A deterrent to diversity: The conditional effect of electoral rules on the nomination of women candidates

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A B S T R A C T

Previous literature regarding the effects of electoral systems on candidate selection has implied a false dichotomy regarding proportional representation (PR) versus single member districts (SMD). This paper unpacks the category of proportional representation, and finds significant differences in the behavior of selectorates depending on their configuration of PR. Using both a natural experiment as well as an original data set comprised of 1095 party lists, I find that the type of proportional representation – i.e., whether or not the voters are allowed to pick a particular candidate from the party list – can have a significant effect on the number of women candidates selected to run for office. Further, I find that the strength of this effect depends on cultural gender norms; if a substantial segment of society believes that women are best in traditional roles, not as leaders, there is a significant, negative effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the nomination of women candidates.

1. Introduction

Twenty-five years ago, Gallagher and Marsh (1988) published their seminal analysis on candidate selection, aptly named The Secret Garden of Politics. Since that time, our understanding of why parties select particular candidates for their lists has grown, but this area of research continues to be something of a secret garden. This article contributes to the subject with an examination of the effect of electoral systems on the selection of women as candidates. I argue that selectorates anticipate voter behavior to be affected by the form of the electoral system, and systematically respond by changing their candidate selection strategies to match. In addition to providing a better understanding of the effects of different forms of proportional representation electoral systems, this line of research is crucial to increasing our understanding of the root causes of under-representation of women in legislatures across the world; while we have indeed seen increases in representation over the past two decades, almost all legislatures have plateaued far before parity.

Using a feminist-institutionalist approach (Krook, 2010), I argue that we must consider both the electoral rules as well as the prevalent gender norms of a society in order to understand the dynamics of candidate selection. Through the use of a natural experiment in the case of Japan, as well as an original data set that includes eight countries, 1095 party lists, and over 33,000 candidates, I find a conditional effect of the type of proportional representation on the selection of women candidates. That is, if traditional gender norms are prevalent in a society, then allowing the voters to select a particular candidate from the party list (a system commonly referred to as “open list proportional representation”) will

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1 The term “selectorate” refers to the group of people, be they national elites, local elites, or even rank-and-file party members, who select the candidates to run on the party lists. I have chosen to use the term “selectorate” instead of “party elites” in order to emphasize that my hypothesized behavior of the selectorate will occur no matter if the selection occurs at the national or local level. In other words, candidate selection can be coordinated and driven by a prediction of voter behavior, even when decentralized.
have a negative effect on the number of women candidates nominated to run. This effect, I argue, is driven by the awareness of the selectorate that voters in this electoral environment are likely to draw on the personal traits of the candidates for information (i.e., information shortcuts), and that the content of the shortcut of “woman” in a culture with prevalent traditional gender norms is likely to carry negative connotations for that candidate’s leadership ability. In other words, under the cultural condition of prevalent traditional gender norms, the type of proportional representation employed has a powerful effect on the number of women nominated to run as candidates. However, in a system where gender norms are more modernized, the intraparty preference vote does not have a negative effect; in this cultural context, the type of proportional representation does not appear to matter.

2. Previous research on effect of electoral systems on candidate selection

Previous research on the effects of electoral systems on candidate selection has focused on two main threads. The first thread concerns the effects (or lack thereof) of electoral rules on the level of centralization of candidate selection (Czudnowski, 1975; Epstein, 1980; Matthews, 1985; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Lundell, 2004). The other common thread on the subject of candidate selection and electoral systems, and the focus of this article, addresses the “who” rather than the “how.” Unlike the debate over centralization, there is relative agreement on this aspect of candidate selection. We know that regardless of the system, candidates with traits such as incumbency, party loyalty, personal wealth, and roots in the district represented are valuable to party leaders. The value of each of these traits varies by electoral system (Shugart et al., 2005), but there is no electoral system in which any of these personal characteristics are seen as negative or off-putting.

Personal traits such as gender, race, or religion, however, are another story. Previous literature on the subject has analyzed the effect of the electoral system on the selection of diverse candidates under the assumption that all proportional representation (PR) systems are the same, and placing them in a dichotomy with single member district (SMD) systems. Scholars have found that in PR systems, one of the primary concerns of the selectors is to present a “balanced” ticket (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Ware, 1996; Goetz, 2003; Norris, 2004). The “balance” of the ticket refers to the inclusion of candidates from all relevant social cleavages (e.g., race, religion, class, gender, and whatever else is deemed an important difference in that cultural context). The appeal of a balanced ticket to selectors is clear: by choosing candidates that belong to a variety of subgroups, the selectorate achieves two of its most important goals. First, they satisfy factions within the party, thereby ensuring their continuing commitment. Second, they cheaply and easily broaden the appeal of the list to the voters. That is, by selecting representatives from each of the relevant subgroups, the selectorate casts a wider net and signals to groups that their concerns will be addressed by the party. This, in turn, attracts a greater number of voters without any messy shifts in ideology and usually without alienating other rank and file members. However, if the elites choose to ignore subgroups and instead select an undiversified list, the costs in terms of negative publicity and alienation can be high.

The irony, however, is that the very traits that are required to diversify the list and broaden appeal in PR systems are seen as repellant in SMD systems. As Gallagher and Marsh (1988) point out, “qualities which selectors might feel, accurately or otherwise, could be electoral liabilities in a party’s sole candidate, like being a woman or a member of an ethnic minority, are needed for purposes of balance when several are being picked” (260). Thus, the power of the electoral system over candidate selection is clearly evident. Depending on whether the system is PR or SMD, parties have different candidate selection strategies: in one electoral context, selecting candidates that have a variety of personal characteristics is a necessity. But in the other, diversity is not only unnecessary, but possibly damaging to a party’s electoral fortunes. What is not yet known, however, is the effect of differences within the category of proportional representation – i.e., can we assume that, even when we vary the institutional configuration of the system, the general effect of the proportional representation system is the same, or must we generate different expectations for candidate selection depending on the type of proportional representation?

3. Expectations for effects of the decisive intraparty preference vote

One of the most fundamental differences among PR electoral systems is the presence of an intraparty preference vote. An electoral system which includes an intraparty preference vote is one in which voters are either given the opportunity or required to express a preference between candidates of the same party. When it is likely that these preference votes will change the list order, then I refer to the intraparty preference vote as ‘decisive.’ The most well-known varieties of electoral systems that include an intraparty preference vote are: open-list proportional representation (e.g., Brazil, Switzerland, pre-reform Italy), single non-transferable vote (e.g., pre-reform Japan), and single-transferable vote (e.g., Ireland, Malta). The candidates of these systems cannot compete for votes solely on the basis of party loyalty, for with several other candidates of the same party in the running, the party label becomes otiose as a means to differentiate among candidates. As noted by Carey and Shugart (1995), Carey (1997) and Ames (1995), this causes parties to become weaker, diminishing party loyalty among legislators, and pushing national policy issues toward the back of any legislator’s list of priorities.

The decrease in the value of the party label as a cue compels candidates to turn to other means to distinguish themselves from their competitors. Thus, a primary goal of most candidates in this system type is to create a personal, irreplaceable connection with the voters, making those candidate characteristics which facilitate this connection highly sought after qualities. As discussed by Katz (1980), Carey and Shugart (1995), Ames (1995), and Carey (1997), two of the most important candidate qualities are high
levels of funding or wealth, so as to allow for personal favors for constituents, and incumbency, for both the value of name recognition as well as for the ability it gives the candidate to use their governmental benefits and access to pork and personal favors. However, resources are limited, party discipline may preclude it, and competition can be fierce, and thus pork provision is often not the only strategy of a candidate.

In fact, as Ames (1995) notes, the strategies of the candidates to create secure electoral coalitions are almost always multi-faceted and almost never identical with one another. That is, candidates do not typically rely on one strategy or one way of promoting themselves, but rather tailor their respective strategies to the demographic context as well as their own personal backgrounds. This clearly signals the value of the third element of strategy that a candidate in a preference vote system can employ: ‘identifier’ characteristics, those which separate the candidate from the others by virtue of unique personal features. These may endear him/her to societal groups and allow access to pre-organized political or social outreach structures based on these characteristics (i.e., region of origin, ethnicity, religion, or occupational group). Essentially any personal characteristic that marks a candidate as distinct from the others in his/her party, and that allows constituents to identify with the candidate, can be seen as a potential advantage (Katz, 1980; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Ames, 1995; Carey, 1997; Shugart et al., 2005).

One might expect, therefore, that women candidates have an advantage in this realm of strategy; the literature would imply that being of a different gender from most of one’s competition should be a good thing. Not only would it provide an instant separation from the crowd of candidates within the party, but it would also allow the candidate special access to existing women’s groups. After all, just as candidates from the same region or with the same religious background can form a costless connection with pre-formed groups based on those characteristics, women should be able to do the same. Shugart (1994) poses this point as a possibility, arguing that in preference vote systems, women could have an advantage due to the incentives in the system to emphasize personal characteristics that both make one different and that allow one to create personal ties with constituents on the basis of that difference.2

Rule (1994) and Kittilson (2006) also expect the intraparty preference vote to be beneficial for women, but use a different line of reasoning than Shugart. They argue that the parties, not the voters, are functioning to keep the number of women serving in the legislatures low,contending that when the electorate is given the option to move women candidates toward the top of the party list in this system type, they will choose to do so. From this assumption, it follows that voters, when faced with a decisive intraparty preference vote, will consciously work in the interest of equality by voting for women and thereby increasing the chances that the female candidates will be selected (and elected).3

4. The proposed effect of intraparty competition on the selection of women

When faced with a ballot in an electoral system that includes a decisive intraparty preference vote, the voters cannot rest their decisions on the party affiliation of the candidates. Instead, because the voters must choose among candidates of the same party, they must go beyond this distinction and look for other reasons to select a particular candidate. Rather than collect extensive information on each candidate, the rational voter in this scenario typically employs the personal traits and behavior of the candidates as substitutes for full information (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1994). That is, instead of gathering extensive information about each candidate, voters employ “information short-cuts” – i.e., cues or signals that the voters can use in place of being fully informed about each candidate. Because the gender of a candidate is one of the easiest bits of information to gather (i.e., in most circumstances a voter need only see a name – not even a picture is necessary to gain this information), it is an obvious response for the voter to utilize an information shortcut based on gender in their decision calculus, particularly when the most frequently used shortcut – political party – does not suffice.

In an electoral context in which a voter engages the gender of a candidate as an information shortcut, the crucial question is clear: what sort of “information” will they assume based on the candidate’s gender? It seems obvious that the information gathered by a voter based on the cue of “woman” varies by cultural context. Thus, before anticipating the effect of an electoral institution that creates an incentive to draw on a personal cue – i.e., the decisive intraparty preference vote – one must identify the content and emotional valence of the cue.

In those societies where traditional gender norms prevail – i.e., a substantial portion of the population continues to believe that women’s “natural” abilities are found in the private sphere of home/family – one would expect the cue of “woman” to carry a more negative emotional valence for leadership than in a society with more contemporary norms. Ample scholarship has demonstrated that voters draw information based on a candidate’s gender4 and, in those environments with traditional gender norms, one can assume that the information drawn will be less likely to benefit women candidates than those in the context of more modern gender norms. And, while great

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2 However, he also posits a competing hypothesis, noting that the “captive supporters” found in the highly clientelistic systems of Japan and Italy may prevent women candidates from using gender to their advantage.

3 In addition to the scholars who demonstrate the positive effects of open list systems, there are those who claim that variations in the type of PR have no effect on the legislative representation of women. Women, according to this camp, have an equal chance of getting elected across all types of PR; they find that the key to representation is not the electoral system but rather the party magnitude (Matland, 2005) or the presence of gender quotas with a placement mandate (Schmidt, 2008).

strides have been made around the world in modernizing expectations for women, there continues to be intra-regional variation in the prevalence of traditional norms. Even if one isolates the analysis to a world region that includes only advanced democracies, one can find significant differences among countries in the prevalence of the beliefs about traditional roles of women (Table 1). Using results from the 2008 wave of the European Values Survey, Table 1 illustrates substantial differences in the prevalence of traditional gender norms even among countries in the same region. For example, when one considers the responses to whether men should be given priority access to scarce jobs, the vast majority of citizens in Finland and Norway disagree with this prospect. However, a considerable segment of citizens (about 20%) in Austria, Ireland and Switzerland agree with the option of giving men priority access to jobs. A similar trend is demonstrated by the responses to the second question as well: traditional gender norms associated with familial responsibilities are weaker in some countries (e.g., Norway and Luxembourg) and stronger in others (e.g., Ireland and Austria).

The selectorate, I argue, has a strong incentive to be attentive to the prevalence of traditional gender norms, particularly when the electoral system allows decisive intraparty competition. That is, selectorates in the electoral context of a decisive intraparty preference vote anticipate the voters’ turn to personal traits as substitutes for full information, and construct their lists with this in mind. There continues to be the incentive to ‘balance’ the list with diversity, but, because voters are more likely to engage personal traits as shortcuts, there may be a counter incentive to cultivate a personal vote. Thus, because of the increased use of trait-based shortcuts by voters in the electoral context of decisive intraparty competition, I argue that the party selectorate will use a selection strategy that allows just enough diversity for ‘balance,’ but not so much that the negative shortcuts drive away voters. In short, in those countries with a prevalence of traditional norms, I hypothesize that the decisive intraparty preference vote will have a negative effect on the number of women chosen as candidates by the selectorate. However, if the prevalence of traditional gender norms is low, I hypothesize that the effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote will be absent – i.e., not significantly different from an electoral system without this electoral institution. The effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote, therefore, is conditional upon the prevalence of traditional gender norms.

Table 1: Responses to European Values survey, 2008 wave.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree (%)</th>
<th>Disagree (%)</th>
<th>Neither (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In systems without a decisive intraparty preference vote, however, the strategy of the selectorate is different. The voters must select the candidates as an inalterable group, not as individuals, and thus the engagement of trait-based shortcuts by the voters changes in several ways: first, the party label can be relied upon in the voter calculus for quick, relatively low cost decisions, and thus the incentive to examine specific candidates, and rest decisions on specific candidate traits, declines. This is not to say that voters are completely unaware of who is on the list, but rather that they do not need to rely on information shortcuts beyond party affiliation to choose among them. Further, unlike systems with a decisive intraparty preference vote, the list order causes candidates at the top of the list (i.e., the “face(s) of the party”) to be more well-known than those that are ‘hidden’ in the middle or bottom of the list. Thus, while the incentive to ‘balance’ the list remains, the selectorate does not need to be as concerned that diversity may trigger negative stereotypes about candidates or the party. The majority of voters may be relatively unaware of the content of the list, and are likely to vote based on party id alone.

For example, consider a situation in which a party runs only women candidates. Because of the stereotypes that women tend to be more leftwing, voters will interpret the high number of women candidates as a signal that the party is moving left on the ideological scale.

5 EVS (2011).

6 For example, consider a situation in which a party runs only women candidates. Because of the stereotypes that women tend to be more leftwing, voters will interpret the high number of women candidates as a signal that the party is moving left on the ideological scale.

7 However, as Shugart et al. (2005) note, this awareness (measured by the candidates’ incentive to cultivate a personal vote) varies by district magnitude.

8 That is, as long as no selectorate makes what could be cast as ‘extreme’ candidate selection decisions by the media (i.e., if a selectorate chooses all male or all female candidates, this could attract media attention that will probably have a negative effect on success).
intraparty preference vote. I test these hypotheses below, using both a natural experiment as well as a multi-country data set.

5. Natural experiment: Japan

The case of Japan offers a unique opportunity for a natural experiment on the effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote due to the electoral reforms of their House of Representatives in 1994. Before their reforms, this house was considered a classic example of the incentives and consequences found in electoral systems with decisive intraparty competition. As Carey and Shugart (1995) note in their survey of electoral formulas, Japan’s pre-reform single non-transferable vote system “really (was) a case of every candidate for herself” (429). In this system, voters were given a single vote to cast in districts ranging from two to six seats and, unlike the open list proportional representation or single transferable vote systems, these votes did not benefit other candidates in the party at all. Thus, although there remained some party influence due to the nomination control retained by the parties, the high levels of intraparty competition fostered by the inability of the system to allow candidates of the same party to share support caused the parties to play little role in uniting the candidates in a common front. Instead, politicians of the same party campaigned and distinguished themselves by any means necessary.

The Japanese electoral reforms of 1994 were enacted with the intent to move their electoral system away from one-party domination and clientelist behavior, and instead shift to a model that would allow both issue-centered campaigns as well as an alternation in power. The chosen solution was a mixed-member majoritarian system based principally on single-member districts. The nominal tier employs a single member district system, and the list tier uses a closed list proportional representation system; as is usually the case for mixed member systems, there is no intraparty competition in either tier. As Reed and Thies (2001) explain, this system type is designed to facilitate a two-bloc multiparty system with disciplined national parties as well as to generate incentives for individual legislators to represent local interests rather than clientelist demands. This is not to say that all candidate-centered or personal vote incentives have disappeared, but rather that they have dramatically declined, and thus that the campaigning and electoral politics of these states have reformed to be more issue-oriented and party-centered.

The cultural context of Japan in 1994 was clearly not beneficial to women candidates. Results from the 1995 wave of the World Values Survey provide a stunning portrait of the bias against women leaders: a majority of the population (56.9%) either “agreed” or “strongly agreed” with the statement that “men make better political leaders than women do.” Therefore, according to my proposed theory, the cultural context of bias should trigger the decisive intraparty competition to have a negative effect in the pre-reform electoral system. When compared to the pre-reform system, I expect the percentage of women candidates to be higher in the post-reform electoral system due to its lack of decisive intraparty competition (Fig. 1).

As predicted, Fig. 1 demonstrates a substantial difference in the number of women selected to run for legislative office in the pre-reform versus post-reform electoral context. When the electoral system included a decisive intraparty preference vote (i.e., the pre-reform system), the average number of women selected to run was about 5% of the total number of candidates. However, when the preference vote was removed from the electoral system (i.e., post-reform), the percentage of women selected to run for election to the House of Representatives jumped to about 13%. Due to the cultural context of bias – i.e., the prevalence of traditional gender norms, there appears to be a powerful negative effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the percentage of women selected to run for legislative office.

6. Multi-state model

To assemble the data used in this segment of the analysis, I collected the lists of candidates for one legislative election in eight countries in Western Europe: Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Austria. These countries were chosen because they provided adequate variation in the independent variable: presence or not of a decisive intraparty preference vote in the electoral system. In addition, I chose to stay within one region (Western Europe) so as to introduce the least amount of cultural and historical variation as possible. Further, I restricted my available cases to those without a constitutional or electoral law level gender quota (i.e., all cases with legal quotas were removed, and only countries with party level quotas were considered), and thus states such as Belgium were automatically removed from consideration. And finally, these countries were selected for reasons of practicality: complete candidate lists can be difficult to attain, and, after narrowing the selection pool based on the above criteria, these were the countries in Western Europe for which I was able to find the complete candidate lists with both first and last names of all candidates.

The states coded as lacking a decisive preference vote are Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, and Austria. This classification is quite straightforward for Spain; this country does not allow its voters to cast an intraparty preference vote (i.e., they are closed-list PR). Norway, Austria and the Netherlands, however, are unique in that they tend to be classified as “Flexible List” proportional representation. This categorization denotes that while voters can cast an

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9 Italy is a similar case – not only did they have electoral reform in the early 1990s but they even reformed from/to a relatively similar system as that of Japan. However, due to the surprisingly effective gender quotas instituted in the first post-reform election, the effect of the electoral reform is clouded and thus the case is not ideal for this analysis.


11 Though of course, as is true with any multi-country study, there is no way to control for the effects of all historical and cultural factors that may impact the dependent variable.
intraparty preference vote, a candidate must receive a very large percentage of the preference vote for it to affect the list order. For example, Koole and Leijenaar (1988) note that since 1945, there are only 3 examples of candidates who were elected due to preference votes in the Netherlands. In Norway, the situation is even more extreme – no candidate has ever received enough preference votes to overrule the party list order (Valen, 1988). Austria follows this same trend as well, with only a handful of representatives over the past 60 years drawing a win from preference votes alone. The intraparty preference vote is, therefore, not decisive in these cases; the vast majority of elected officials won their positions based on list order, not preference votes.

It is important to note that while the electoral systems of Ireland, Finland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg all use a proportional representation system that includes a decisive intraparty preference vote, there is a significant difference among the systems. Finland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland all use an open list proportional representation system, however Ireland employs a single-transferable vote system (STV). In an STV election, voters are asked to not only select their favorite candidate, but to also rank order their preferences. Then, as candidates hit the quota and are chosen as winners (or dropped as definite losers), their votes transfer to the next preference. Unlike open list systems, parties in STV do not present party lists. Each party has several candidates running under the label in each district (which one could refer to as a list of candidates), and a vote for a candidate does not benefit the party as a whole. Thus, this system is considered more candidate-centered than many other types of PR. While these differences are important, the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote, I argue, is a strong enough similarity to justify grouping them in one category.

Before running the data, I removed all parties from the analysis that either had no winners in any district or no incumbents in any district. In other words, only parties that either won a seat or ran an incumbent (in any district) were included in the data set. I chose to remove these parties due to my concern that parties with essentially no chance to win may have different goals than that of just vote maximization. This, in turn, could affect their choices for candidates. If, for example, the goal of a party is not to win any seats, but rather to call attention to an issue or cause, their candidate selection strategy may be very different from those parties with the goal of winning seats. Additionally, approximately 220 candidates in Switzerland (out of a total of 2858 Swiss candidates) ran on lists that were reserved entirely for either all men or all women – these lists were also removed from the analysis. One final group was removed from the data set: any candidate that ran as an “independent” (defined as not being affiliated with any political party).

Each data point in this analysis is a party list in an electoral district, and a total of 1095 lists were used in this data set. The dependent variable is the percentage of women on each party list (number of women on list divided by list size). Of all of the cases, only the Netherlands included the genders of the candidates in the official

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12 This is, of course, a relatively old citation. But, after a check of the lists/winners since then, I could find only six winners since 1989 who were elected based on preference votes.

13 For ease of discussion, I frequently refer to party lists throughout this article and I do not make the distinction that parties in Ireland do not present formal lists.

14 Though, as Gallagher (2005) points out, the vote-transfer mechanism of this system essentially requires that candidates of the same party behave as a team. This is in stark contrast to the pre-reform PR-SNTV system of Japan, in which “LDP candidates could openly regard each other with animosity” (524).

15 That being said, in order to demonstrate that the anomaly of STV is not driving the results of this article, I ran the models without Ireland. All variables key to this analysis remained significant.

16 If a party won a seat in hypothetical district 1, but not in hypothetical district 2, both lists remained in the data set. So, if a party wins in one district, I assume that it had a chance to win in others. Admittedly, this assumption is not true in all cases. However, the analysis required to determine the chance of winning of each party in all districts is very high-time constraints prevent it.

17 There were also several country specific decisions that needed to be made due to the various eccentricities of each electoral system. The decisions are as follows: In the Netherlands, most parties run only one list because this is a state with essentially a country-wide district magnitude. However, 3 minor parties ran multiple lists and had the same candidates in the same positions on all lists, except for the last few (unelectable) spots. Because this was relatively uncommon, and because I did not want to inflate the power of those parties in my data set, I calculated the average number of women on the lists for those parties that submitted multiple lists, and included it in my data set as just one list. In Spain, all parties run lists of primary candidates (primarios) and in addition, a small list of supplemental candidates that are very rarely, if ever, selected to serve (suplentes). Because I was concerned that parties may stack the supplemental lists with women, I ran the analysis both with and without the supplemental lists – the results were the same either way. In Austria, there are three different tiers in the electoral system for the parliament: the regional, the Land (the level that we would usually refer to as a state), and country-wide. Two levels are included in this analysis: the regional and the Land because I was unable to find the national level seats. However, the vast majority of elected legislators come from either the regional or the Land level – only, on average, about 13% come from the third national level tier (Müller, 2005).

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**Fig. 1.** Comparison of effect of electoral System on the percentage of women candidates nominated for election in Japanese House of Representatives. Source: [http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/27.htm](http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/27.htm)
publication of the party lists. For all other cases, I hand-coded the genders of the candidates based on the names provided on the party lists, and calculated the percentage of each list as male/female. Table 2 presents a comparison of the average number of women on party lists by country (i.e., an average of the dependent variable) as well as the number of women elected to serve in the legislature in that particular election (Table 2):

This table demonstrates that on average, party lists in countries with decisive intraparty competition tend to have fewer women candidates than those in states without a decisive intraparty preference vote. In other words, fewer women tend to be nominated as candidates in states where voters are given an opportunity to select a specific person from within a party. However, this relationship is not without its complications; the case of Finland jumps out as an obvious outlier to this trend, and Luxembourg does not have dramatically fewer women candidates than Austria or the Netherlands. This suggests that another variable is intervening in the relationship between electoral system and the selection of women as candidates. As discussed above, I argue that the intervening variable that determines the effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the selection of women is the prevalence of traditional gender norms.

There are three main independent variables in my model: first, whether or not the electoral system includes a decisive intraparty preference vote (coded as a dichotomous variable); second, the prevalence of traditional gender norms; third, an interaction of these two variables, offered as a statistical tool for capturing the conditional effect of the intraparty preference vote. I operationalize the prevalence of traditional gender norms by employing the results from Question 21B of the European Values Survey discussed in Table 1. The variable Traditional Norms, therefore, refers to the percentage of respondents, by country, who agree with the statement that “when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.” The interaction term, PV\_Norms, is the interaction of the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote and the level of societal adherence to traditional gender norms.

Several control variables are included as well, each one having been demonstrated in the literature as having a significant effect on the selection and/or election of women candidates: Party Ideology (Alexander and Andersen, 1993; McDermott, 1998; Koch, 2000), Percentage of Male and Female Incumbents (Erikson, 1971; Cain et al., 1987; Gelman and King, 1990), the District Magnitude for the specific district in which each list ran (Norris, 1985; Rule, 1987; Studlar and Welch, 1991; Matland and Brown, 1992), the Party Magnitude – i.e., the number of seats each party won in each district (Matland, 1993), the presence of voluntary Party-Level Gender Quotas (Jones, 1998; Gaul, 2001; Kittilson, 2006; Dahlerup, 2006), the Candidate Selection Centralization – i.e., if nomination control is centralized at the national level or decentralized to the regional level (Krouwel, 1999; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Bille, 2001; Lundell, 2004; Hazan and Voerman, 2006; Rahat, 2007), and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% Women candidates</th>
<th>% Women legislators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 My coding methodology was as follows: I began by collecting common male and female names in each country from websites devoted to baby names (www.babynology.com, www.thinkbabynames.com, and www.babynamenetwork.com), and then coded the names on the party lists based on this collection. If the name was common and, according to the baby name websites, highly correlated with a particular gender (i.e., Thomas is almost always male, Betty is almost always female), then no further investigation was done – the name was coded based on the recommendation of the baby name websites. However, if the name was either uncommon or androgynous (i.e., Pat could be either male or female), then I searched for a picture of the candidate in question. If no picture was found, the candidate was removed from the analysis. In addition, if one website disagreed with another regarding whether a name was male or female, the name was considered androgynous and picture evidence was collected. The list of names coded as automatically male or female ended up containing more than 40,000 names and thus it seems too long to include with this document – but of course I am happy to provide it to any curious readers.

19 The position of women on the party lists, and specifically, whether or not women are placed in positions that can potentially lead to election, is another important aspect of candidate selection. However, I have chosen not to operationalize list position into my dependent variable for two reasons. First, based on their success rates of winning legislative seats, it appears that women in this particular selection of countries are not being systematically relegated to the bottom ranks of the list. This is not to say that poor list placement would not be a concern in other regions (see, for example, Kunovich, 2003), but in this region it does not appear to be occurring. Just to make sure, I replicated one of the tests performed by Kunovich (2003) on one of my cases: Norway. This case was chosen due to its simple, one level electoral system (compared to the multiple levels of Austria), as well as due to its lack of supplementary or substitute lists (found in Spain), both of which introduce additional complexity to the analysis. Looking only at the top of the list – i.e., the header – women hold the top position in 28% of the lists. Of the lists where any candidate won a seat, 72.9% of them were headed by men, 27.1% by women. Of those lists where no candidate won, 69.5% were headed by men, 30.5% by women. Thus, it doesn’t appear that women are placed disproportionately on losing lists; the relatively equal number heading up both winning and losing lists does not provide evidence for a party strategy to relocate women to losing lists. My second reason for not including list position in my dependent variable is due to data constraints. While we know that list placement can vary in some (but not all) of their districts/parties (e.g., Switzerland and Finland). Thus, because ballot order can vary by district and is sometimes alphabetical, proper analysis of the effect of list placement in open list systems would require me to attain all of the ballots used by all districts across my cases; while ideal, this does not seem plausible.

20 I also ran the model using the results from the other survey question in Fig. 1 (Question 48C); the results of the model remain the same.

21 Though as Murray (2008) demonstrates, in the case of France (and perhaps this could apply elsewhere) the advantages of incumbency are less clear and concrete than previously thought.
Years Since Women’s Suffrage was achieved (Matland and Montgomery, 2003; Norris, 2004).22

The table below presents the results from the ordinary least squares regression employed to test the hypothesis on the relationship between the decisive intraparty preference vote and percentage of women on the list.23 It is a virtual certainty that the lists of candidates within each party are influenced by one another (i.e., the Social Democrat list in District A is not completely independent of the Social Democrat list of District B) Thus, because I cannot assume that the lists are independent within each party, the observations are clustered by party. In addition, because the number of party lists varied by country (for example, there were only 10 party lists in the Netherlands versus 260 in Austria), I weighted the data such that each country has an equal impact in the model (Table 3).24

Given that interacted variables are not easily interpreted (Kam and Franzese, 2007), I present these results graphically in Fig. 2.

The graph above25 demonstrates that when traditional gender norms are not prevalent (i.e., when relatively few respondents agree that when jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women), the presence of a decisive intraparty preference vote has no significant effect on the selection of women candidates. In other words, under these cultural conditions, the type of proportional representation employed does not affect the number of women candidates nominated. And in fact, when the prevalence of traditional gender norms is exceptionally low, there is evidence that the decisive intraparty preference vote may even have a positive effect on the selection of women candidates.

However, as the prevalence of traditional gender norms increases, so does the effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the selection of women candidates. At the mean of the traditional norms measurement (approx. 15% of respondents agree that men should have priority access to jobs), there is a significant, negative effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the number of women selected to run as candidates on party lists. In other words, under these cultural conditions, the type of proportional representation employed has a significant effect on the number of women candidates nominated to party lists. Thus, these data suggest that there is a conditional effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote, and that this effect is dependent upon the prevalence of traditional gender norms in a society.

7. Conclusion

While candidate selection continues to be something of a secret garden, our insight into the strategy, motivations, and methods of the selectorate has grown tremendously over the past 25 years. This article seeks to contribute to the continuing growth of our understanding by offering an analysis of an under-studied electoral institution, the decisive intraparty preference vote, and its conditional effects on the selection of women candidates. The evidence presented here suggests that, contrary to assumptions made in existing literature, we cannot determine the effects of this institution in isolation; we must consider the cultural context in which the preference vote operates in order to correctly predict and understand its effect on candidate selection.
Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Shaun Bowler, Matthew Shugart, Jessica Trounstine and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments at various stages. I would also like to thank Benjamin Nyblade, Bonnie Field, Andre Krouwel, Thanh-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, Raphael Kies, Andreas Ladner, and Daniel Bochsler for generously sharing their indispensable case knowledge.

Appendix A

Explanations of codings of control variables included in model:

Party Ideology

Each party ideology is coded as a dichotomous variable:

\[ 0 = \text{right-wing}, \quad 1 = \text{left-wing} \] 26

Incumbents

\[ a \quad \% \quad \text{of each party’s list populated by female incumbents.} \]

\[ b \quad \% \quad \text{of each party’s list populated by male incumbents.} \]

District Magnitude

Because each data point in this analysis represents a party list, the district magnitude employed is the magnitude for the district in which each specific list ran. For example, in the Swiss district of Bern, there are 27 seats up for election, and I coded every party list that runs in this district as having a magnitude of 27.

Party Level Gender Quotas

None of the cases included in this analysis employ legal quotas for the included legislative elections. Some of these states, however, do have parties that use voluntary targets, but because there are no sanctions for non-compliance and no monitoring agencies one cannot be certain that these quotas will have a significant effect. I coded the party level quotas using a dichotomous variable which signaled whether or not any voluntary quota was associated with each party list at the time of election. 27

Candidate Selection Centralization

To measure the centralization level of selection in each party, I created a dichotomous variable using the existing research of Krouwel (1999), Rahat and Hazan (2001), Bille (2001), Lundell (2004), and Hazan and Voerman (2006). 28 One category of this variable includes those parties in which significant control is in the national level (Centralization = 0), and the other includes those in which control is decentralized to the local level, including primaries (Centralization = 1). In addition, as Hopkin (2001) and Norris (2006) note, a complicating factor in measuring nomination procedures is that the process of candidate selection can appear more democratic than it actually is (i.e., the formal rules and the reality of selection sometimes differ dramatically), and thus I also contacted experts on parties and selection in each of my cases to confirm the selection mechanism coding.

Suffrage

From the point of the legislative election, the number of years that women in the state have had full voting equality with men. 29

References


26 The following sources were employed to categorize each party’s ideology: Hix and Lord 1997, Day 2000, Adams et al., 2004, Hug and Schulz 2007, and www.ipu.org.
27 Data on the presence of gender quotas in each state was collected from the Global Database of Quotas for Women: http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/search.cfm
28 I chose to measure selection using a dichotomous variable instead of the more common ordinal scaling found in most candidate selection analyses because I could not find enough reliable data on under-studied cases (such as Luxembourg) to be able to code an ordinal scale.


