IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC., et al., CA No. 1:18-cv-02610-TJK

Plaintiffs, Washington, D.C.

v. Friday, November 16, 2018

10:00 a.m.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY J. KELLY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiffs: Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Esq.

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Proceedings recorded by machine shorthand; transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.

## 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, this is civil 3 matter 18-2610, Cable News Network, Incorporated, et al., v. 4 Donald J. Trump, et al. 5 Will counsel please approach the lectern and state 6 your appearance for the record. 7 MR. BOUTROUS: Good morning, Your Honor. Theodore Boutrous for Plaintiffs CNN and Jim Acosta. 8 9 THE COURT: Good morning, sir. 10 MS. CHAMPION: Good morning, Your Honor. Champion from Gibson Dunn for Plaintiffs CNN and Jim Acosta. 11 12 MR. LIPSHUTZ: Good morning, Your Honor. Joshua 13 Lipshutz from Gibson Dunn for Plaintiffs CNN and Jim Acosta. 14 THE COURT: Good morning. 15 MR. BURNHAM: Good morning, Your Honor. James 16 Burnham here on behalf of the defendants, along with Michael 17 Baer, Eric Womack and Joseph Borson. 18 THE COURT: All right. Good morning to you all. We are here for an oral ruling on the plaintiffs' 19 20 application for a temporary restraining order. 21 And I'd better get some water right away here. 22 (Brief pause.) 23 On November 7th, 2018, President Trump held a news 24 conference at the White House. Soon after it started, he 25 called on Plaintiff Acosta, a reporter for CNN, to take a

question from him. After Mr. Acosta asked several questions about the caravan of migrants heading to the U.S.-Mexican border, the President indicated that he wanted to move on to call on another reporter but Mr. Acosta would not be seated and continued trying to ask his question and then he would not give up the microphone, even when approached by an intern employed by the White House Press Office who attempted to retrieve it from him. The President made several comments toward Mr. Acosta while this happened, including, You are a rude, terrible person, and, When you report fake news which CNN does a lot, you are an enemy of the people. Eventually, Mr. Acosta did relinquish the microphone.

Mr. Acosta to relinquish his hard pass, his credential that allows him access to the White House press facilities. That same evening, the White House Press Secretary, Sarah Sanders, posted a video on Twitter purporting to show the exchange between Mr. Acosta, the intern and the President. In a tweet, Ms. Sanders cited the conduct in the video as the reason that Mr. Acosta's hard pass had been revoked. In a tweet, she characterized Mr. Acosta as placing her hand — his hands on the intern and she also asserted that Mr. Acosta had been disrespectful to his colleagues to not allow them to — the opportunity to answer a question.

The next day, on November 8th, CNN sent a letter to the White House requesting that Ms. -- the reporter's credentials be reinstated immediately. CNN alleged that the White House simply did not like the content of the questions posed to the President and threatened to take legal action if the revocation was not reversed.

The next day, on November 9th, the President suggested that other reporters might have their credentials revoked and that reporters must treat the White House with respect and treat the presidency with respect and he also conceded that Mr. Acosta's -- but he also conceded that Mr. Acosta's conduct toward the Press Office intern had not been overly horrible.

Then the long holiday weekend intervened. And on the morning of Tuesday, November 13th, CNN and Mr. Acosta filed this lawsuit and moved for a temporary restraining order.

That morning, after -- the same morning, after the suit was filed, Ms. Sanders issued a written statement setting forth reasons for the revocation of Ms. -- Mr.

Acosta's hard pass. It read: We have been advised that CNN has filed a complaint challenging the suspension of Jim Acosta's hard pass. This is just more grandstanding from CNN and we will vigorously defend against this lawsuit.

CNN, who has nearly 50 additional hard pass holders, and Mr.

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Acosta is no more or less special than any other media outlet or reporter with respect to the First Amendment. After Mr. Acosta asked the President two questions, each of which the President answered, he physically refused to surrender a White House microphone to an intern so that other reporters might ask their questions. This was not the first time this reporter had -- has inappropriately refused to yield to other reporters. The White House cannot run an orderly and fair press conference when a reporter acts this way which is neither appropriate nor professional. The First Amendment is not served when a single reporter, of more than 150 present, attempts to monopolize the floor. Ιf there is no check on this type of behavior, it impedes the ability of the President, the White House staff and members of the media to conduct business.

To obtain a temporary restraining order, the plaintiffs must clearly demonstrate, one, a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim; two, a likely irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; three, a balance of the -- that the balance of the equities is in their favor; and, four, that the TRO is in the public interest. And where the Government is the party opposing the TRO, the Court merges the latter two factors into a single inquiry.

Much of our discussion at the hearing the other

day concerned the applicability or inapplicability of the D.C. Circuit case Sherrill v. Knight. I'm going to first talk about the likelihood of success of [sic] the merits with regard to the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment due process claim.

Much of our discussion at the hearing concerned the applicability of Sherrill v. Knight. I've read the case closely and I think it's fair to conclude, as the Government argued, that there are at least some portions of it that plaintiffs would rely on that are fairly characterized as dicta, but if Sherrill stands for anything at all, I think it's unavoidable to conclude that it — to conclude anything other than it stands for the Fifth Amendment's due process clause protects a reporter's First Amendment liberty interest in a White House press pass. Whether that's a holding I agree with or not is another thing, but that is not relevant. The case has not been abrogated and, as a district judge, I must apply the precedent of this circuit as I see it.

So let me quote from Sherrill. Quote, In our view, the procedural requirements of notice and the factual basis for denial and opportunity for the applicant to respond to these and a final written statement of the reasons for denial are compelled by the foregoing determination that the interest of a bona fide Washington

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correspondent in obtaining a White House press pass is protected by the First Amendment. This First Amendment interest undoubtedly qualifies as liberty which may not be denied without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.

A few more words about Sherrill before I move on.

The Government argued that the holding of Sherrill is limited to Secret Service restrictions based on security concerns, and the Government points out there's nothing in the record here that the security of the President or the White House is at issue, but Sherrill, as I read it, provides no reason why the court's recognition of a First Amendment interest in a press pass -- in a White House press pass would turn on whether that decision to limit that interest was made by the White House Press Office or the Secret Service or any other part of the executive branch, and the case suggests no reason to me why the due process required to deny someone a pass would turn on a specific component of the executive branch that made that decision. The court was very clear that the basis of this interest was rooted in the First Amendment and not the decision of any part of the executive branch to agree that Sherrill should be granted the press pass.

The Government also made the point that there is case law for the proposition that the public doesn't have a general First Amendment right to enter the White House

grounds. I have no quarrel with that at all, but Sherrill holds that once the White House opens a portion of it up to reporters for their use, some kind of First Amendment liberty interest protected by a due process right is created, and I simply have no choice but to apply that precedent here.

The Government also argued that some of the factual underpinnings of Sherrill had changed and that today, the White House routinely exercises discretion in different ways, giving out hard passes to certain journalists aside from whatever review the Secret Service undertakes for security purposes. I can see how that might be relevant in examining the nature of whatever liberty interest Sherrill holds is at stake here, but even assuming that was a distinction that would make a difference in terms of how I apply Sherrill, I don't have any evidence in the record here; I don't have any declarations or sworn statements that explain how that factual landscape has shifted since Sherrill was decided.

And, finally, the Government makes the point that the First Amendment does not restrict the ability of the President to dictate the terms of how he chooses to engage or not engage with any particular journalist. That seems entirely correct to me, but nothing in the holding of Sherrill relating to the Fifth Amendment due process right

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it recognized contradicts that. In fact, Sherrill explicitly recognizes the President's right to engage with whomever he pleases. Certainly, he need not ever call on Mr. Acosta again. But under Sherrill, as I read it, the government must provide Mr. Acosta due process if it is to revoke his hard pass. Accordingly, the likelihood that the plaintiffs succeed on the First -- on the Fifth Amendment claim hinges on whether the government provided adequate due process to Mr. Acosta. The court in Sherrill held that this process must include notice, an opportunity to rebut the government's reasons and a written decision. And all the court -- although the court in Sherrill did not have occasion to address it, when an important interest is at stake and when the government is able to provide this process before deprivation, it generally must do so. is no evidence that one of the few exceptions to this rule would apply here such as some kind of emergency. So I do hold that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that adequate process was not provided to Mr. Acosta. Indeed, whatever process occurred within the government is still so shrouded in mystery that the Government could not tell me at oral argument who made the initial decision to revoke Mr. Acosta's press pass -his hard pass.

On the notice, as for notice, the Government

points to only one statement that could possibly constitute prior notice to Mr. Acosta that his pass would be revoked, the President's statements to him during the exchange at the press conference on November 7th, but the President's statements did not revoke -- did not reference Mr. Acosta's hard pass at all, let alone that it would be revoked; therefore, that statement cannot have put him on notice of the government's intention to revoke it.

Now, it is true that the public and Mr. Acosta were eventually provided two things. First, explanations as to why his hard pass was revoked through Ms. Sanders's tweets; and a written statement of explanation, apparently prompted by this litigation, but given their timing and their lack of connection to Mr. Acosta's opportunity to rebut -- which we'll talk about in a moment -- these belated efforts were hardly sufficient to satisfy due process.

As for Mr. Acosta's opportunity to be heard in rebuttal, the Government points to the letter CNN sent to the White House the day after his hard pass was revoked, but this does not reflect a meaningful opportunity to rebut the government's reasons for the revocation or to challenge the appropriateness of the government's action. Indeed, anyone can avail themselves of the mail, and there's nothing in the record that demonstrates that whoever the decisionmaker — the initial decisionmaker was in this case read or

considered the letter. And, of course, the letter was sent after the revocation, not beforehand. The need for the opportunity to be heard seems especially important in this case when the record strongly suggests that one of the initial specific reasons for the revocation cited by the government -- that Mr. Acosta laid his hands on the White House intern -- was likely untrue and was at least partly based on evidence that was of questionable accuracy.

At oral argument, the Government made the point that more process would not have helped here because the ultimate decisionmaker -- I believe, is how the Government referred to the President -- at a minimum, ratified this action. Maybe that's so, but on the record before me which, at this point, is devoid of evidence concerning who, in the government, first reached this decision; how they reached the decision; whether they considered CNN's letter or whether they considered potential other responses by the government, I simply cannot assume that that would be so.

So in light of all the above, I find that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Fifth Amendment due process claim.

I'll now talk about irreparable harm with regard to that claim.

The plaintiffs also must demonstrate that irreparable harm will result in the absence of preliminary

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relief. That harm must be both certain and great, and it must be actual and not theoretical. Here, harm to Mr. Acosta has already occurred. As already explained, he's demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim that his Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated such that his liberty interests were deprived; therefore, I don't need to speculate or theorize as to whether harm will occur absent preliminary relief, but for plaintiffs to satisfy their burden, the harm must be irreparable. Constitutional injuries are often considered irreparable due to their very nature. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has held that, quote, Suits for declaratory and injunctive relief against the threatened invasion of a constitutional right do not ordinarily require proof of any injury other than the threatened constitutional deprivation itself, closed quote.

On the other hand, procedural due process injuries do not necessarily cause irreparable harm when, for example, the thing that is deprived is tangible property, because the due process violation that led to that injury might be reparable with money damages. Here, the procedural due process violation at issue that has led to the deprivation — to a deprivation of what Sherrill requires me to recognize as a liberty interest as opposed to a property interest that's grounded in, quote, The First Amendment

guarantee of freedom of the press, closed quote.

Moreover, the First Amendment interests, as recognized in Sherrill, were not vested merely in publications or agencies. They were liberties of the individual journalists themselves. For that reason, that CNN may still send another journalist or other journalist to the White House does not make the harm to Mr. Acosta any less irreparable. Each day that he is deprived of that interest without the process prescribed by the court in Sherrill, he suffers a harm that cannot be remedied in retrospect. The Court cannot restore his access to press briefings that have already occurred or to conversations in the White House press facilities that have already been had.

And so on this highly, highly unusual set of facts and interests at stake, I do find that the plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing that irreparable harm has and will continue to occur in the absence of preliminary relief.

The next factors are the balance of the equities and the public interests.

In balancing the equities at stake, I find that the harm to Mr. Acosta from sustaining an ongoing violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights outweighs the government's interest in orderly, respectful press conferences. This is especially so because the government

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can serve its stated interest in other ways during this litigation or perhaps until it is back before me arguing that their due process obligations had been fulfilled. Obviously, the balance of the equities would not likely have come out this way if Mr. Acosta had been excluded for safety or security reasons, in which case, my deference to the executive equities would be far, far higher. But even in this circumstance, I don't take lightly the executive branch's weighty general interest in control of its White House press facility, but the balance here is tipped by the fact that Sherrill obligates me to recognize the violation of Mr. Acosta's due process rights and the resulting impact on his First Amendment interests. So in finding -- also, in finding that these factors favor the plaintiffs, I have also considered case law that suggests that constitutional violations are always contrary to the public's interest.

So because the plaintiffs have shown a likelihood that the government has violated Mr. Acosta's Fifth Amendment rights under Sherrill, because the type of injury he has suffered is irreparable and because the public interest in the balance of equities favor granting a temporary restraining order, I will grant the application for a -- for the temporary restraining order here. I will order the defendants immediately restore Mr. Acosta's hard pass until further order of the Court or the restraining

order expires. And if, at some point after restoring the hard pass, the Government would like to move to vacate the restraining order on the grounds that it has fulfilled its due process obligations, then it may, of course, do so and I will promptly address that and then the remaining bases for the TRO.

I want to emphasize the very limited nature of today's ruling. In resolving this TRO, I haven't -- because I've found that it must be granted on -- as to the due process claim, I haven't had to reach the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim at all in which they alleged that the government engaged in viewpoint or content discrimination. So I want to make very clear a couple of things. I have not determined that the First Amendment was violated here; I have not determined what legal standard would apply to the First Amendment claim here; I have not determined the specific nature of the First Amendment interest that Sherrill recognizes -- or that Sherrill at least doesn't describe but recognizes, yes; and I haven't determined what portions of Sherrill, if any, would bind me on those questions.

So let me turn to the parties, then, and suggest that as far as procedurally moving forward goes, one -- the avenue I thought of is to give you all some time to consult with your clients; assess your positions; and come back

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early next week -- perhaps Tuesday afternoon -- to see how
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       you all would like to proceed from here. I trust the --
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       this litigation will continue in a rapid pace. Either
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       party?
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                 MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you. Thank you very much,
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       Your Honor.
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                 That sounds like a good process to us. We can
       confer. We may be able to just confer and then report back
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       Monday with the proposal and see if we can work out either a
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       briefing schedule for the preliminary injunction or
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       something else and, if not, we can just come back and see
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       you on Tuesday.
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                 THE COURT: All right. So your proposal would be
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       a written joint report for the parties --
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                 MR. BOUTROUS: Would that --
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                 THE COURT: -- on Monday?
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                 MR. BOUTROUS: Yeah. Would that work for the
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       Court?
                 THE COURT: All right. That's fine, if that's --
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       but I'd like to hear from Mr. Burnham.
                 MR. BURNHAM: Your Honor, I'd like to talk to our
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       clients.
                 That should be okay, but I'd just like to talk to
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       our clients and come up with a proposal before we --
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                 THE COURT: Absolutely. I mean, we can't have any
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       quicker turnaround than a joint report --
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                 MR. BURNHAM: Right.
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                 THE COURT: -- on Monday. So --
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                 MR. BURNHAM: Right.
                 THE COURT: I mean, I --
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                 MR. BURNHAM: The timing certainly works for us.
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       Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: Fair enough. So I'll get that report.
      Obviously, if you can agree on something, great; if you
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       can't agree, if you would still submit it jointly but just
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       lay out your respective positions on where we go from here,
       I'll take that under advisement, and my hope is -- well,
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       depending on what you all agree to, if we need to come back
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       to court next week, even though it's the short week -- the
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      holiday -- I will be available to do that.
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                 MR. BURNHAM: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right.
                 MR. BOUTROUS: We greatly appreciate it, Your
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      Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right.
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                 MR. BOUTROUS: And then just procedurally, under
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       the TRO, we'll just proceed to get the hard pass back
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       immediately and have it reactivated. Thank you very much.
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                 THE COURT: Yes. Is there any other -- anything
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       further -- else from the plaintiffs that you think I need to
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       address today before I turn to Mr. Burnham?
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                 MR. BOUTROUS: I think that's it, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right.
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                 MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you.
                 THE COURT: Sir?
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                 MR. BURNHAM: So Your Honor, under the local
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       rules, our opposition to the PI is due on Tuesday.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
                 MR. BURNHAM: Would it be okay, given all that's
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       going on, to suspend that deadline until we file our joint
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       status report?
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                 THE COURT: Yeah. I assume the plaintiffs --
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                 MR. BURNHAM: I assume --
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                 THE COURT: -- would agree to that.
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                 MR. BURNHAM: We haven't spoken about it.
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                 THE COURT: Yes.
                 MR. BOUTROUS: That's fine with --
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                 MR. BURNHAM: Okay.
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                 MR. BOUTROUS: That's fine with us, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: Yeah. So that deadline certainly will
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       be, you know, held in abeyance --
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                 MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: -- vacated until I get your report and
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       we'll see where we go from there.
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                 MR. BURNHAM: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right.
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1	MR. BOUTROUS: Thank you.
2	THE COURT: If there's nothing further, then,
3	counsel's dismissed.
4	THE DEPUTY CLERK: All rise. This Honorable Court
5	is adjourned.
6	(Proceedings concluded at 10:28 a.m.)
7	* * * * * * * * * *
8	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
9	I, TIMOTHY R. MILLER, RPR, CRR, NJ-CCR, do hereby certify
10	that the above and foregoing constitutes a true and accurate
11	transcript of my stenographic notes and is a full, true and
12	complete transcript of the proceedings to the best of my
13	ability, dated this 16th day of November 2018.
14	/s/Timothy R. Miller, RPR, CRR, NJ-CCR Official Court Reporter
15	United States Courthouse Room 6722
16	333 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001
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