THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF VISIBLE MINORITIES IN ELECTORAL DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARISON OF FRANCE, DENMARK, AND CANADA

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This article examines political representation among visible ethnic minorities in France, Denmark and Canada. Drawing from these cases, it proposes a general model for comparing patterns of visible minority representation. Three sets of factors—citizenship regimes, institutional features and interest constellations—interact to shape the political opportunity structure for ethnic minority representation. Because these factors vary across and within countries, the result is very different levels of representation from one country to another, as well as important local differences within each country. Configurations across these three factors also have an important impact on the electoral strategies of individual ethnic candidates, and determine the style and substance of ethnic representation in each country.

Introduction

For varied reasons, visible ethnic minorities have long been absent or notably under-represented in the legislatures of established electoral democracies. In some countries, even as late as the mid-twentieth century, selected racial groups were explicitly excluded from franchise. Long waits for citizenship have also kept many migrant minorities off the voting rolls for several years after their arrival, while other countries deny them (and in some cases their children) citizenship altogether. Language barriers, lack of familiarity with a new political system, and conditions of poverty and social exclusion are other factors that have depressed the political participation, and in turn, the political representation of ethnic minorities. Wherever they are densely concentrated, ethnic communities have often attracted the interest of political parties. For example, through much of the early wave of immigrant settlement to the northeastern United States, the Democratic Party machinery

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dispensed funds and favors to ethnic power-brokers in return for delivering their communities’ vote. Yet the participation of ethnic minorities within such systems was largely meaningless, and little input beyond their vote was ever sought. Parties were reluctant to field candidates from ethnic communities, and few were ever elected to political office.1 Recently though, things have begun to change. Visible minorities have not yet made spectacular gains towards more equitable political representation, but significant improvements are apparent in many countries. While it remains intrinsically difficult to measure the level or the quality of their political representation, what interests us in this article is why visible minorities are beginning to attract attention in terms of political representation. What factors tend to produce better levels of representation in some places than in others, and what are the characteristics of minorities who emerge as elected representatives in these countries? This article examines political representation among visible ethnic minorities in France, Denmark, and Canada.2 It describes developments over the last few years in each of these countries, and suggests a theoretical model to account for quantitative and qualitative differences in ethnic representation, both across and within these countries.

The Scope of Analysis

The dynamics of group identity, residential patterns, and opportunities for political mobilization are essential factors that must feature prominently in explaining levels of ethnic minority representation. Differences in electoral rules and candidate nomination procedures are also important. All of these factors vary and interact in complex ways not only across countries, but also from city to city within a single locale. It is as a consequence of this complexity that almost all of the empirical research done in this area consists of single case studies. A number of these are country-level studies, while others have concentrated on individual cities where there are large ethnic populations.3 These single case studies are highly descriptive, yet tend to be circumscribed by the unique features animating elections and by the characteristics of a particular ethnic group in a given locale.

At a higher level of theoretical abstraction, scholars like Anne Phillips, Melissa Williams, and Jane Mansbridge have succeeded
in working out a set of helpful principles under which measures to enhance political representation for historically marginalized groups may be democratically justifiable. This work has made an important contribution to democratic and multicultural theory, especially within the Anglo-American context. However, it has generally ignored the complex interaction between macro-level political institutions and micro-level processes of identity formation and collective mobilization among particular groups. The theoretical research on descriptive representation can also be criticized for its failure to differentiate sufficiently among groups. The under-representation of ethnic minorities, women, disabled people, the poor, gays and lesbians (and so on) is often addressed in a single stroke, despite the fact that the opportunities for political mobilization within and across such groups can differ quite substantially. Political movements and advances (in some countries) in women’s political representation serve as inspiration for better representation for visible minorities. But empirically, it is not the case that all marginalized groups are equally underrepresented, nor are the reasons for under-representation (or over-representation) identical across groups. In fact, explanations for actual patterns of representation across diverse groups require such different theoretical models that it is only minimally helpful to consider these groups together.

An apparent increase in political participation among visible minorities in many countries, along with growing attention of political parties to these voters, makes it more important than ever to examine the dynamics of ethnic representation in comparative context. This article charts out a middle ground of theoretical-empirical analysis on visible minority representation in politics. It draws together the threads of highly descriptive, single case studies and proposes an analytical model for understanding patterns of visible minority representation across political systems.

The democracies examined here were selected because they differ significantly on three counts. First, they represent very different models of how a political community should deal with ethnic minorities; second, they demonstrate significant variations in terms of their electoral systems; and third, they have different histories of migration and therefore quite distinctive minority populations. All of these factors are theorized to account for differences in patterns of political representation. Yet there is considerable
variation in some of these factors within countries, as well as across them. This within-country variation provides further leverage in understanding the effects of particular features of the political opportunity structure, and in explaining why visible minority representation varies at different levels and in different spaces within a country. Extensive fieldwork was undertaken in each country, and interviews were conducted with political candidates, elected office-holders and party strategists from a cross-section of political parties, as well as leaders within various ethnic communities and non-governmental organizations.

*Conceptual Framework for Comparing Visible Minority Representation in Politics*

To assess the capacity for visible minority representation, this article draws on the concept of political opportunity structures. This concept, initially developed in the context of research on social movements, denotes the degree of openness or accessibility of a given political system for movement initiators. In a very influential study, Herbert Kitschelt describes political opportunity structures as “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others.”

A model of the political opportunity structure for visible minority representation is presented in Figure 1. This model highlights the role of collective identity and capacity for political mobilization within ethnic groups, as well as the responsiveness of the party and political system to such mobilization. Moreover, the model implies that differences in levels of ethnic representation are always the result of a complex configuration of causal elements. In some contexts, a certain feature may produce higher levels of visible minority representation, whereas it may depress it or prove insignificant in other contexts.

These elements can be condensed into three general factors: *citizenship regimes, interest constellations,* and *institutions*. A country’s citizenship regime includes its rules of access to citizenship (legal rights), and the cultural rights of citizenship (cultural assimilation or cultural pluralism). In countries where immigrants enjoy easy
access to citizenship and voting rights, and where ethnic minorities are recognized as possessing a distinct culture and set of interests, they should be more likely to mobilize and achieve political representation as a group. Countries that are officially multicultural may even have formal measures in place to promote ethnic minority participation and representation in politics. Yet patterns of political mobilization and representation vary significantly for different groups, even when they are subject to the same formal rules and rights of citizenship. One important consideration is the historical relationship between receiving and sending societies. For example,
post-colonial minorities may be subject to old colonial stereotypes, and may be viewed by the majority population and by party leaders as less qualified to participate in the task of government (this appears to be the case regarding people of Maghrebin origin in France). Another important element of a citizenship regime is the extent to which it produces equal social and economic rights. Where large portions of the ethnic minority in a country are unemployed and segmented within the labor force and housing market, if they are poor, or lacking in basic educational and health services, they are less likely to enjoy the resources necessary to achieve political representation.

Ethnic groups may also differ widely in their interest in political participation (as seen in the comparison of East Asians and Chinese Canadians in the Toronto area). These differences may spring from the degree of (dis)similarity between the political cultures of the sending and receiving societies, and from a group’s length of settlement in a community. The potential for political mobilization of an ethnic group is also related to its size and spatial density, the completeness of its social institutions, and resources such as communication networks and leadership. Ethnic groups may do especially well in terms of representation if their spatial location corresponds with electoral boundaries, if they can be mobilized to vote as a bloc, and if they are located in a competitive constituency where they can deliver seats for one party at the expense of another.

Collective mobilization of ethnic minorities is well and good, but its effects in terms of representation will be muted if the political system is not responsive to such action. The responsiveness of the political system to ethnic mobilization is determined by a number of factors. Countries with a more participatory democratic culture may be more likely to draw upon the leadership resources of ethnic communities, while those with a more rigid political elite may be resistant to promoting political outsiders as candidates. Parties with democratic candidate selection rules may be more likely to nominate visible minorities in districts where they are numerous, but alternatively less likely to nominate them in districts where their numbers are very small. Factors such as strong party competition, a high degree of legislative turnover, and public funding for political campaigns may also make political systems more open to ethnic minority candidates.
In addition to exogenous factors affecting the propensity to elect visible minority representatives, we must not neglect the role of individual candidates. Visible minority candidates use ethnicity in a selective and entrepreneurial fashion. Indeed, impression management of one’s identity may be a particularly important element of political strategy for visible minority candidates. As conceptualized within Figure 1, candidates are expected to develop an electoral strategy based upon the political opportunity structure within their country and/or local community. Especially if they choose to address themselves to the ethnic minority community, these candidates may in turn become a factor in the political identity and mobilization of those groups. However, ethnic candidacies are rarely pitched exclusively toward ethnic voters. One of the most interesting characteristics of successful visible minority candidates is the way they manage the multiple and sometimes contradictory demands of their political party, their own ethnic community, and majority voters. As discussed below, visible minority candidates may adopt different mobilization strategies and enjoy different configurations of voter support, depending on such factors as their age, gender and socio-economic status.

Those factors that vary at the level of country may be classified as macro-contextual, and are expected to impact opportunities for minority representation at all jurisdictions and locales within a country. Micro-contextual factors are expected to produce differences in ethnic minority representation at the very local level—depending, for example, on the characteristics and settlement patterns of a particular ethnic group within a particular city—even where macro-contextual influences remain constant. Meso-level factors lie at the middle range. A good example is electoral rules, which vary at different jurisdictions within a country and therefore may produce very different patterns of minority representation for the same group in municipal politics compared to national politics. Micro-contextual factors tend to be particularly decisive in determining the electoral success of ethnic minority candidates, and studying them requires deep familiarity with both national and local race politics. Speaking of ethnic minority political representation in the UK, Saggar and Geddes write (p. 28): “It is the local dynamics of race politics in the UK that are fundamental. . . because it is at the local level that the complex tapestry of British race politics has been woven.”

The conceptual framework in Figure 1
acknowledges the importance of these micro-level factors, yet examining these micro-level dynamics systematically across countries is an exceptional challenge, requiring coordinated data collection among various ethnic groups, within several local communities, across several countries.\textsuperscript{10} In this article, I pay selective attention to micro-contextual factors, and describe only a few instances where local characteristics impact minority representation. While every feature of this model will not be given equal attention in the discussion countries to follow, it nevertheless suggests a useful framework for the fruitful comparison of visible minority representation across diverse groups and distinctive political systems.

In the following sections, I describe differences in patterns of visible minority representation in France, Denmark, and Canada, and discuss the principal features that account for these differences. While there are signs of statistical improvement in the political representation of visible minorities across all three countries, the gains are not consistent, nor are they clearly linked to substantive improvement in the representation of ethnic minority interests.

\textbf{Post-Colonial Legacies and the Political Promotion of Ethnic Elites: The Fragile Emergence of Visible Minority Representation in France}

French law makes it impossible to count the size of the country's ethno-religious minority population.\textsuperscript{11} Nevertheless, estimates place the total number of non-European foreigners, immigrants, and second-generation descendants, along with migrants from overseas departments living within the French “hexagon” at between 6 and 7 million (about 10 to 12 per cent). The most significant group is the Franco-Arab/Muslim/Maghrebi/Beur minority (the terms are used interchangeably in the present discussion, though there are differences), who are estimated to number about 6.5 per cent of the total population.\textsuperscript{12} France has the largest Muslim population, in per capita as well as absolute terms, of any country within Western Europe. In contrast, it is quite easy to count the number of visible minorities elected to French political office. There are currently none among the 574 representatives in the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{13} Across the history of the Fifth Republic, there has been just a single visible minority representative to
parliament. There had been no visible minorities among the 321 members of the French Senate, until September 2004, when the first two were promoted to that office. Until the most recent cantonal and regional elections held in March 2004, there were just three visible minorities among the more than 4,500 conseillers généraux seated within the 96 departmental parliaments across France, and just five among the more than 1,700 conseillers régionaux seated across 22 regional parliaments. Across more than 36,000 French cities and towns, there are just three mayors and a little over 100 councilors of minority ethnic background. Regardless of the evidently complex relationship between numerical and substantive representation, visible minorities are staggering absent among all levels of French elected office. These figures make the French political system the least inclusive among the three countries studied here.

There are manifold causes of under-representation of visible minorities. However, the key explanation for France’s distinctively poor record lies in the intersection of two features: its officially assimilationist citizenship regime; and a political system in which party leaders enjoy broad discretion in promoting ethnic elites with little if any democratic negotiation.

The French Citizenship Regime

Of the three countries examined in this article, France has a moderately open citizenship regime. Access to French nationality is based on a mixture of jus soli and jus sanguinis: most children born on French soil to immigrants or non-citizens are granted French nationality immediately, as are children born outside of France where at least one parent is a French citizen. For others, nationality can be granted after five uninterrupted years of legal residency (compared to nine years in Denmark, and three in Canada). With legal citizenship come full political—including voting—rights.

Legal citizenship is not an exclusive precondition of political rights. Under the terms of the 1991 Treaty of Maastricht, non-citizens living in France who are citizens of another EU-member country enjoy the right to vote and stand for office in local and European elections in France. However, non-European foreigners in France do not enjoy this right. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
immigration organizations called for municipal voting rights for non-Europeans, but this demand has been continually rejected by the French government. In theory, the length of residency requirement for nationality and the lack of voting rights for third-country nationals dilute the size of the politically eligible ethnic minority and limit the capacity for political mobilization among this group. In fact, France is a relatively “old” immigration society, such that the vast proportion of visible minorities are either second- or third-generation citizens.\textsuperscript{17} Many others are internal migrants from French colonies or overseas territories, and these people have always, in a legal sense, been full French citizens.

More significant than limited access to citizenship and voting rights are the limited cultural rights granted ethnic minorities under France’s assimilationist model of citizenship. France has traditionally viewed the retention of ethnic identity as an obstacle to both integration and national solidarity, and so immigrants and their descendants, as well as territorial minorities, are expected to give up their cultural identity, linguistic distinctiveness, and so on, in return for the full benefits of French citizenship. In the past, this has meant limited rights of association for ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{18} France’s long tradition of equating French citizenship with equal treatment has also meant that the state does not track ethnic origins in official statistics. It has been historically difficult to document and punish hate crimes and acts of racial discrimination, given that race as a category has been assumed not to exist. Finally, this has meant that, until recently, there has been little attention in France to the problem of descriptive under-representation in political assemblies.

While still \textit{de rigeur} in theory, France’s traditional republican principle of non-differentiation among citizens has become increasingly unworkable.\textsuperscript{19} A new openness toward ethnicity has been prompted by international as well as domestic events. Recent European directives including, notably, Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, have forced France to examine more carefully its legal and judicial approach to the problem of racial discrimination. The parity law of 2000, requiring an equal number of male and female candidates for most French elections, has effectively toppled the notion of undifferentiated representation, and lifted the old taboo against affirmative action.\textsuperscript{20} Slowly breaking with the French model of integration that emphasized French
identity over ethnic identities, new terms have emerged to help identify these communities, such as the “second generation” or “français issu de l’immigration.”21 And new movements are arising to challenge the political marginalization of these groups. Most have remained local, but a few have attained a national scope.22 These movements have helped push the issue of ethnic representation out of the shadows, and parties have responded by strategizing more carefully to attract the support of ethnic voters. But they have not fundamentally improved the representation of visible minorities in electoral politics.

Party Strategies

While the question of minority political representation had received some attention locally in the 1980s, it was the presidential election of April-May 2002 that propelled the issue into the national spotlight. This was the election in which extreme right-wing candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen reached the second round, against right-of-centre incumbent Jacques Chirac. Chirac’s overwhelming victory (he received 82 per cent of the vote) reflected both the support of left-wing voters without a socialist candidate and the significant mobilization of ethnic minorities registering their opposition against the extreme right. The results led throngs of visible minority citizens to celebrate in the streets, optimistic that the new government would make strides toward addressing minority—especially Franco-Arab—issues and aims.23 One initial step, many argued, should be the inclusion of more minorities in government. But the governing party has fallen far short of expectations.

Immediately following the presidential election of 2002, the government appointed the first ever Franco-Arabs to sub-ministerial political positions. Tokia Saifi—the daughter of Algerian immigrants—became the new Secretary of State for sustainable development, while Hamlaoui Mekachera—a former Algerian officer in the French army—was named Minister for veterans. The government also named four people of French-Arab origin to ministerial advisory positions. But their duties have been principally directed towards shoring up political support within the minority community, and they enjoy little credibility within policy circles.24 In a telling sign, not a single person from the North...
African community won a seat in the parliamentary elections of June 2002 which were carried easily by Chirac’s party.

During regional elections held across France in March 2004, there was further optimism that visible minority candidates would be placed in winnable positions on the mainstream party lists. The UMP promised a strong showing of “candidates of foreign origin” in eligible positions. Tokia Saifi, with her ministerial advisor (and spouse) Amo Ferhati, vetted 300 local councillors of visible minority background to prepare of a list of potential candidates, which they presented to the party leadership. The party bowed, as it typically does, to the local barons who largely control the candidate selection process. The UMP lists for regional elections ultimately included fewer than six visible minorities in eligible positions, and none was elected. Several immigrant-origin candidates who were not in a position to be elected abandoned their candidacies in protest. Ms. Saifi protested at first, and then fell silent.

At first blush, the UMP appears as the most “minority friendly” of the mainstream French parties. Nicolas Sarkozy—currently the president of the UMP and a certain contender in the battle to become the party’s presidential candidate in 2007—is the key actor to watch in this respect. Sarkozy has assumed an innovative posture with respect to France’s Muslim population, arguing for a new relationship between ethno-religious communities and the public authorities. While Minister of the Interior (2002–2004), Sarkozy made much fanfare of appointing the first “Muslim” prefect to administer national policy at the departmental level. He also sponsored and then accredited a Muslim umbrella group called the French Council of the Muslim Religion (CFCM), to become the official interlocutor of Muslims in representing their religious interests before the public authorities. While apparently friendlier to Muslim interests and forms of political representation than other party leaders, Sarkozy’s tactics feed upon growing distrust in French–minority relations. His intent is to grant moderate Muslims a place in the republic, while strongly signalling the need to control clandestine Islamic activity. For example, Sarkozy has insisted that Muslim women must remove their headscarves when being photographed for French identity cards.

Like the UMP, the Socialist Party has also sought to develop a stronger base of electoral support among ethnic minorities. At the party’s annual congress in May 2003, members generated a
thematic contribution, entitled *Lutter contre les discriminations politiques au sein du Parti socialiste*, intended to promote more ethnic minorities within the party leadership. Following the approval of this text, the party elected two people of French-Arab origin as national secretaries (there had been none). It later selected one of these individuals, Bariza Khiari, as a candidate for Senate, a position to which she was elected in the fall 2004. Yet the Socialist Party’s record in nominating visible minority candidates in national and regional elections has been little better than that of the UMP. The Socialists swept the regional elections in 2004, winning all but two of France’s 22 regional parliaments and capturing over 80 per cent of the 1,700 contested seats, yet they elected no more than 20 visible minorities. The Greens and the Communists have been more likely to include visible minorities as candidates, but these small parties generally win few seats.

*A Closed Political System*

One of the most striking observations of France is the almost complete absence of visible minority representatives within local politics, including within the *banlieues* of major cities, which host the densest concentrations of citizens of immigrant origin. This is not because the ethnic population has been lacking in associative life and organizational capacity. Rather, political parties have failed to capitalize upon the rich and lively associative life within these neighbourhoods. The left in particular has missed its “rendez-vous” with this youthful cadre of ethnic leaders. Part of the explanation for the exceptional marginalization of ethnic minorities in local politics lies in the history of social housing development in impoverished French suburbs, and the pattern of clientelistic political authority that became established in those places. And part lies in the particular structure of local politics in France.

During the immediate post-war period of reconstruction, left-wing governments developed the neighbourhoods around major industrial cities into thriving subsidized housing estates (known as *HLM* or *habitation à loyer modéré*), inhabited by French workers and their families. In some cities, as many as four in five dwellings might be subsidized housing allocated by the city. Through this first age of municipal socialism, left-wing parties relied on the HLM-dwellers for political support; indeed many of the cities throughout
the so-called “red ring” around major urban centres had uninterrupted Socialist or Communist governments for several decades. But the coincidence of French decolonization and the rapidly expanding needs of French industry led to a transformation of these neighbourhoods. By the 1980s, the HLM environment had shifted significantly from being housing for workers to being housing for immigrants, and with this came a de-legitimation of these areas. The banlieues have come to be seen as crime-ridden ghettos and, increasingly, as harbours of religious fundamentalism. The Front National has capitalized upon growing anti-immigrant sentiment, to become the No. 2 party in local politics in many cities. The left has subsequently sought to distance itself from immigrants, though remaining dependent upon their electoral support. None of the competitive parties in these areas have made any attempt to promote candidates of immigrant-origin. In many cities where the ethnic population runs as high as 30 to 40 per cent, there have been virtually no ethnic minorities elected to the executive level of local government.

The exclusion of visible minorities from these city governments also owes much to the comparatively elitist nature of French local politics. This system concentrates extraordinary power in the office of the mayor, and affords few outside of a narrow elite any significant opportunity for policy influence. Local candidates run in slates, and elections are determined by using a system of semi-proportional representation that vastly over-rewards the winning party. The system produces solid, stable majorities, and a particularly powerful mayor who enjoys a six-year term. In addition, most French mayors practice the cumul des mandats (holding different political offices simultaneously at various levels), an advantage that produces considerable pork-barreling for local projects, and that makes incumbents quite difficult to defeat. The selection of candidates is controlled by the mayor and his local power barons. While visible minorities might be included on the list, they are rarely given key positions (these are usually reserved for those very close to the mayor, who are normally intended to succeed him). Power is so centralized around the mayor and a few key adjuncts that token ethnic minority councilors—indeed all other councilors—are almost completely without political influence. By comparison, in countries where local elections are decided using single-member constituencies, and where policy-making is decentralized
across parliamentary style committees, ethnic minorities are more likely to be elected, and enjoy greater democratic legitimacy and policy influence. The exclusion of minorities from city politics has a cumulative effect at higher levels, as access to local power in France remains essential to attaining power at the national level.

*The Promotion of Ethnic Elites*

As in all of the countries studied here, the potential for political mobilization of the minority community has become increasingly apparent to France’s mainstream political parties, and they have responded with electoralist pragmatism. But this has not yet resulted in the inclusion of minorities in significant posts and policy-making roles. Moreover, the ascension of visible minorities in French politics is a democratically fragile process. Almost all of the prominent visible minorities in national politics have been appointed. Not surprisingly, the capacity for representing minority ethnic interests is diminished by the appointees’ overwhelming allegiance to their party and its particular strategy with respect to ethno-religious relations. Visible minority representatives are largely disconnected from the ordinary classes of ethnic minorities they are supposed to represent. Their political legitimacy owes little to grass-roots support or community activism. They are exceptionally assimilated minorities, who are careful not to demonstrate any outward signs of religious affiliation. A very large number are women, who tend to be viewed as more successful models of integration than ethnic men. If lucky enough to be designated by the party as an electoral candidate, they serve a pair of essentially contradictory functions that depend upon their paradoxical status as both ethnic minority and indistinguishably integrated French citizen. On the one hand, they must appeal to those ethnic voters who have felt excluded and ignored by political parties; on the other, they are expected to draw the support of non-minority voters who view them as a model of successful immigrant integration.

The French political system thus remains largely closed to visible minorities at all levels. Despite significant collective resources within the Franco-Arab community—including size, spatial concentration, length of settlement, social networks and leadership capacity—the limited cultural rights afforded ethnic minorities
in France, as well as the poor responsiveness of the political system has sharply constrained opportunities for effective political representation. Indeed, the French case appears to refute several common assumptions about the factors that may promote ethnic minority representation. The geographic concentration of ethnic minorities has not led to greater representation of their interests. The electoral system also matters little: neither single nor multi-member districts have produced more than a few “token” visible minority candidates, and most of these fail to win a seat. Ethnic entrepreneurs do emerge at all levels within the French political system, including most recently at the national level. But they are generally appointed at the pleasure of the party and lack an independent base of voter support. Their credibility problem is compounded by the tendency of authorities to recruit to the governing apparatus only the most secular of Franco-Arab representatives—a trend that has accelerated with the growing specter of Islam in France. Once designated, these representatives are most often assigned as the state’s interlocutor on contentious religious and multicultural issues. Charged with responsibilities in which they have no particular competence or credibility among the pertinent religious and ethno-community leaders, the frailty of their leadership is further accentuated.

Many of the most educated and sophisticated visible minority voters have felt deeply betrayed and insulted by these political strategies. We have thus seen—in spite of strong cultural and political norms against this strategy—the formation of independent multi-ethnic lists for French elections, usually described as “liste jeune” or “liste de quartier.” There is little coordination among these lists, which remain for the most part local protests against municipal authorities. However, a few movements have adopted this strategy for national contests. Though these lists have failed to return a single representative, they stand as a significant form of mobilization in a country where “ethnic politics” has traditionally been distained.

The Good Immigrant: Ethnic Entrepreneurship Amidst the Anti-Immigrant Climate in Denmark

For the first time ever, in November 2001, two visible minority representatives were elected among the 179 members of the Danish
parliament. A third won a seat in the March 2005 election. At the same time, the number of ethnic minorities elected to local governments in Denmark’s largest cities has approached proportionality to their number in the population. Statistically, this makes the Danish record on ethnic minority representation better than that in most European states (rivaled only by Belgium and the Netherlands).

Yet, while the statistical representation of visible minorities in politics has risen, the tone of politics has expressed increasing animosity toward immigrants. Despite relatively modest numbers of foreigners in Denmark, immigration and ethnic diversity has become, in just the last ten years, a highly charged issue. There has been, under successive governments, a growing rhetorical emphasis on the “problem” of immigration, a strengthening of negative immigrant stereotyping, and a deepening fear that “little Denmark” and Danish values are under assault by those with foreign values. In keeping with this rhetoric, policy changes over the past decade have produced a continual erosion of the social entitlements and political rights of non-citizens, and have gradually legitimized differential treatment of the population on the basis of their ethnic origin and identity. The Danish case then raises a puzzle. Ethnic minority representation is increasing, but this comes in the context of growing animosity toward immigrants and public fear that cultural difference is eroding the universalistic structures and shared ideological presumptions of the Danish state. How were ethnic minority representatives elected in this context? What is their role and their relationship to the ethnic minority population?

*Immigration and Ethnic Diversity in Denmark*

Denmark is a small country, with fewer than 5.4 million inhabitants, a strong national and collective identity, an active civil society, and a generous welfare system. As is the case throughout the Nordic countries, immigration and cultural diversity is a relatively recent phenomenon in Denmark. Before 1960, the few foreign-born residents came almost exclusively from other Nordic countries, Germany and the United Kingdom. Large-scale labor migration to Denmark took place for the first time in the late 1960s, when industries were permitted to recruit significant numbers of workers
from abroad—mostly from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan—in response to labor shortages.

A second wave of immigration began in 1983, after the Danish parliament liberalized the country’s immigration laws, and enlarged its acceptance of refugees. There was a considerable increase in the rate of immigration during this period, as well as a shift in source countries. Immigrants after 1983 came especially from Turkey, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and the occupied Palestinian territories and, in the 1990s, from the Balkan states, Afghanistan, and Somalia. The response with respect to asylum-seekers was especially generous. During the decade to 2002, Denmark ranked third among all industrialized countries for granting admission and refugee status to asylum-seekers, with 13.7 refugees accepted per 1,000 inhabitants. During this period, Denmark also provided generous and immediate welfare assistance to all residents, including new arrivals.

As of January 2001, about 7.3 per cent of the population of Denmark were immigrants or second-generation descendants of immigrants, and roughly three-quarters of these—5.4 per cent of the total population or a mere 300,000 people—have originated from countries outside of Europe and North America. Demographic forecasters project that these so-called “third-country” immigrants and their descendants may comprise close to 10 per cent of the population by 2020, and almost 15 per cent by 2040. While the Danish census bureau does not keep statistics on religion, it is clear that the majority of these second-wave immigrants are from Muslim countries.

The Danish Citizenship Regime

Of the three cases examined here, Denmark has the most restrictive access to nationality. Since legal reforms in 2001, newcomers must wait seven years before attaining permanent residency, and at least nine years to attain Danish nationality. They must also pass a Danish language and history exam. However, Denmark does grant local voting rights to foreigners. Third-country nationals are eligible to vote and stand for local election, on the condition that they have been resident in the realm for three years prior to election day. Denmark thus joins Sweden, Finland, Norway, the
Netherlands, Ireland, and (most recently) Belgium, as countries offering limited voting rights to non-Europeans.

Immigrants to Denmark have also faced diminished welfare rights, and declining public acceptance of their very legitimacy within state borders. A universalistic welfare state has long been a key feature of the Danish approach to citizenship. Through most of the 20th century, the Danish welfare state ensured a high level of public provisions accessible to all citizens and residents in the country. While costly (the tax rate for most Danes is over 50 per cent of earnings), these programs were based on conceptions of social egalitarianism and universalism, and on the assumption that recipients earn their entitlements by contributing over a lifetime of active work to the maintenance and growth of the national wealth. The welfare contract worked successfully, bridging class differences among workers, industrial capitalism, and peasants. But over the last decade, it has become questionable whether the sharing and solidarity of a well-developed welfare state can co-exist with cultural diversity.47

The arrival of unprecedented numbers of ethnically dissimilar, low-skilled immigrants beginning in the mid-1980s presented an uncomfortable challenge to the Danish welfare state and the goal of cultural integration. The relatively high level of welfare benefits has meant that many immigrants stand to gain little or nothing in terms of real income by getting a job, and the least skilled among them have been caught in a benefit trap. As well, Denmark’s rigid bureaucratic regime has prevented the development and use of informal networks among immigrants. Immigrants have become largely dependent clients of the state and have rather failed to develop autonomous community resources. Finally, the close-knit nature of Danish civic society has tended to exclude culturally distinct immigrants from the social and informational networks that are frequently the gateway to participation in both the labor market, and in civic and political institutions.

The result is one of the largest gaps (compared to other OECD countries) in work-force participation between nationals and third-country immigrants and their descendants. Among the working-age population, just 59 per cent of men and 43 per cent of women who migrated from, or whose parents migrated from third countries are active in the workforce, compared to 83 per cent for men
and 75 per cent for women among native Danes.\textsuperscript{48} For some very recent immigrant groups, the rate of participation in the labor-force is lower than 20 per cent. In addition to high unemployment rates, immigrant groups are subject to residential crowding in areas with higher than average social problems. While there may be a preference among some immigrants for settlement into areas already inhabited by their own ethnic group, Danish policies have exacerbated this problem in a number of respects. First, municipalities have primarily allocated refugees to public housing estates and to neighborhoods with already dense immigrant concentrations. Second, rent controls for private rented dwellings and cooperatives have kept rents under market value and produced long waiting lists and low turnover for desirable housing—making access for newer immigrants especially difficult.

In this environment, political actors and public opinion have come to focus on, and to ideologically exaggerate, the immigrant “problem.” Specifically, the political rhetoric has concentrated on the financial burden which newcomers place on the provisions of the welfare system, on the lack of contact between immigrants and Danes and their unwillingness to integrate into Danish society, and on the apparent correlation between immigrant enclaves and rates of crime. The policy response has been to impose tighter restrictions on immigration and to roll back the social entitlements and political rights of non-citizens.

\textit{An Open Political System}

In contrast to the increasingly restrictive citizenship regime, the Danish electoral system has remained distinctively open and responsive to ethnic participation. A key reason for the relatively strong minority presence in electoral politics lies in the Danes’ use, at both the local and national level, of proportional methods of representation (PR) with preferential voting.\textsuperscript{49} Especially at the local level, where foreign residents enjoy voting rights, and where their spatial density becomes politically significant, this has resulted in very high levels of political participation and representation for visible minorities.

Under the PR methods used in France, the order of candidates on each list is fixed.\textsuperscript{50} Seats are awarded beginning with the top
candidate on each list, working down until each list has received its designated proportion of seats. The party selection process is paramount in determining which candidates are elected and, because visible minority candidates are usually placed well down on local lists, few ever win seats. In contrast, Danish rules allow voters to alter the order of candidates on the list. They may give their vote either to the whole list (a list vote), or to a single candidate (a personal vote). Candidates with more personal votes move up the list, while those with fewer personal votes move down. Within such a system, the electoral success of an individual candidate depends critically on the candidate’s ability to mobilize eligible voters both to participate in the election and to cast their personal vote for them. For strategic reasons, visible minority competitors will usually focus their mobilization efforts on voters within immigrant communities.

The Danish electoral system produces three positive consequences for visible minority representation. First, visible minority candidates tend to receive higher than average numbers of personal votes: they typically “burst the list” and win seats. For example, following the 2001 elections in Copenhagen, the Socialdemokratiet (Social Democrats) obtained 16 seats. Two candidates of non-European origin were placed by the party in 16th and 22nd position (marginal or ineligible positions), but scored 7th and 8th respectively in preference voting. Second, parties understand that it is politically advantageous to include visible minorities on the list, because of their ability to attract a large number of personal votes (which are counted toward the total list as well). Finally, due to ethnic candidates’ mobilization strategies, voter turnout among immigrants tends to be exceptionally high in these elections, sometimes even higher than the turnout among indigenous citizens.

In larger Danish cities with significant immigrant populations, this electoral system tends to produce governing councils that are statistically representative of groups of non-EU immigrant origin, though some groups have done better than others. For example, following municipal elections held in 2001, there were eight visible minority councilors out of 56 in Copenhagen (14.3 per cent), two of 31 in Aarhus (6.5 per cent) and two of 28 in Odense (7.1 per cent). In many large cities, and in the suburban municipalities close to those cities, the proportion of ethnic minorities
on city council meets or exceeds their percentage in the electorate. These numbers have been increasing steadily over the past 20 years, along with the growth of immigration: while just three visible minorities were elected to local councils across Denmark in 1981, that had increased to 15 in 1993, to 24 in 1997, and to 54 in 2001.54

_Ethnic Entrepreneurs and the Substantive Representation of Minority Interests_

While Danish electoral rules produce higher levels of political engagement and representation among visible minorities, they also generate a distinctive set of electoral strategies among minority candidates.

Visible minorities have run as candidates across the whole spectrum of parties. However, the optimal strategy for election is to seek the candidacy with one of the largest parties—usually the Socialdemokratiet, a centrist party, or Venstre (Liberals), a right-of-center party. Because these parties tend to win the most seats in a given election, the number of personal votes required to win the party’s “last seat” is relatively low. In many cases, a local candidate needs as few as 200 or 300 personal votes to be elected within one of the major parties. In smaller parties, a candidate may need to achieve first or second position on the list to win a seat, and this requires a far higher number of personal votes. This produces an interesting paradox. Most visible minority representatives have been seated as members of one of the two major parties—the Liberals or the Social Democrats—though in policy matters, neither has been especially compassionate toward immigrants.55 Minor parties that are more sympathetic to immigrants, such as the left-wing Enhedslisten (Unity Party), have elected very few visible minority representatives.

Given that they are running in multi-member constituencies, visible minority candidates may choose to mobilize support within the ethnic minority community, or among ethnic Danes, or (more difficult still), to cast their appeal broadly across both communities. This choice has produced very distinctive models of ethnic representation. Consider the case of Naser Khader.56 In 2001, Khader became one of the first two visible minorities to be elected to Danish parliament. A Syrian-born immigrant who came
to Denmark in 1974 at the age of 11, Khader is, according to polls, the most popular politician in Denmark and one of the most popular role models in the country. The key to Khader’s success has been his ability to capitalize upon the vacuum that has emerged in Denmark between “new left” postmodern issues on the one hand, and “new right” issues on the other. While many progressive Danes are critical of the rising right-wing populism of the Danish People’s Party and its anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric, they have also grown increasingly uneasy about certain illiberal practices related to the cultural background of immigrants, such as forced marriages and sexual discrimination. In this ideological and political atmosphere, Khader has presented himself as a bridge-builder between Muslim immigrants and Danes. The target of his message is progressive, middle-class, ethnic Danes, and he has thus made a point of supporting issues that are key to this group. He supports gay and lesbian rights, women’s rights, and projects broad-minded and tolerant ideas on sexuality: for example, Khader has been keen on telling the press that he has a child out of wedlock. Other ethnic candidates have cast themselves in Khader’s model. For example, in the city of Aarhus, Bünyamin Simsek—a local councilor of Turkish descent—has made a point of telling the public about the breakdown of his traditional arranged marriage to a Turkish woman, his extra-marital affair and eventual marriage to a Danish woman. Simsek is also eager to explain that he sought and was awarded sole custody of the child from his first marriage, on the grounds that the child would be disadvantaged by being raised in a traditional Muslim environment. Another Aarhus candidate, Ouafa Rian similarly projects herself as a fully modern, integrated Muslim woman. A young, divorced, single mother, and owner of a public relations company, Rian acknowledges that she did not even try to mobilize support within the local Muslim community. The strategy of ethnic politicians like Khader, Simsek and Rian has been to distinguish themselves as progressive and open-minded immigrants. This approach has earned them substantial voter support across the Danish community—in each case, support among ethnic Danes has been key to their electoral success—while earning them considerable criticism within their “own” ethnic communities.

In contrast, Hüseyin Arac is one of the rare minority politicians to receive broad support from both minorities and ethnic Danes.
Arac was born in Turkey in 1957, migrated to Denmark in 1972, and was first elected to local council in Aarhus in 1993. Re-elected to his third term in 2001, he ranked fourth on the list for the Social Democratic Party with 1,722 personal votes. He was elected to national parliament in 2005. Arac has sustained strong relations with the Turkish community—his lengthy employment as a translator for the city of Aarhus appears to have been an essential key in these relations—and that community has in turn extended its significant electoral support. In his campaign for national parliament, he declared his support for Turkey’s entry into the EU, a fairly unpopular position in Denmark. At the same time, Arac speaks perfect Danish and consistently makes the point that he is a Danish citizen by choice. This has made him a reasonably popular figure among Danes, and estimates suggest that approximately half of his personal votes in the 2001 election came from ethnic Danes.  

Electoral strategies among ethnic minority candidates thus depend upon a host of factors, including the personal background of each candidate and the nature of the ethnic vote in particular locales. Turkish candidates will do well both because they enjoy strong support among the politically active and well-organized Turkish community, but also because ethnic Danes look on Turks quite favorably, as well-integrated and secular immigrants. Female ethnic minority candidates tend to receive stronger support among ethnic Danes, and many deliberately cast their appeal to these voters, abandoning any hope of attracting support within their own ethnic communities. Especially in local elections, where non-citizens enjoy voting rights, the strategies of successful ethnic minority candidates can be quite diverse, depending on the nature and size of the ethnic community.  

Local minority councilors also appear to have a significant substantive influence in policy making, compared to their counterparts in the Danish parliament, or compared to local councilors in France. Many minority representatives at this level owe their political legitimacy to the support of ethnic communities, and see themselves as accountable to those voters. Furthermore, the fully proportional system of representation for local elections in Denmark almost always produces multi-party governing alliances. This provides leverage to individual councilors, who are able to exercise their influence through multi-party parliamentary-style committees organized around policy sectors. The issue of “mother-tongue”
education is a case where a small number of visible minority councilors have been able to exercise significant policy influence. In 2001, the Danish national government suspended its support of first language programs in public schools, leaving individual municipalities to decide whether they would continue to fund their portion, or end funding altogether. In Aarhus, the mayoral candidate for the Venstre party had announced during the campaign that, if elected, she would end city support for mother-tongue education. After her election, the two ethnic minorities on council, Simsek (Venstre) and Arac (Socialdemokratiet), were able to convince enough members of their parties to support the program, that the mayor did not introduce a vote. The city has continued to fund its portion of the program.

In sum, local voting rights and strong communities of ethnic interest, combined with Danish electoral rules, appear to be the most important features affecting the opportunity structure for visible minority representation in Danish politics. This is the bright spot in Denmark’s increasingly anti-immigrant politics. The implications of preferential voting, and the capacity for electoral mobilization among minority communities will become increasingly important over time, as migrants attain citizenship and as the second generation reaches voting age. Their participation in the political life of Danish society will be crucial for influencing the framework of their lives and the development of the country as a whole.

Chasing the Ethnic Vote: Political Parties and Visible Minority Representation in Multicultural Canada

Canada is a country of significant immigration, with the world’s highest per capita rate of naturalizations: about 6,700 new citizenships per million people each year. In a given year, this means the admission of approximately 200,000 to 250,000 new Canadians. Canada flung open its doors to immigrants in the mid-1960s, with the introduction of a skills-based point system for economic migrants that made applicants’ race and country of origin irrelevant. This, along with a general increase in the global movement of peoples means that today, visible minorities represent more than 80 per cent of all newcomers arriving in Canada. Currently, 18 per cent of the total population of Canada is foreign-born, while approximately 13.4 per cent identify as visible minorities. Statistics
Canada projects that by 2017, roughly one in five persons living in Canada will be a visible minority; in cities like Toronto, the number will be more than one in two. In addition, Canada makes it clear that cultural diversity is welcomed and supported, through funding for cultural activities, maintenance of heritage languages, and significant employment equity standards.

Is all this ethnic diversity reflected in Canada’s elected and governing bodies? The answer depends on where we look. Visible minority representation in Canadian national politics has increased steadily over the past two decades. In the current House of Commons, visible minorities occupy 20 of 308 (6.5 per cent) seats, up from five in 1988, 13 in 1993, and 19 in 1997. Two of the visible minorities elected to Parliament serve as cabinet ministers. And Canada’s two most recent Governors General, Adrienne Clarkson and the present vice-vegal, Michaëlle Jean, have both been visible minority women. While still under-represented at this level, visible minorities are doing slightly better (in proportional terms) than women, who account for just 21.1 per cent of members of Parliament while they make up 52 per cent of the population. Foreign-born Canadians are also well represented, holding 14 per cent of seats.

Surprisingly, visible minorities are far less numerous in local politics in Canada. Most notably, this is the case in Toronto, Vancouver and Montréal, Canada’s three most multicultural cities. In Toronto, for example, just 11.1 per cent of seats on city council are held by visible minorities, though 36.8 per cent of the population in the metropolitan area identify as visible minorities. A number of world cities do far better than Canadian cities at producing ethnically representative governing councils, including many of the larger cities in Britain, Belgium, and Denmark. The low level of representation of visible minorities in Canada’s cities is puzzling. It is generally assumed that local politics is more accessible to groups such as women and minorities. Factors such as smaller electoral districts, cheaper electoral campaigns, a more flexible party structure, and residential concentration among some ethnic groups, are assumed to make it easier for members of disadvantaged groups to get elected. Yet these features do not appear to have helped visible minorities achieve anything close to proportional representation in Canada’s largest immigrant-receiving cities.
Canada’s Citizenship Regime

Regardless of their country of origin, immigrants to Canada acquire voting rights as soon as they become citizens, after three consecutive years of legal residence in Canada. This makes access to voting rights for newcomers to Canada more open than in Denmark (where foreigners are granted local voting rights on the condition of three years of residency, but where they typically wait as long as 12 years for Danish nationality and national voting rights), or in France (where newcomers must wait five years to attain French nationality and voting rights). While Canada admits a relatively high number of refugees and family-class immigrants, the bulk of newcomers are economic migrants, who have been selected on the basis of their education and employment skills, as well as their competency in at least one of Canada’s official languages. These migrants are expected to move into good paying jobs relatively quickly, and are seen as vital to Canada’s economic growth. On average, Canada’s newcomers enjoy higher levels of employment and wealth compared to newcomers in most European countries, and these resources can be expected to ease the way to political involvement. In addition, Canada is officially a multicultural polity, where the constitution and legislative framework provide special protection for linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity. If an open and welcoming citizenship regime were the key to opportunities for visible minority representation, then Canada should have a better record at every level than France or Denmark. Yet this is not the case. Visible minority representation at the national level is at least as high in Canada as in Denmark, and much higher than in France. However, representation at the local level is much lower than in Denmark.

The Electoral System and Strategic Incentives for Mobilizing Ethnic Minority Voters

There are a number of factors that account for the relatively stronger representation of visible minorities in national, compared to local politics. Where they are densely concentrated, electoral rules and nomination procedures at the national level produce
strong incentives for parties and individual candidates to mobilize visible minority voters. This same configuration of incentives is missing at the local level, where parties play a minimal role in the electoral process.

Candidates for national election run in single member districts (SMD), and are typically selected through a local nomination contest, in which members of the party’s local riding association cast ballots on who should be the party’s candidate for that riding. In most cases, incumbents go unchallenged in the nomination; however, in open ridings the nomination is hotly contested. This candidate selection procedure leads parties to engage in mass recruitment drives to sign up as many new party members as possible, with each wing of a party trying to recruit members to support their nominee. It is common for nominees in these contests to focus on recruiting party members within ethnic communities—especially communities with tightly knit social networks, where it is easier to mobilize and turn out large numbers of supporters on nomination day. This strategy is facilitated by party rules that allow legally resident non-citizens to become party members, and to vote in the candidate selection process. Party membership levels are usually highest in those ridings with the largest visible minority populations. It is not unusual, in such ridings, to find that 75 per cent or more of new party members signed up by nominees are visible minorities. This is typical in both the Liberal and Conservative parties, and whether or not the nominee is a visible minority.67 This candidate selection process provides ample opportunity for visible minority mobilization and influence within political parties. Yet it can also produce a certain degree of manipulation by party elites and ethnic power brokers. Typical practices of nominees include hiring people within the ethnic community to sign up members, delivering busloads of instant party members from mosques, temples and other ethnic/religious centers, and paying the dues of new members. Nomination battles are internal party matters and as such, there has often been little oversight of these practices.

While this open and decentralized candidate selection process tends to facilitate the nomination of visible minority candidates, the very high incumbency factor in Canadian politics remains a significant obstacle to electing visible minorities. The Liberal Party enjoys the strongest incumbency advantage, having formed the government for all but ten of the last 40 years.68 But with a higher
proportion of incumbents, the party has tended to nominate fewer visible minorities than the other major parties.\textsuperscript{69} At the same time, this incumbency advantage has tended to produce a clientelistic pattern of relationships between Liberal MPs and ethnic leaders. Consequently, the Liberals have done exceptionally well in urban areas with large immigrant and visible minority populations, despite running very few visible minority candidates in those ridings. Consider the 19 ridings in the Greater Toronto Area with the largest (each has at least 40 per cent) visible minority populations. All went to the Liberals in the 2004 election, yet the party ran a visible minority candidate in just four of these ridings, while the Conservatives and New Democratic Party each ran six. Despite making up more than 50 per cent of the population in these ridings, visible minorities are proportionately less well represented in the GTA than they are across Canada as a whole.\textsuperscript{70}

Recognizing the importance of this critical mass of minority voters, the Conservative Party has adopted an ethnic outreach strategy to make inroads into these Liberal strongholds. They have run more visible minority candidates than other parties.\textsuperscript{71} They have courted minority voters through publicity campaigns in the ethnic press.\textsuperscript{72} On issues like homosexual marriage, a significant portion of the visible minority community holds views that are congruous with Conservative positions. Tax relief is another issue that plays well among many economic migrants and their children. And the party has made a concerted effort to remind immigrants that many of them arrived in Canada during Brian Mulroney’s Conservative reign (1984 to 1993), when immigration to Canada reached historically high levels.

Only one party, the left-wing NDP, has stipulated an affirmative-action guideline for selecting visible minorities as candidates. The party has established as a target that 50 per cent of all candidates must be from marginalized groups (the party includes within this category visible minorities as well as youth, women, handicapped persons, gays and lesbians). Riding associations must show the party’s Elections Planning Committee that they have made efforts to attract such candidates. The party also maintains an affirmative-action fund that is intended to assist candidates from marginalized groups with their election expenses.\textsuperscript{73} The NDP is one of very few parties in the world that have formal guidelines for recruiting more visible minority candidates.
All ethnic groups are not equally involved or represented in electoral politics. The patterns of political representation among Canada’s two largest visible minority groups—Chinese and South Asians—could not be more different. The South Asian community has had an impressive performance in national politics: in the 2004 election, ten South Asian Canadians were elected to parliament. By comparison, there is just one Chinese Member of Parliament. By all accounts, the South Asian community is extraordinarily active politically, and their support tends to be highly sought after through the nomination and campaign process in many ridings. Campaign chairs describe South Asians (Sikhs and Ismaili Muslims, in particular) as “legendary organizers,” whose geographic clustering, dense and overlapping networks of religious, social and business memberships, and strong elder-centric culture make them a key community for political mobilization. In addition, they enjoy a tradition of democratic participation in their countries of origin, strong English language skills, and a high degree of economic security—all important resources for political participation that other visible minorities (notably the Chinese) often lack. This brief portrait of South Asian political involvement should help to dispel the traditional notion that visible minorities tend to be politically passive, or that recent immigrants must go through a fairly long transition phase before becoming involved in politics in their new country. In fact, political activism among visible minorities varies widely according to community-linked differences. So too do political interests.

Conclusion

Across the three countries examined here, there are both converging trends as well as important differences with respect to minority representation. Among the converging trends, we see that political parties in each country have responded pragmatically to growing numbers of immigrant-origin and visible minority citizens. The promotion of visible minority candidates has become a key strategy in courting electoral support among this increasingly politicized population. This “ethnicization” in party strategy has occurred regardless of whether the country follows an assimilationist
citizenship model (France and Denmark) or a multicultural model (Canada).

There is, of course, no direct equivalence between statistical and substantive representation. Yet, if the inclusion of visible minorities in elected bodies does not necessarily guarantee policies that are more sensitive to minority interests, their absence certainly points to the fact that something is amiss. Most clearly, the political under-representation of visible minorities can be taken as a proxy for particular dysfunctions within the political and electoral systems of a given country. The openness of the political system, party processes of candidate selection, and electoral rules appear to be the most decisive factors with respect to the numerical presence or absence of visible minorities in political office. These features also account for the particular electoral strategies adopted by visible minority candidates, their representative role once elected, and their accountability to minority interests. Within some political systems, ethnic minority candidates cast their appeal to minority voters. Within others, the principal target of the ethnicity message is the ethnic majority. In Denmark, the latter strategy evolves as a result of a strong anti-immigrant political climate, and an electoral system that encourages candidates who can distinguish themselves from their party list, so as to obtain a maximum number of personal votes. A similar style of ethnic entrepreneurship may be found in Belgium and the Netherlands, countries where there are high numbers of visible minority representatives, yet a less than friendly climate for immigrants.

The evidence presented here also suggests that the political opportunity structure can be very different for visible minority women seeking candidacy and election, than for visible minority men. In countries such as France and Denmark, where there are fairly negative attitudes toward immigrants, visible minority women appear to enjoy an advantage over visible minority men: they may be viewed as more assimilable and less culturally threatening. Where this is the case, visible minority women are more likely to cast their appeal to the ethnic majority, or to be selected as candidates in ridings with relatively few ethnic minority voters.

A further pattern apparent across the three case studies is the surprisingly high number of minority candidacies among center-right and right wing parties. For example, in the 2004 election, the Conservative Party of Canada boasted the highest percentage of
visible minority candidates of any national party. And in France, the UMP has been more assertive than the Socialists in promoting visible minorities. Surprisingly, even the National Front in France has elected a number of visible minority representatives. These parties view support among visible minorities and newer immigrants as integral to engineering an electoral re-alignment. While there is only scant research on the vote choices of immigrants and their descendants, there is anecdotal evidence that the second generation demonstrates greater diversity in party choice, and that the traditionally strong support for left-wing parties among immigrants is beginning to erode. Selecting minorities as candidates may be an effective tactic for right-wing parties to court minority voters, as well as counter the criticism that they are immigrant unfriendly. Still, the conditions under which visible minority candidates attract the support of visible minority voters are unclear, and the topic requires much further research.

This article has examined the domestic conditions which produce or constrain opportunities for visible minority representation. International events may also impact the political participation and representation of immigrant communities. For example, in countries with significant numbers of Muslim immigrants, Arab and Islamic lobby groups have made a concerted effort to consolidate the Muslim vote by pointing out the electoral weight of Muslim voters, calling attention to the presence of Muslim candidates, and evaluating the record of sitting legislators on a set of foreign and domestic issues deemed critical to the Muslim community. Foreign countries have also found satisfaction in the election of their emigrants in distant states. Yet there has been little evidence of transnational mobilization for increased political representation. Opportunities for transnational mobilization are limited, largely because the norms and institutions of the nation-state continue to provide the most important frame of reference for migrants and ethnic minorities who make political claims. This is especially true where the contested issue concerns formal representation within the electoral system of that state. And while there are numerous anti-racist organizations addressing the issue of minority under-representation within particular countries, there has been virtually no attempt anywhere to organize across ethnic lines. Visible minorities appear less able than other politically marginalized groups—women for example—to agree
on similar goals and strategies, or to place uniform pressure upon national governments toward reforming electoral rules. One problem may be that diverse ethnic communities are often in direct competition with each other over a limited number of legislative seats. While more research on the transnational and transethnic mobilization of visible minorities is certainly needed, for the moment at least, it appears that the opportunities for ethnic minority representation are still determined largely by circumstances at the local and national level.

Finally, the major focus of this article has been on the macro- and meso-context of political systems—those elements that may be said to pull (or to obstruct) visible minorities to enter politics. These systems do not have universal consequences for political representation; rather their effects vary depending upon the autonomous capacity for political mobilization demonstrated by different visible minority groups. Moreover, through their capacity for political mobilization, some groups have clearly caught the attention of political parties and candidates who (to varying degrees) have sought to make politics more responsive to minority group interests. The article has paid less attention to the push factors inherent in each ethnic community that produce (or constrain) its autonomous capacity for political mobilization. Clearly these matter in accounting for why some groups may be relatively well represented while others within the same political system remain excluded. A productive future step in this research agenda would be to begin systematic data collection on political behavior across a number of ethnic communities (e.g., South Asians, Chinese, Blacks), to explore further the interaction between various pull and push factors of political inclusion.

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also to the numerous candidates, elected representatives, party members, and ethnic community leaders across three countries, who were interviewed in the course of this research.

Notes


2. The analysis presented here is strictly limited to the political representation of visible ethnic minorities. For operational purposes, I define visible minorities as non-aboriginal persons who are non-Caucasian in race and non-European in origin. Such people may be recent immigrants, or their ancestors may have lived in the country in question for several generations. To simplify the study, I have excluded from this definition other ethnic groups (e.g., Jews, Eastern Europeans) whose contemporary visibility, as well as their history of exclusion and discrimination, varies widely from country to country. Nor do I include territorial or linguistic minorities, or indigenous groups. In many cases, these latter groups have obtained some type of collective representational rights as part of a historical bargain to assure the viability of the state, and studying their political representation requires a different theoretical model than that presented here.


6. For a discussion of the strategy of maximizing the number of cases, by including observations at multiple levels within a country, see Gary King, Robert O.
10. Such a project could examine variables such as voter turnout and political preferences among a set of ethnic groups in several cities, within a number of countries. It would require sample surveys for selected census tracts, which could be compared to census data for the same geographical area, and possibly to voter turnout figures at corresponding polling stations. Such data would allow us to compare, for example, voter turnout rates among various ethnic groups in instances where there is a same-ethnic candidate running for election, controlling for factors like length of settlement and spatial concentration of the group. Other information on ethnic networks, and how these may foster group-based political mobilization, would also be essential.
13. This count for France does not include representatives of French overseas departments, territories and collectivities (Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guyana, Reunion, Mayotte, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, and Mayotte). Over 90 per cent of the population of these colonial constituencies is indigenous, as are most of their legislative representatives (15 of 22 members in the current legislature). The exclusion from this study of aboriginal and regional-territorial minorities means that, in Canada, neither francophone nor First Nations representatives are counted. In Denmark, the representatives elected for the Faroe Islands and Greenland are excluded.
14. This was Kofi Yamgnagne, the Togolese-born Socialist deputy for Finistère from 1997 to 2002.
15. Both are Franco-Arab women: Bariza Khiari (Socialist) and Alima Boumédiene-Thiery (Green). It is important to note that Senators are elected indirectly by an electoral council composed largely of municipal and regional representatives. The rule of gender parity applies to these elections.
16. *Conseillers généraux* are directly elected by canton, using SMD majority rules (the winner must receive at least 50 per cent of the vote, in elections taking place over two rounds), for a term of six years. *Conseillers régionaux* are elected by list, using PR, with the additional requirement that an equal number of male and female candidates be included in alternating order on every list. Following elections held in March 2004, the number of ethnic minorities elected at the cantonal level remained constant, while the number at the regional level appears to have increased to approximately 25.
17. With the exception of family reunification, France effectively ended new immigration in the early 1970s.
18. For example, until reforms introduced in 1981 to the basic 1901 law on the right of association, foreigners were prohibited from forming their own associations.
20. So too does the new “positive discrimination” policy adopted by the prestigious Institut d’Études Politiques in Paris, which exempts from competitive entrance examinations applicants who have graduated from a high school within a designated geographical zone. These so called “ZEPs” or education priority zones are determined in part by the proportion of immigrants and foreigners living in a neighborhood.
21. For the most part, the terms “ethnic” or “visible minority” are deliberately avoided even by the advocates of these groups. In the French context, the more accurate description might be the “children of colonization.” They are, principally, those North African Arabs, sub-Saharan, Polynesian and South American Blacks, and Asians, who have long been relegated by the color of their skin, the national origin of their ancestors, or the sound of their names to the periphery of French citizenship.
22. Among the latter are: *Égalité effective*, an equal rights movement for visible minorities, headed by Stéphane Pocrain; and *Africagora*, a movement to increase Blacks’ representation in business and politics.
24. Saïfi’s essential role has been to improve the electoral strategies of the party within the Franco-Arab community (see below). Mekachera, who was president of the Conseil national de Français musulmans until his appointment, was chosen to help ensure a moderate influence in the newly established Conseil Français du culte musulman (*French Council of the Muslim Religion*).


27. It is significant that, while a prefect has no authority on religious issues, Sarkozy (and subsequently the press) has persistently described Roger Ben Mebarek as Muslim rather than as Franco-Arab.


29. In the UMP, five of the party’s 81 national secretaries are visible minorities.

30. For example, in Ile-de-France, just five visible minorities were elected among 209 regional councilors (2.4 per cent), and there are none within the regional executive. This region—encompassing Paris and its suburbs—has one of the most ethnically heterogeneous populations in all of France.

31. The Communist Party applied an innovative strategy during the 2004 regional elections. In Ile-de-France and five other regions, they formed a political alliance across a multitude of civic associations, including many devoted to anti-racism and human rights. Running under the banner *Parti Communiste—Alternatif Citoyen*, the party selected one-third of its candidates from among community leaders, a large number of whom were visible minorities.


36. Under this system, the winning list receives the first 50 per cent of all council seats, and the remaining half are distributed proportionally. Thus a winning list that receives 60 per cent of the popular vote will actually receive 50 per cent of the first half, plus 60 per cent of the remaining half—for a total of 80 per cent of all seats. The remaining 20 per cent of seats are split proportionally among the losing parties.


38. Nominating ethnic women for election also helps parties to meet the new gender parity requirement.

39. This lack of democratic credibility is not only a problem for ethnic minority representatives. Mariette Sineau has documented the same pattern in the ascension of women to political power in France. See Mariette Sineau, *Profession femme politique* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001).

41. The *Union Française pour la Cohésion Nationale* presented a slate of Franco-Arab candidates for cantonal elections in March 2004, and again formed a list for European elections in June 2004. Similarly, the association Africagora sponsored a multi-ethnic list for European elections.


44. The Danish statistics bureau does not record ethnicity or religion, but it does consider the place of birth of one’s parents. Descendants of immigrants are those persons born in Denmark to parents who are not Danish citizens born in Denmark. There are very few third- or fourth-generation immigrants in Denmark, but they would be considered Danes, as long as one of their parents is a Danish citizen born in Denmark.


46. European citizens as well as citizens from the Nordic countries enjoy this right on the same basis as Danish citizens, that is without the three-year residency requirement.


49. This method is also used in Belgian local elections, though with slight variations from the Danish rules. Note that a number of major cities in Belgium have also achieved nearly proportional political representation of ethnic minorities. This occurred before Belgium adopted (in 2004) its new law granting local voting rights to third-country nationals. See Dirk Jacobs, Marco Martiniello, and Andrea Rea, “Changing Patterns of Political Participation of Citizens of Immigrant Origin in the Brussels Capital Region: The October 2000 Elections,” *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003), pp. 201–21.

50. An exception is in the semi-proportional methods of election applied in the smallest villages (under 1,500 inhabitants) in French municipal elections. In these contests, voters are allowed to write in names of candidates and to cross others from the list.

51. In fact, some cities have seen too many ethnic candidates, in which case they tend to split the vote of the ethnic communities. For example, in 2001 municipal elections in Aarhus, there were 20 ethnic minorities of a total field of 220 candidates (9 per cent). Just two were elected.

53. The Turkish population is clearly the best represented in Denmark. This appears to be due to this group’s longer history and deeper integration in Denmark.
55. While they were in government, the Social Democratic coalition began the tightening of immigration policy with the Integration Act of 1999, and sought to introduce lower welfare benefits for immigrants. The present Liberal government, with parliamentary support from right wing parties, has made further cuts in immigration, and to social and political entitlements of settled immigrants.
60. A candidate’s age also factors in this strategic calculus. Younger candidates are more likely to cast their appeal to ethnic Danes, while older candidates are more likely to appeal to the ethnic communities. Note that while the visible minority male candidates in Denmark have ranged broadly in age, almost all ethnic minority women who have run as candidates are under 40 years of age.
61. Visible minorities, as defined under the federal Employment Equity Act, are persons other than aboriginal people who are non-Caucasian in race and non-European in origin. Statistics on the size of Canada’s visible minority population are based on a census question asking people whether they are White, Chinese, South Asian, Filipino, Latin American, South-East Asian, Arab Japanese, Korean, or other. Additional census questions ask whether one is an aboriginal, and about the cultural background of one’s ancestors.
64. Ujjal Dosanjh is Minister of Health, and Raymond Chan is Secretary of State for Multiculturalism. Dosanjh was formerly Premier of the NDP government in British Columbia.
65. In Canada, it is possible to calculate with relative accuracy a proportionality index for various groups (\(PI = \frac{the\ proportion\ of\ group\ members\ within\ an\ elected\ body}{the\ proportion\ of\ group\ members\ within\ the\ general\ population}\)). A score of 1.00 indicates that a group is represented in proportion to its numbers in the general population. The proportionality index for visible
minorities in the House of Commons is 0.49; for women it is 0.40; and for foreign-born Canadians it is 0.78.

66. In Toronto, Vancouver and Montréal, the proportionality index for visible minority representation is 0.30, 0.37 and 0.39 (respectively). Visible minority representation is also low in Canada's medium-sized cities, such as Halifax, Hamilton, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Calgary, and Edmonton.

67. This figure is based on my interviews with candidates and campaign managers in a number of the ridings in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). Similar figures have been reported in British Columbia. See Des Verma, Lenn Chow, Martin Collacott and Steve Kaufman, “Recruiting by Race is No Way to Build a Party.” National Post, 13 August 2003.

68. More than 77 percent of all Liberals who were elected in 2004 were incumbents, compared to 58 percent of Conservatives, and 53 percent of New Democrats.

69. In the 2004 election, the Liberals appear to have had 20 visible minority candidates, compared to 29 for the Conservatives and 23 for the NDP. These numbers are based on an extensive review of campaign websites for all candidates of the three major parties. The numbers are generally consistent with figures reported by the Toronto Star (Liberals 23; Conservatives 32; NDP 25). See Robert Benzie, “It’s Still a White Men’s Club,” Toronto Star, 9 June 2004, p. A9.

70. PI for the 19 largest visible minority ridings in the GTA: 0.21/0.53 = 0.40; PI for the House of Commons = 0.49.

71. The Conservatives do not have an affirmative action program to attract more visible minority candidates. Indeed, some Conservatives are unwilling even to acknowledge any formal ethnic outreach strategy, for fear that this may appear to make race a criterion in candidate selection.

72. One series of ads, run during the 2004 election, reminded immigrant voters: “You don’t have to vote Liberal to be Canadian.” Another series sought ethnic support for the Conservative position against legislation to allow same-sex marriage.

73. The Liberals have a similar fund that is available to female candidates, but not to visible minorities.

74. They include nine Indo-Canadians: Navdeep Singh Bains, Ruby Dhalla, Gurbax Singh Mali, Wajid Khan, and Ujjal Dosanjh (all Liberals), Gurmant Grewal, Nina Grewal, Rahim Jaffer and Deepak Obhrai (all Conservatives). The tenth South Asian elected in 2004—Yasmin Ratansi (Liberal)—was born in Tanzania. All represent ridings in Ontario, British Columbia, or Alberta. Of note, the Grewals became the first married couple to be seated in parliament. Their marriage, as is the custom in their ethnic community, was an arranged one.

75. There is some evidence that the Chinese Canadian community demonstrates higher levels of political involvement in the province of British Columbia and in the city of Vancouver than they do in Ontario and Toronto. This may be a result of their much longer period of settlement on the west coast.

76. This is the case for women, as well as visible minorities. For many years, women’s political representation was stunted by the popular belief that
women were not suited by circumstance or temperament to govern. Yet even as this belief has waned over time, there has been only marginal improvement in women’s representation. For advanced democracies at least, studies suggest that popular attitudes toward women are no longer a significant barrier to their inclusion in politics—though these attitudes do profoundly shape the way that women do politics. See, for example, Mariette Sineau, Profession Femme Politique (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001).

77. Prior to the 2004 elections, three of the five visible minority representatives elected to regional councils across France were members of the FN.

78. One survey in Canada has suggested that the children of immigrants are more likely than their parents to support the positions of the Conservative Party. See National Post “Immigrant Children Inclined to Vote Tory,” 21 May 2004.


80. The Turkish parliament, for example, congratulated Hüseyin Arac for his success in becoming the first Turkish MP in Denmark. Likewise, The Tribune, an Indian on-line newspaper, has thoroughly documented the political successes of Indo-Canadians in various provincial and national elections (see www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20001126/edit.htm).


82. The issue was raised at the Durban World Conference against Racism, but the principal focus of these discussions was on securing voting rights for foreigners.

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