

so-called "value-freedom," that Weberian term that has become a sort of middle-echelon devil in the conceptual hell of the sociological left. The *discipline of sociology*, I insist as emphatically as I can, must be value-free—however difficult this may be in some situations. The moment the discipline ceases to be value-free in principle, it ceases to be a science and becomes nothing but ideology, propaganda, and a part of the instrumentarium of political manipulation. The *practitioner of the discipline*, the sociologist—a living human being,—must *not* be value-free. The moment he is, he betrays his humanity and (in an operation that can simultaneously be called "false consciousness" and "bad faith") transforms himself into a ghostly embodiment of abstract science. These two statements about value-freedom are made, of course, in discrete frames of reference. The statement about the value-freedom of sociology is a methodological one; the statement about the value-freedom of the sociologist is ethical. But perhaps it is appropriate to conclude these observations with a little homily.

We may return here to the two images of the sociologist that were conjured up earlier—that of the sociologist as the antiseptically neutral technician and that of the sociologist as the fiercely committed partisan. I think that the sociological left has been very largely right, ethically speaking, in its denunciations of the former type (even if it has been unfair in individual instances). In an age in which not only freedom but the very survival of man is in jeopardy, there is something obscene about the scientist who claims that he is not responsible for the uses to which his science is put. This is not to deny in any way the right of individuals to live the theoretical life or to abstain from political engagement. This right, however, can be exercised more acceptably by Byzantinologists than by most sociologists. Sociology is too much linked to the agonizing dilemmas of our time to permit most of its practitioners to pursue their theoretical interests in detachment from the struggles of their fellow-men.

It is clear, beyond that, that the sociologist in the employ of politically relevant organizations cannot disclaim political responsibility for his work—a point that has been impressed on us very forcefully by the debate that followed the revelations about Project Camelot.

Because of these considerations, I emphasize my belief in the political partisanship of sociologists and concede that at times this partisanship may be quite fierce. For example, when it comes to the Pentagon's view of Latin America, my own political reactions tend to be of considerable ferociousness. It is equally important to stress, however, that the sociologist has no doctrine of redemption to bring into the political arena. What he has to contribute is the critical intelligence that is, or should be, the foundation of his discipline. This is a political *as well as* a methodological mandate. There are plenty of passions available, and the sociologist may well participate in some of them. His distinctive contribution to politics should be his consistent, unswerving application of critical intelligence—to the status quo, yes, and to any challengers of the status quo. Indeed, when a sociologist joins a revolutionary movement (an option I have indicated I would not normally prescribe), his most important political contribution to it will be his ongoing critique *of it*. Put differently, my principal objection to most of my radicalized colleagues is not that they are engaged in the business of "bringing to consciousness" but that they are not doing enough of it.

To whom will such a conception of the sociologist's role appeal? Evidently not to those who simply want a career in any kind of establishment—and not to those who see themselves as Messianic figures. It is all too clear that both such types are strongly represented in American sociology today. I have found, however, and not least among my students, that there are others—those who are still willing to commit themselves militantly to reason. And reason has its own seductiveness.