorship from sowing to harvest. More than a hundred elementary, middle, and high schools in Oakland use gardens as classrooms to teach science, health, and nutrition. To do justice to the accomplishments of these organizations and individual activists is impossible within the scope of this chapter, as is a discussion of the radical roots and emancipatory vision of these food justice organizations.

This history of demarcated devaluation of the Oakland flatlands suggests that food deserts arise from an incredibly complex intersection of historical forces operating at multiple spatial and temporal scales. In this chapter I uncover only a few of the many sedimentary layers of the urban palimpsest, that of industrial, residential, and retail capital and some of the ways in which their ebbs and flows were spatially demarcated.
Further excavation, new geographies are still needed to more fully map the uneven terrain of food access in the flatlands. Other layers need to be uncovered: the role of food policies operating at multiple scales, from federal to local, farm subsidies to food stamps and free lunch; the politics of city contracts and bidding, development and redevelopment programs, planning and zoning; how current economic and demographic shifts in the flatlands may both fuel and fight the advances of food justice activists.

What becomes clear then is that the fight for food justice cannot be waged with urban gardens and produce stands alone. This hands-on, experiential, and participatory approach is powerful and effective, both through its ability to bring food to those in the surrounding neighborhood and to rally newcomers to the food justice movement. Yet it functions only at the microscale; even massive agglomerations of urban gardens are unlikely to meet more than 5 percent of the vegetable demands of a city such as Oakland (McClintock and Cooper 2009). The passion and vigor with which food justice activists break new ground in the urban fallows in Oakland and elsewhere must extend also to rethinking and rebuilding the entirety of the metropolitan and regional food system—production, processing, distribution, retail, and waste recovery—in both urban and peri-urban areas. Creative new economic incentives and land use protections will be needed to buffer a fledgling local food system from the continuous cycle of economic booms and busts and competitive pressures of the global food system. Perhaps most importantly, jobs paying a living wage must be fundamental to the design. Once capital flows are diverted and used to cultivate a more just food system in the urban fallows, keeping it bountiful will remain one of the great challenges.

Notes

1. The jury is still out on whether or not “food desert” is an appropriate metaphor. Food may well be available in these so-called food deserts, but it is generally of poor nutritional value. Fast food outlets may abound while fresh fruit or vegetables are nowhere in sight. Some opt for the term health food deserts or fresh food deserts while others reject the image of a bleak and parched urban landscape, opting for the lush and primordial junk food jungles. Others hope to throw out such sensationalist taxonomy altogether, with its potentially racialized subtext linking people of color to exotic and/or depraved environments. I use the term food deserts here simply in metaphorical contrast to Oakland’s history as an “industrial garden.”
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2. Rather than envisioning these relations as a nested hierarchy, however, it is helpful to think of a complex web of interconnectivity. Global economic restructuring in the neoliberal era, as well as increasing access to technology and information, have undermined and reorganized the traditional hierarchical relationships.

3. Rather than stop at an explanation of how the biophysical environment, human bodies, or social relations are transformed by flows of capital, we should also address how these flows are then resisted, reconfigured, or redirected in response. This dialectic helps unravel the classic “structure versus agency” binary by instead emphasizing the creative and destructive tension between “actors” (biophysical and social, individual and collective) operating at the same or different spatiotemporal scales. Distinguishing structure from the agency of individual actors becomes simply a question of shifting the spatiotemporal grain and extent of analysis, in essence, zooming in to identify the actions of an individual actor and zooming out to see how these individual actions operate collectively on larger scales over time and space.

4. According to Harvey’s analysis, when there is an overaccumulation of surplus capital or labor, it either seeks a spatial fix to find new spaces for investment (2001) or enters into a “second circuit” of capital, and is invested in this kind of “fixed capital” to avoid a crisis of devaluation of one or the other (1989).

5. In such cases capital actually undermines its own means of production by fouling its resource base; see James O’Connor (1998) on capitalism’s “second contradiction.”

6. In the urban morphology literature, the term urban fallow denotes derelict land and buildings, abandoned, obsolescent, and awaiting redevelopment, the final successional phase of a “burgage cycle” of urban development (Clark 2001). Viewing urban fallow as part of a broader lumpengeography of capital helps to locate these investment cycles within a larger spatial geography of capital.

7. Doreen Massey (1995) incorporates social relations into this palimpsest. Using a vivid geomorphological metaphor, she describes the series of “sedimentary layers” laid down by past cycles of investment. These layers embody not only physical fixed capital, but also the associated negotiations and struggles between capital and labor (and society more broadly).

8. As Harvey (2006) elaborates, this concentration of devaluation constitutes another form of capital accumulation by dispossession; by confining devaluation elsewhere, new sites can monopolize production.

9. Urban growth obviously does not arise of its own accord but is stewarded by a “growth machine,” a coalition/class alliance of business owners, developers, media, and industrialists (Logan and Molotch 1987). In Oakland much of the growth in the earlier part of the century was due in large part to the efforts of the city’s powerful growth machine, a class alliance that included Francis “Borax” Smith, owner of the Key System, mayors Frank Mott (in office 1905–1915) and John Davie (in office 1915–1931), and the city chamber of commerce. The dynamo at the center of it all was the conservative pro-business Oakland Tribune under the ownership of the Knowland family from 1915 to 1977. The
Knowlands’ powerful control of media consolidated the growth machine’s grip on city politics for much of the twentieth century. This growth machine resisted San Francisco’s repeated efforts to incorporate Oakland into a regional metropolis. Rather than being periphery to San Francisco’s core, Oakland’s growth machine pushed on several occasions to become the core of an East Bay metropolis (Rhomberg 2004; Self 2003; Scott [1959] 1985).

10. This promise of homeownership, which in the Hoover years had risen to be the symbolic pinnacle of American citizenship, was central to the reformist planners’ attempt to “Americanize” (read “deradicalize”) recent European immigrants and subsume them into a growing class alliance of white, working-class homeowners (Hise 1997).


12. Some argue that redlining did not actually restrict lending, but that higher interest rates in redlined areas may have prevented investment by builders and buyers (Hillier 2003).

13. As Self (2003) describes, this boundary gradually moved farther east to Telegraph Ave., the major north–south artery connecting downtown Oakland to Berkeley.

14. The ranks of the unemployed become the rank-and-file of the “industrial reserve army” (Marx [1867] 1976; Harvey 2001), brought in when necessary to meet production demands or to lower wages when production costs rise, and cast back into the reserve when no longer needed.

15. Explanations of “white flight” from the black city center largely revolve around (a) white fear of an inundation of blacks into their neighborhoods, (b) the American dream of homeownership fueled by postwar prosperity, and (c) the expansion of automobile ownership and “car culture.” While aspects of this reading of history are certainly valid, the story of suburbanization is more nuanced than this old-school view of a big bang spewing “little boxes made of ticky-tacky” outward from ground zero at the city center, pulling all the scared white folks with it. By refocusing on the greater logic of metropolitan regionalism and industrial dispersal that helped to steward extensive, dispersed residential development, we can move beyond the urban/suburban dualism and the common trope that suburbanization should be read as a rejection of the city in general (Hise 1997; Walker 1981).

16. While Oakland’s industrial economy was diversified enough that it did not suffer “the urban crisis” to the same extent as the Rust Belt cities in the Northeast and Midwest (Sugrue 2005), it nevertheless followed the same trend.

17. The state of emergency led to a host of redevelopment initiatives, including the Home Maintenance and Improvement and Urban Homesteading programs.

18. The Cypress Freeway collapsed in 1989 during the Loma Prieta earthquake, killing forty-two people. In response to public outcry over the socioeconomic
impact of its original location, the new freeway was built farther west, adjacent to the Port. The old Cypress viaduct is now Mandela Parkway.

19. Calculated using data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Business 1935, 1948, 1958, and 1967; and the U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Retail Trade 1977 and 1988 (see notes for tables 5.2 and 5.3).

20. A recent announcement by Kroger to open two new 72,000-square-foot Foods Co. stores in East Oakland made national news, one of them in Foothill Square where Lucky’s and Albertson’s stores closed their doors several years earlier.

21. A CSA is a direct-marketing arrangement that links producers and consumers. Customers purchase a share at the beginning of the season in exchange for weekly deliveries of a box of fresh produce.

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Oakland Tribune. 2007. Eastmont Mall Sold to Oregon Investors, March 16.


Alkon—Cultivating Food Justice


