Democratic enclaves in authoritarian regimes

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This article introduces a new concept to the literature on authoritarian regimes – the ‘democratic enclave’ – and contrasts it to the well-known concept of the ‘authoritarian enclave’. The meaning and description of democratic enclaves is given. A causal theory of democratic enclaves is outlined and their consequences considered. Theoretical and policy implications follow.

Keywords: authoritarian enclave; democratization; institutions; democracy; authoritarianism; democracy promotion

Introduction

In the study of new democracies, the term ‘authoritarian enclave’ has been widely used to describe durable pockets of authoritarian practice at odds with the regime’s political norms and rules of the game.1 These pockets are generally found within the state – a particular sub-national region, say, or a particular institution like the military. They may also be in social spaces that the state claims to regulate, such as education or the media. They are characterized by an adherence to recognizably authoritarian norms and procedures in contrast to those of the democratic regime. Such enclaves have been widely studied because of their assumed importance to democratic consolidation.

By contrast, the existence of ‘democratic enclaves’ within authoritarian regimes has been largely overlooked. In part, this is because of a lack of conceptualization of certain institutionalized sites of democratic norms and practices within authoritarian regimes as ‘enclaves’. More important, the theoretical possibility of genuine and stable pockets of democracy within authoritarian regimes has been downplayed.

Recent fieldwork in China,2 coupled with the study of authoritarian regimes past and present, provides ample evidence for the existence of democratic enclaves. The dynamics of such enclaves, including those that fail, could shed light upon the descriptive realities of authoritarian regimes as well as the reasons for their

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transformation or durability. The concept of democratic enclaves also holds potential policy importance for the promotion of democracy.

This article elaborates the concept of the democratic enclave, cites some successes and failures, and seeks to explain them. This is followed by an analysis of their consequences, and of the policy and theoretical conclusions that follow. The purpose throughout is to make explicit a latent concept that might be fruitfully applied to the comparative political and historical analysis of authoritarian regimes.

**Definition**

The concept of the ‘authoritarian enclave’ is well-established in the comparative politics literature, mainly in studies of Latin American democracies. Garreton was probably the first to use the term in 1991, later describing authoritarian enclaves broadly in a 1995 article on Chile as including ‘nondemocratic institutions, unresolved human rights problems, and social actors not fully willing to play by democratic rules.’ The literature on Latin American democracies has paid most attention to militaries, senates, and sometimes courts as authoritarian enclaves. The concept has also been applied backwards to studies of American political development with respect to deep southern ‘Dixie’ states in the century after the Civil War. In Asia, institutions such as the Thai monarchy, the Indonesian military, and the Vietnam-backed Cambodian People’s Party in Cambodia have variously been described as authoritarian enclaves in newly-democratic states.

Authoritarian enclaves are thus institutional spaces in the state or regulatory spaces in society that adhere to authoritarian norms at odds with those of a democratic regime. To turn this concept around, then, a ‘democratic enclave’ is an institution of the state or a well-defined regulatory space in society where the authoritarian regime’s writ is substantively limited and is replaced by an adherence to recognizable democratic norms and procedures.

The notion of democratic enclaves has been implicit, or latent, in much theorizing about authoritarian regimes. In *Polyarchy*, for instance, Dahl noted the possibility of ‘competitive’ institutions at the sub-national level even when the national regime remained ‘hegemonic’. Recent contributions by Wright, Magaloni, and others have begun to explore the degrees of democratic autonomy possible within authoritarian institutions. A democratic enclave represents the most robust form of democratic autonomy.

Several points of specification are necessary before exploring this concept’s causes and consequences. For one, a democratic enclave is more than just a site of democratic *resistance* to an authoritarian regime. Iran’s unicameral lower house, the Islamic Consultative Assembly or *Majles*, for instance, often resists the authoritarian powers of the Council of Guardians and of the supreme leader (*rahbar*) by claiming democratic legitimacy. But thus far that resistance has been effectively circumscribed. It is better described as a ‘failed’ or ‘facade’ democratic enclave. Likewise, courts in many authoritarian regimes occasionally show flashes of democratic will in arbitrating politically important cases – as when
Malaysia’s Federal Court overthrew the conviction of opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim in 2004 on the grounds that it violated due process. An enclave, however, has gained an *enduring* ability to act in democratic ways or in espousal of democratic norms. In other words, an enclave has become a realm of highly limited penetration by the regime. An enduring rejection of authoritarian norms and practices in favor of democratic ones is an essential feature of a democratic enclave.

Secondly, not all social spaces that espouse democratic norms or practices are democratic enclaves. Those that the regime does not seek to regulate – religious or sports organizations for instance, no matter how democratic their practices and commitments – are not enclaves if they do not challenge state regulatory powers. Certain social groups like students and Christian clergy are often at the forefront of democratic movements in authoritarian regimes, but do not necessarily constitute enclaves unless they occupy social spaces that the state presumes to control.

Thirdly, not all institutions or regulatory spaces that effectively banish regime norms and practices are democratic enclaves. A democratic enclave is distinguished by its adherence to or espousal of norms and procedures that stress individual rights, due process, political equality, and popular control in contrast to the dominant norms of an authoritarian regime. Organized criminal groups, for instance, while they may successfully resist the writ of the state and act in ways inconsistent with a regime’s norms, are not *democratic* enclaves because they are not structured by norms and procedures that constitute a democratic alternative to those of the regime. Likewise, enclaves within the state that resist state policies are not necessarily democratic enclaves. Haklai, for example, has written of the ‘bureaucratic enclave’ in the Israeli state that supports the settlers movement, resisting the state’s own rules designed to limit settlements.9 And of course, there are many examples of ethnic enclaves where the state’s writ is weak but which do not challenge the authoritarian rules of the game – the former Tamil enclave in Sri Lanka, say, or Somaliland in Somalia. Democratic enclaves espouse democratic practices. They are, so to speak, walled gardens of democracy.

Fourthly, democratic enclaves are more than just ‘nominally democratic’. They are *actually* democratic, in the sense of actually practicing and espousing democracy, as defined above. Indeed, their formal status may be anything but democratic – as in the case of the media under communist regimes that are nominally sworn to uphold party propaganda and ideological indoctrination but which may act in quite democratic fashion. As an empirical matter, many cases will fall into a gray area between being nominally and actually democratic. But the appropriate measurement criteria are actual not formal practices and norms.

Fifthly, democratic enclaves must be institutionalized. By this is meant that they operate on a repeated basis according to relatively fixed pattern of interactions that are valued for their own sake. In other words, enclaves are structural or organizational in nature. An individual who successfully challenges regime norms with democratic ones, such as Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi, does not constitute an
enclave, whatever their popular appeal and power, although her ‘National League for Democracy (Liberated Area)’ is. Dissidents and activists or loosely-bound groups of individuals are not enclaves unless they create institutionalized (organized) forms of opposition that survive regime assaults. The organized social movements seeking to recall the victims of authoritarian persecution – the Tianamen Mothers in China, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in authoritarian Argentina, or the anti-Stalin Memorial movement in the former Soviet Union – were institutionalized and democratic, and thus should be considered democratic enclaves within social spaces that the state sought to regulate.

And finally, democratic enclaves are not necessarily illegal. Indeed, as we shall see, many of them have a formal legal status, even if their behavior makes them vulnerable to legal sanction. Linz used the term ‘alegal’ (unrelated to law) to describe forms of democratic opposition within authoritarian regimes that are both formally legal but also ideologically oppositional. Democratic enclaves are alegal in this sense.

Three Types
Democratic enclaves can be divided into three main types. Interventional enclaves are those formed as a result of foreign intervention. West Berlin after 1948, Kurdistan after the First Gulf War of 1991, and Hong Kong after 1997 are all examples of democratic enclaves built within the boundaries of existing states as a result of foreign intervention. Such enclaves arise due to explicit and direct efforts by foreign states to create or protect democratic freedoms in some geographic region of an authoritarian state. However, the origins of such enclaves in international politics make them less interesting to students of domestic sources of political transformation.

Transitional democratic enclaves are those formed during an immediate transition to or from authoritarian rule. Such enclaves are also less interesting since they are descriptively part of those transitions – either as hold-outs against a new authoritarian regime or as pathbreakers to a newly democratic one. Writing about struggles over local councils in the midst of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1990, for example, an Australian newspaper noted attempts by reformers to build ‘democratic enclaves where new political parties will be allowed to register, independent newspapers and radio stations will be free to operate, and market-oriented economic reforms will be encouraged.’ A commentator in the Jakarta Post in 2002 described direct presidential elections, the elimination of military seats in the national legislature, and the creation of press freedoms ‘as important democratic enclaves that will serve as important foundations for the consolidation of democracy’ in Indonesia. In Algeria, the ruling regime intentionally created democratic enclaves in the form of elected national and regional parliaments in 1997 as part of its democratic transition. In the unsettled period of Mexico’s transition from Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI – Institutional Revolutionary Party) dominance after 2000, Fox noted the ‘patchwork quilt’ in which
some regions or social groups remain under entrenched authoritarian rule while others have carved out veritable democratic enclaves.'

The most important type of democratic enclave for our purposes can be called *consolidated* enclaves. These are enclaves within authoritarian states that result from domestic political processes and are not short-term artifacts of regime transitions to or from democracy. The term consolidated includes two senses: they are internally consolidated in terms of some minimal degree of institutionalization (as defined above); and they arise in authoritarian regimes which are themselves minimally consolidated (in the sense of not being in an immediate transition to or from authoritarian rule).

The distinction between a transitional and a consolidated democratic enclave may only be perceived in retrospect. What appears at first to be a consolidated enclave in a rock-solid authoritarian regime may turn out to be a leading indicator or even cause of a train of events that leads to that regime’s replacement by a democracy. The Memorial movement in the USSR to honor Stalin’s victims was established in 1987, well into the *glasnost* era but before there was any sense that a democratic transition was in progress. The classification of Memorial as a consolidated democratic enclave depends on dating Russia’s transition to after 1987.

Similarly, there is often uncertainty about whether an authoritarian regime is minimally consolidated. Pakistan’s Supreme Court, for instance, remained an active and organized democratic enclave under the military rule of Pervez Musharraf from 1999 to 2008. During that time, Pakistan’s democratic constitution was at first held in ‘abeyance’ and then formally suspended despite fierce opposition. Musharraf’s dismissal of the chief justice in 2007 set off a cascade of events that returned the country to democracy. If the Musharraf period was always ‘in transition’, first *from* democracy (1999 to 2001) and then back to it (2002 to 2008), then the Supreme Court was never more than a transitional enclave, albeit one that played a critical role in preventing the consolidation of that authoritarian regime.

Recent literature stresses the essential hybridity of many regimes, making the distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes difficult at the margins. Many long-stable regimes, such as Malaysia’s United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) coalition, stand close to the dichotomous dividing line between authoritarianism and democracy. If Malaysia is classified as a democracy, then any ‘democratic enclave’ there would be at best an advanced site of democratic consolidation.

Thus, consolidated democratic enclaves arise in regimes that are not in immediate transition to or from democracy. Such enclaves are of greatest interest to the study of authoritarian regimes because of their contrastive nature. Studying their varieties, their causes, and their consequences takes up the remainder of this article.

**Cases**

In this section, I introduce some basic descriptive facts of successful and unsuccessful consolidated democratic enclaves (henceforth simply ‘democratic
enclaves’). By ‘successful’ I mean those that are substantively democratic and that endure through institutionalization. Considering both is essential for the causal analysis that will follow. The purpose is to describe the variety of democratic enclaves – historically as well as typologically – in order to motivate an interest in why they arise (or fail) and the consequences that follow.

For the purposes of later analysis, we can distinguish between state-led and society-led enclaves. State-led enclaves are those created by state actors, society-led enclaves by non-state actors. Recalling that enclaves may exist within the state or within social spaces that the state seeks to regulate, this gives us three possible sub-types of democratic enclave: state-led enclaves within the state; state-led enclaves within society; and society-led enclaves within society (society-led enclaves within the state seem insufficiently likely to merit attention) (see Table 1).

**Successes**

**Peru’s ombudsman**

Two years after being elected president in 1990, Alberto Fujimori staged his *autogolpe* (‘self-administered coup’). He dissolved the legislature and wrote a new constitution that concentrated power in the executive. In 1993, Fujimori set up an ombudsman’s office – the Defensoría del Pueblo – as a citizen’s safeguard against abuses of power by the state. It had legal and investigative powers similar to those found in democratic Argentina and Costa Rica.\(^\text{17}\) While scholars agree that its powers were circumscribed, they also agree that it acted as independent and democratic manner – taking on cases for groups like women and internal refugees that were direct challenges to the regime.\(^\text{18}\) Kenney described it as ‘the only source of accountability within the Peruvian state’ at the time and as ‘an island in a truncated network of horizontal accountability.’\(^\text{19}\) Pegram says it was ‘no client of Fujimori’ even if its effectiveness often depended on his tolerance.\(^\text{20}\) Ugglå writes that ‘it appears to have been able to achieve some autonomy even under [Fujimori’s] rule.’\(^\text{21}\)

**Mexico’s electoral commission**

Ruled by the authoritarian Institutional Revolution Party (PRI) and its predecessors from 1929 to 2000, Mexico had a long tradition of sham elections that gave the

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<th>Table 1. Typology of democratic enclaves by actor and location.</th>
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opposition parties little chance of success. A key to this system was the Federal Electoral Commission (or CFE), created in 1946, which was, in the words of one commentator, ‘notorious for directing elections toward outcomes dictated by the President and his party, rather than for its accountability to the voting public.’ In 1977, however, the PRI introduced a set of reforms – the Federal Law on Political Organizations and Electoral Procedures – that made the CFE more independent and more committed to democratic norms. Opposition parties gained formal representation on the body for the first time (holding 16 seats compared to the PRI’s 19), as well as the right to sit on its polling station supervisory bodies. The result was the transformation of the CFE into a democratic enclave that remonstrated with the regime over the effective implementation of electoral laws. Between 1978 and 1981, opposition candidates won victories in 41 municipal councils nationwide. Opposition seats in the national legislature rose steadily. The transition to democracy in Mexico is generally dated to further electoral reforms that were launched in 1988, when the CFE was replaced by a new body.

China’s village governments

In 1982, seeking to make the country’s 950,000 villages the basis of rural governance following the abolition of communal farming, China’s ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) endorsed an experimental reform in direct elections for village councils that had begun in the remote Guangxi region. The elections proceeded quickly after a detailed law was passed in 1987 making them mandatory every three years. Probably no more than a quarter of all villages held competitive elections (at nomination and election stages) in the first decade of the law. After the law was updated in 1998 (681,000 villages by then due to redistricting), the proportion holding competitive elections rose steadily. Turnout was consistently in the 50% to 70% range when reliable surveys were done. Birney writes of ‘local enclaves emerging within village elections in China’. Provincial regulations on issues like private voting booths, open nominations, and bans on proxy voting continue to enhance their procedural validity. Today, village elections are institutionalized, democratic, irreversible, and at odds with the norms of the regime itself concerning direct competitive elections.

Hungary’s media

Hungarian journalists played a leading role in the 1956 Budapest uprising against Soviet control. The newly-established regime of János Kadar initiated what became known as the ‘democratic press debate’. Press restrictions became relatively lax from the early 1960’s onward and the main incentives to toe the regime line were access to official news feeds and nomenklatura promotions. The result was to embolden an already autonomy-minded media. The Hungarian media covered more stories from more perspectives than any other in the
Eastern Bloc. Sukosd provides evidence that the media institutionalized democratic practices in several ways: by broadening the scope of its news coverage to include events and topics not sanctioned by (and not flattering to) the regime, including issues relating to ‘the national past and democratic traditions’, thus engaging in democratic agenda-setting; by enabling civil society and political parties to blossom; and by ‘personalizing’ Hungarian politics.28

Failures

China’s township governments

In contrast to its villages (in theory a form of social organization rather than a part of the state), the lowest level of state administration in China, the rural townships (xiang or zhen), of which there were 34,379 in 2007, have had less success establishing democratic enclaves. The main initiative for township elections has come from ambitious local officials who believe they might be rewarded as ‘path-breakers’ in democratization.29 In 1998, Buyun township in Sichuan province became the first to experiment with the direct election of its leader. The experiment has been repeated there in modified form since. But in most of the other two dozen places where it has been tried, Beijing has stepped in to annul the results and punish the organizers. The biggest experiment involved the simultaneous direct election of seven township government heads by 103,000 voters in remote Honghe prefecture near the Vietnam border in Yunnan province in 2004. This led to an intense internal debate for more than a year, the result of which Beijing forced the prefecture to replace the winners with appointees, defeating the attempt to create a democratic enclave.30 Further experiments have been halted.

Malaysia’s courts

Malaysia’s British legal tradition was bequeathed to its judiciary. But the commitment to judicial independence among Malay elites did not survive the rule of Mahathir Mohamed, who led the ruling UMNO and was Prime Minister from 1981 until 2003. Under Mahathir, courts became pliant agents of the authoritarian regime. In 1988, Mahathir sacked the then-Lord President (chief justice) Tun Salleh Abbas after he accepted a suit by 11 members of Mahathir’s own party over the legitimacy of the 1987 UMNO elections. In 1999 and 2000, courts sentenced Mahathir’s main rival, Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, to consecutive prison terms of six and nine years for corruption and sodomy in 1999 and 2000.31 New and similar charges were revived in 2009. As one Malaysian legal scholar wrote: ‘What Dr. Mahathir has done . . . is to sacrifice, for the sake of a transitory, temporary and possibly illusory political advantage to himself and his supporters, the priceless asset of judicial independence.’32 Malaysian courts have failed to live up to expectations that they might become an institutionalized site of democratic opposition.33
Yugoslavia’s worker councils

In the wake of its split from the Warsaw Pact in 1948, Yugoslavia’s communist regime introduced ‘worker councils’ with a stated aim of ensuring democratic management of state enterprises. The first councils were created in 1949 and then institutionalized through further laws and constitutions through the mid-1970s. Councils were fully elected by the enterprise workers and had discretionary powers over matters such as the formulation of general policy and business plans, investment and borrowing, and the approval of enterprise accounts. Worker democracy was a key feature of the Yugoslavian economy and was widely studied by foreign scholars as evidence of the potential for ‘true democracy’ within communist regimes. However, the autonomy and power the councils was systematically circumscribed. Kolaja found that the communist regime’s labour union committees, youth organizations, and especially the League of Communists, which replaced the vanguard Communist Party of Yugoslavia after 1952, dominated council agendas and directed firm policy. Enterprise directors were de facto appointees of the League. In this way, communist authorities retained veto power over council decisions. In a comprehensive review of the literature on the councils, three authors find that ‘party control of organizations became increasingly consolidated and . . . eventually, managers and communist party members made key decisions and real workers’ control was severely restricted.’37

Ukraine’s Chigirin election

In 1876, villagers in the Ukrainian district of Chigirin elected their own ataman (district leader) and then their own village leaders. Encouraged by revolutionaries claiming to act in the name of the tsar, the villagers were about to evict all landlords and officials. When the authorities heard of the plan, it was brutally crushed. This was the peasant uprising that went furthest in pre-revolutionary Russia. It would have created a tiny if symbolically important enclave of democratic rule. Ulam calls it ‘a madcap venture’ because of its low chances of success. Not only was the tsar increasingly intolerant of radical and revolutionary movements, he shows, but the villagers had been misled into believing that they were heeding the wishes of the tsar himself.

Causes

The precise historical process through which any democratic enclave comes into being involves a complex story of personalities, contingent events, institutional settings, and socio-economic conditions. Each enclave has its own story. Establishing what causes such enclaves at a theoretical level requires abstracting from this historical process into more general categories. This then allows us to restate particular case histories in general terms.
China’s village elections, for instance, resulted from a confluence of many factors. The contingent abolition of communal farming between 1978 and 1982 created an opening for villagers in remote Guangxi to experiment in direct elections in 1980 and 1981. This experiment coincided with Beijing’s quest for new means of managing rural society in a way that would retain state power while providing an effective check on cadre corruption. A critical role was played by party elder Peng Zhen, then vice chairman of the national parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC), who drew upon his own nostalgia for close party-people relations in the revolutionary period. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Civil Affairs exploited institutional openings to press the case for incremental spread of minimal elections, expecting them to become genuine elections through diffusion and ratchet effects. Despite resistance from local party officials, the elections succeeded. Not only did villagers take to the elections, but they became an unexpectedly important device of international legitimation for China as Western governments sought to justify their post-Tiananmen engagement with China to skeptical publics.

When similar pressures arose for township elections in the 1990s, many factors had changed: Peng Zhen had died in 1997, living to regret his failure to press for township elections, and other liberal elders such as Tian Jiyun had been sidelined; the NPC had been transformed from a liberal institution promoting popular representation into a conservative institution promoting ‘rule by law’; the global political climate made the party cautious about domestic democratic enclaves; and China’s growing international acceptance dampened incentives for change. While the powerful party Organization Department continued to look favorably upon township elections, other voices within the party-state were less accommodating. Popular support for the elections, meanwhile, was not noticeably higher among citizens than cadres (indeed cadres were slightly more supportive of the elections in principle than citizens – 79% versus 70% in one survey).

In case-oriented research such as this, the most appropriate approach to causality is the specification of combinations of sets of variables that are variously necessary and/or sufficient for the outcome in question, an approach often known as ‘fuzzy-set’ analysis or qualitative comparative analysis. Specifying the set or sets is a prelude to broader quantitative analysis of the discrete causal links between inputs and outcomes across all possible cases.

The Chinese case highlights several important factors in the creation or failure of democratic enclaves: the preferences and perceptions of particular political actors, contingent political events, historical legacies and prior regime structure, international pressures, developmental conditions, current regime structure, and positive feedback effects. Some of these – regime structures, international pressures, and developmental conditions – are easier to generalize about than the others. In the case of ‘democratic legacies’, for instance, the most that can be said (paralleling the discussion of authoritarian regimes) is that the more durable and innovative was the previous democratic regime, the more likely it is that democratic enclaves will arise in the authoritarian period. The more that these factors are present, the more likely is a democratic enclave.
Looming over all causal arguments is top-level political backing. Among our cases, this appears to be a necessary and sufficient condition for democratic enclaves. The contrast between China and Peru, on the one hand, and Malaysia and Yugoslavia on the other hand is instructive (see Table 2). Elsewhere, Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) has neutered the power of the nine non-PAP ‘nominated MPs’ appointed to the country’s docile 94-seat parliament by developing a complex vetting system to ensure that only ‘non-partisan’ candidates win. If an authoritarian regime does not tacitly accept or even back the existence of a democratic enclave, then it will almost certainly fail.

Political backing does not invalidate the existence of a successful democratic enclave. Schedler argues that authoritarian regimes ‘will always try to make sure that the nominally democratic institutions they set up remain substantively authoritarian. Political institutions that are created by and embedded in an authoritarian regime are never, except by a slip of language, “democratic institutions”’. Yet if we accept this, then the same logic must apply to authoritarian enclaves. Democracy cannot be held to a double (higher) standard than authoritarianism. Being supported or tolerated by the authoritarian regime does not necessarily render such enclaves mere façades. More to the point, we can empirically observe democratic enclaves with a genuine degree of autonomy. Democratic enclaves exist in practice even if they are difficult to explain in theory.

The key causal question, then, is this: when and why do authoritarian leaders choose to tolerate or support democratic enclaves? Certainly, leadership backing is not due to an inability to control or even crush such enclaves. In most cases, this could be done, albeit at some cost. Nor is it due to a genuine commitment to democratic norms among regime leaders. In some cases, as evidenced by Peng Zhen, there may be an honest belief in the regime’s claims to be enacting ‘true democracy’. But genuine democratic commitments at the top are rare.

Instead, the logic of democratic enclaves must be found in the strategic value of such enclaves for the regime. That is, enclaves are seen as generating certain benefits and sometimes these benefits are perceived by dictators to be worth the risk. Ginsburg and Moustafa find that authoritarian regimes accept the ‘double-

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<td>Leadership support</td>
<td>YES</td>
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<td>International pressures</td>
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<td>Popular pressures</td>
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<td>Decentralization/ dispersion</td>
<td>YES</td>
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edged sword’ of judicial independence for purposes of social control, popular legitimacy, elite cohesion, economic development, governance, and policy implementation. Wright, meanwhile, argues that authoritarian regimes accept ‘binding legislatures’ for purposes of economic development. Authoritarian states, like democratic ones, can become ‘self-restraining’ if it serves their interests. These lists could well be generalized to explain the support or tolerance of successful democratic enclaves of all sorts.

One factor that should be added to these explanations is international legitimacy. Peru’s Defensoría, for instance, was an emulation of similar bodies in Spain, Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela that Fujimori used to show that he was committed to human rights protections. Eisendtadt argues that ‘the increasing pursuit by Mexico of an international profile requiring more enlightened domestic governance’ helped to give the CFE the autonomy it gained, while Middlebrook notes the external pressures the PRI was under following the Cuban revolution. China’s post-Tiananmen international isolation gave reformers the basis on which to urge the implementation of village elections.

What is notable is that the list of payoffs is not substantively different from the lists offered by Gandhi and Schedlerin in their studies of both nominal and real ‘democratic institutions’ in authoritarian regimes (which Schedler enumerates as formal state institutions such as legislatures, courts, elections, and subnational governments as well as regulatory spaces such as political parties, the media, and civil society). In other words, a theory of democratic enclaves should be embedded in a more general theory of institutions and regulatory spaces under authoritarianism. The key point to make is that, as Gandhi shows, the functional benefits of democratic institutions – which she cites as legitimacy, cooperation, and co-optation – are directly correlated with how democratic they are. By revealing preferences more accurately, offering a space for bargaining, and dispersing power, more democratic institutions deliver more payoffs, even if they simultaneously generate an array of structural and ideational problems for the regime (considered below). This then points to the logical answer to our question: authoritarian regimes accept democratic enclaves when only such a high degree of autonomy and normative separation is perceived to be sufficient to generate the payoffs necessary for the smooth functioning or survival of the regime.

Magaloni, for instance, finds that only ‘credible’ (not façade) institutions are sufficient for authoritarian regimes to overcome the commitment problem when they promise to share power. Democratic enclaves can be seen in this light as ‘super-credible’ signaling devices or ‘super-effective’ preference revelation and bargaining sites. Such arrangements, despite their risks, may be the only way for regimes to see another day. When such enclaves fail, it is because the regime does not subjectively perceive such extreme solutions to be necessary to its rule. The success of the CFE in Mexico, for instance, was due as much to the support of its (liberal) PRI members as to its opposition members. They needed this enclave to sharpen the electoral competitiveness of their party to
defend its threatened hegemony. In the case of China’s village elections, the regime was quite literally worried about a national peasant uprising in the wake of Mao’s death – ‘commune party secretaries will lead the peasants into the cities demanding food’ warned one party elder in 1978. Similarly, South Africa’s Wiehahn Commission of 1977 urged the establishment of ‘industrial democracy’ through black trade unions in order to contain the rising influence of communist groups, already on the rise in neighboring Angola. Kadar liberalized Hungary’s media to help release political tensions following the Soviet intervention. Democratic enclaves, in other words, are a potent medicine for a perceived serious illness.

To push the causal logic back one more stage, we can ask the following: What explains when democratic enclaves are perceived to be likely sources of functional benefits for the regime? The case studies highlight the importance of various structural features that make enclaves more or less useful, that is features that in the language of fuzzy-set analysis are necessary but not sufficient for another condition (high-level political backing) that is itself necessary and sufficient for the outcome in question. These show that there is a credible link between objective potential and subjective backing (see Figure 1).

One factor is historical legacies. Democratic enclaves (like democracies themselves) are more likely to function when they inherit a set of usable structures, norms, discourses, and symbols from the past. Hungarian journalists and Chinese villagers alike experienced their regained freedoms as ‘picking up the pieces’ of past democratic practices following brief episodes of intense Stalinization.

Two others – decentralization and developmental levels – emerge from the case studies as important. Diamond and others have argued that authoritarian enclaves are more likely to arise in decentralized political systems. The same logic applies to democratic enclaves. What made China’s village elections arise and then succeed, for instance, was the fact that villages enjoyed a de jure separation from the unitary state, considered officially as mass organizations rather than branches of government. That meant there was already a tradition of local autonomy and a structure to accommodate it. Likewise, the success of the CFE in Mexico depended on its decentralized structure. In contrast, one key obstacle to township elections in China is that this level of government is formally incorporated into the unitary state: an elected township leader could not simultaneously respond to the top-down accountability demands of the party-state and to the bottom-up demands of voters. Even in supposedly decentralized Yugoslavian

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**Figure 1. Explaining regime support of democratic enclaves.**
case, three scholars conclude that ‘democracy from below seems to have been severely constrained by undemocratic practices at the federal level.’

Closely related is the role of geographic distance – a sort of natural world equivalent to decentralized power. There is an over-abundance of attempts by democratic actors in remote regions of authoritarian regimes to carve out enclaves of heterodox practice – China’s village and township elections are both the product of attempts that took place in remote southwestern regions first. Geographical distance also seems to enhance the probability of regime acceptance. In the Soviet Union, for instance, Gorbachev’s unexpected endorsement of an uprising against a corrupt and tyrannical local party chief in the remote Sakhalin Island region in May 1988 – ‘Finally, perestroika has arrived in Sakhalin’ he told national television in June – was aided by the fact that it was a fait accompli by the time news of it reached Moscow. Distance from the capital should be included as an independent variable with a hypothesized positive effect on the probability of regime support of democratic enclaves.

Developmental levels are also a structural inducement to democratic enclaves – probably because they are a proxy for state and social capacity to establish and maintain effective institutions. Among 53 authoritarian regimes in 2006 (measured as 4.5 or worse on the seven-point Freedom House scale), the correlation between income level and rule of law quality, for instance, was 0.79. Even when controlling for regime score, income per capita remains a significant predictor of a genuine rule of law system. In other words, wealthier authoritarian regimes are more likely to support independent courts (one type of democratic enclave), other things equal. Contemporary Algeria has a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita five times that of contemporary Tajikistan (although both are 5.5 regimes) and its courts are far more independent than those of Tajikistan. Hungary’s media, meanwhile, was able to carve out its democratic autonomy in part because better developmental conditions in the country gave it a sufficient basis to enjoy financial autonomy from the party-state. Hu finds that the success of village elections in China is closely correlated with developmental levels, as does Wright with respect to the likelihood of ‘binding legislatures’ in military and single-party authoritarian regimes.

Interestingly, popular pressures seem least prominent in determining whether democratic enclaves win regime backing. Those with high popular support (for instance Yugoslavia’s worker councils) may fail to gain regime support while those with little popular support (China’s village elections, at least initially) may succeed. This may be a simple relic of the fact that, as we have defined them here, democratic enclaves arise in minimally consolidated authoritarian regimes. In such regimes, policy-making is more isolated from popular pressures. More broadly, it points to an important feature of democratic enclaves that parallels the theory of authoritarian enclaves: they are beachheads of normative ideals that are by definition located at the opposite end of the authoritarian–democratic continuum as the regime itself. They are created independent of mass political culture and become sites for the reshaping of that culture.
Consequences

Democratic enclaves do not by definition tell us that an authoritarian regime is not (minimally) consolidated. This would be true only if consolidation is defined using an exacting ideal-type of authoritarian control over every sphere of the state and of all social spaces claimed by the state. Such an approach would foreclose the study of the consequences of democratic enclaves. After all, while democratic enclaves may be causally linked to the deterioration of an authoritarian regime, they may also be causally linked to its persistence. It is possible that they shore up authoritarian regimes rather than undermine them – indeed this is why authoritarian leaders support them in the first place. While such enclaves by definition represent an incompleteness of the regime’s consolidation, they do not necessarily represent an imminent threat to it. An incompletely consolidated authoritarianism might be the most that the regime can hope for.

In other words, it is important to avoid a teleological approach to the consequences of democratic enclaves. We should investigate their consequences rather than assume them, either by definition or by untested causal hypothesis. Magaloni, for instance, argues that routinized multi-party elections in Mexico served to prolong the PRI regime by managing intra-elite conflicts. She has generalized that finding to multiparty authoritarian regimes as a whole. Such unexpected consequences should be held out as both theoretically possible and empirically interesting. They should not be ruled out by definition. Nor should they force us reclassify such enclaves as mere façades ex post simply because they do not happen to have democratizing consequences.

The same argument, it is worth noting, should apply to the study of authoritarian enclaves, another instance where the conceptualization of democratic enclaves has clear payoffs. Too often, it has been assumed that authoritarian enclaves necessarily impede democratic consolidation, either by definition or by strong causal hypothesis. Linz and Stepan wrote that ‘when the last authoritarian enclave is finally displaced, Chile will on that same day complete its transition and consolidate democracy.’ This implies a definitional or theoretical incompatibility between authoritarian enclaves and democratic consolidation. However, in the same work they cite the civil, political, and economic society along with the legal system and the state bureaucracy as five key ‘arenas’ that are causally linked to democratic consolidation. If so, then one should consider the possibility that authoritarian enclaves might in some instances actually enhance democratic consolidation – providing a relatively contained space for the expression of authoritarian nostalgia, as for instance the neo-communist political parties in Russia or the courts that routinely deny symbolic anti-Francoist historical suits in Spain thus mollifying and demobilizing ageing supporters of that regime.

To begin, it is useful to keep in mind that democratic enclaves have important consequences for the nature of an authoritarian regime – improving accountability, widening social space, improving economic performance, or strengthening elite incorporation, for instance – even if they have no discernible effect on
democratization. China’s village elections have certainly increased village autonomy from township party committees, despite uncertainty about their democratizing effects.

For the most part, however, we are concerned with the consequences for regime survival, transformation, or democratization. A key methodological challenge for assessing this is to separate out their independent effects. Those effects always exist in the presence of other factors that have their own effects on democratization. To understand the consequences of democratic enclaves depends on overcoming this observational problem.

As noted, one reason that enclaves arise is strategic choices by regime leaders to accept them, assuming that they yield certain payoffs despite the risks. The obvious point to make is that sometimes these consequentialist calculations prove to be right. Beijing has tolerated the 100-odd elderly women who are declared members of the Tiananmen Mothers Movement, begun in 1994, because they have never achieved the social contagion effects of similar memory movements in Latin America and any repression would be delegitimizing at home and abroad. By contrast, it quickly crushed the nascent China Democracy Party in 1999 after it established 29 branches with 83 leaders and was given official recognition by one province. Likewise, in 2009 it crushed a six-year old legal aid center devoted to advancing citizen rights and political participation, the Open Constitution Initiative (gongmeng), after it began to generate wide interest in society. Vietnam’s repression of the institutionalized Block 8406 alliance of opposition groups in 2006–2007 is likewise attributable to a strategic calculation that the loss of legitimacy and other functional benefits would be offset by the gains in political control.68

Thus, regime leaders are often correct in believing that the survival or repression of democratic enclaves enhances their survival, at least compared to some plausible counterfactual. China’s village elections may on balance have strengthened the authoritarian structure of the regime by improving rural governance and generating international prestige, even if they have created important democratizing effects in terms of individual political participation.69 Apartheid South Africa’s inclusive ‘African’ trade unions based on ‘industrial democracy’ successfully rolled back the influence of communist groups. This does not mean that regimes with democratic enclaves are more long-lived, for as Gandhi notes those regimes that embrace even nominally-democratic institutions may face greater threats to their survival in the first place.70

In other instances, the decisions authoritarian leaders make are wrong – in other words democratic enclaves are tolerated (Hungary) or repressed (Malaysia) with unanticipated democratizing consequences. Indeed, some successful democratic enclaves have been attributed with a critical causal role in historical reconstructions of democratization processes. Lindberg and others, for instance, have studied the ways in which democratic local-level elections have provided the pathway to democracy in many African states.71 The Defensoría del Pueblo in Peru played a central role in the condemnation and investigation of the stolen
2000 presidential election in Peru and the subsequent round-table talks with the opposition that contributed to Fujimori’s fall from power that year. Similarly, Gorbachev’s ‘sudden tolerance’ of the democratic enclave run by the Sakhalin Popular Movement after people there overthrew their leaders in May 1988 is seen as a turning point in the onset of transition in Russia, something Gorbachev had not intended.

Garreton wrote that authoritarian enclaves ‘can hobble … efforts at the institutional consolidation of democracy.’\(^\text{72}\) The same therefore should be said for democratic enclaves. Either they prevent authoritarian leaders from deepening a minimally-consolidated regime (like hold-out transitional enclaves), or they chip away at the foundations of an already-deepened one (like pathbreaker transitional enclaves), leading the way to democratic transition.

In light of these descriptive observations, two general pathways can be specified to explain how democratic enclaves affect authoritarian regimes: structural and ideational (see Figure 2).

Along the structural pathway, democratic enclaves create institutional obstacles to complete authoritarian consolidation and/or they provide continuist ‘within system’ opportunities for democratic change. Gorbachev’s endorsement of the petitions of the Memorial movement at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) 19th party conference in 1988 – an endorsement that Remnick calls ‘one of the most critical moments in the political and emotional life of the perestroika era’\(^\text{73}\) – was made possible by the fact that two Memorial members had been chosen as delegates to the conference. In China, village elections have provided the necessary institutional basis for reformers to argue for the expansion of elections to higher levels, although so far unsuccessfully. Premier Wen Jiabao, who was closely associated with the failed democratic movement of 1989, said in 2005 that ‘If the Chinese people can manage a village, I believe in several years they can manage a township’,\(^\text{74}\) an echo of Peng Zhen’s statement that ‘after villagers have learned how to govern a village, they can govern a township; and after they have learned how to govern a township, they can govern a county.’\(^\text{75}\) In authoritarian Taiwan and Mexico, democratic local
elections empowered democratizers in ruling parties who could deliver victory. In three quarters of the 35 cases of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ that Levitsky and Way study, the existence of political competition through elections, the legislature, the legal system, and the media led to either democratization or regime decay.

Structural effects can also be geographic. The Mexican CFE’s commitment to fair elections, for instance, led to the development of a second set of democratic enclaves as opposition parties began to take control of state and city governments in places like Baja, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Michoacán, Guerrero, Colima, Queretaro, Guanajuato, and Jalisco. Beer writes that ‘slowly, and sometimes imperceptibly, small enclaves of democracy began to emerge’. In other words, enclaves that form at the core of a regime can become powerful sources of transmission to the periphery, and vice versa.

Democratic enclaves within the state may have greater structural potential as democratizing forces. One reason that China may have survived so long after 1989 is that the enclaves it has permitted have been in society. The state and party itself have remained wholly consolidated with authoritarian value orientations – despite periodic signs that the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the National People’s Congress, the National Auditor General, or even the Central Party School might emerge as enclaves. The lesson from the Latin American cases in particular is that within-state enclaves exert the most pernicious effect on authoritarian regime persistence.

Along the ideational pathway, democratic enclaves stoke democratic sentiments and aspirations among key actors in society and the state, as Li has documented with respect to village elections in China. While this is harder to measure and trace than the structural pathway, the importance of value shifts to democratization implies the need to take this seriously. The emergence of the Workers Defense Committee in 1976 and then its successor, Solidarity, in 1980, as democratic enclaves within the regulatory space of trade unions in Poland had an electrifying effect on the move towards democracy there. Mexico’s CFE was at the forefront of the ‘clean elections’ movement in the late 1970s that came to include powerful actors such as the Catholic Church and the business community. Hungary’s media, meanwhile, was a leading norm-entrepreneur in the period that led to the delegitimation of the communist regime there. In Uganda, the popularly-elected ‘resistance councils’ that the National Resistance Movement (NRM) established at the village level during its takeover of power from 1981 to 1986 became in Rubongoya’s phrase, ‘a normative template for the rightful exercise of political power’ in post-Amin Uganda, forcing the NRM to replicate them nationwide despite internal party resistance in 1989 and then to embrace national-level democracy a decade later. The attempts by reformist members of the Beijing Bar Association to directly-elect their own leadership in 2008 portends a growing democratic consciousness among lawyers in China. In all these cases, democratic enclaves have stood at the forefront of the normative re-orientation of politics in authoritarian regimes.
This ideational or ‘contagion’ pathway brings us back to the very fact of what democratic enclaves are: institutional or regulatory spaces where dominant regime values are held at bay. Democratic enclaves do not depend upon democratic sentiments in the population at large. Rather, they often infuse that population with democratic sensibilities, limiting the extension of authoritarian values. Again, to raise the parallel, Diamond wrote that the persistence of authoritarian enclaves ‘prevents the effective extension of basic political rights to the entire population, leaving segments effectively disenfranchised’. Read backwards, democratic enclaves prevent the effective denial of basic political rights to the entire population, leaving segments effectively enfranchised.

If the analysis above is correct then the consequences of unsuccessful enclaves could simply be described as the absence of these effects. However, failed democratic enclaves may have additional consequences that either strengthen or undermine an authoritarian regime. In the former case, the perception that a regime is engaged in ‘democratic experiments’ may bolster its legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and foreign audiences, even when those experiments are a sham. Thus, both communist China and communist Yugoslavia gained wide domestic and international support for their experiments with local-level democracy, even if only the former can properly be described as enclaves. Alternately, a regime’s repression of would-be democratic enclaves can stoke popular opposition: Malaysia’s teetering authoritarianism prompted by the abuse of judicial power is probably the best contemporary example.

Both structural and ideational pathways have strong parallels to the ‘contagion effects’ that are often ascribed to international and interventional democratic enclaves. Just as we can turn the concept of the authoritarian enclave inside out to define a democratic enclave, so too we can domesticate the notion of international diffusion effects, from country-to-country transmission to domestic space-to-space transmission. Democratic enclaves can exfoliate at the domestic level no less than at the international level.

**Theoretical and policy conclusions**

Students of regime change have often focused on authoritarian strongholds that remain following democratic transitions and their significance for democratic consolidation. This article, by contrast, has attempted an initial inquiry into the relatively uncharted conceptual flipside: democratic enclaves in authoritarian regimes.

Beyond the theoretical attractions of completing an existing concept, the concept of the democratic enclave provides us with important new theoretical leverage on the understanding of authoritarian regimes. Both as a theoretical ideal-type and as a subject of case studies, the democratic enclave helps to explain the dynamics of authoritarian institutions and regulatory behavior in terms of the functional needs of ruling and survival. Democratic enclaves are particularly worth thinking about because of their substantive (rather than nominal) democratic nature and the structural and ideational consequences that follow.
They can be clearly demarcated from the full spectrum of sham, façade, nominal, semi-competitive, oppositional, or ‘loose canon’ authoritarian institutions whose existence in the grey area reduces their inferential value. The existence of a democratic enclave reflects an authoritarian regime’s perceptions of threats to its functioning and survival.

The concept of the democratic enclave also forces us to rethink authoritarian enclaves. In particular, if true democratic enclaves can never exist in an authoritarian regime then the same must be true of authoritarian enclaves. If instead we afford authoritarian enclaves the courtesy of not-excessively demanding empirical traits, then a similar approach yields the existence of many democratic enclaves. Studying democratic enclaves forces us to ask ‘how democratic they really are’ and the same question must therefore be put to authoritarian enclaves. Further, the ambiguous consequences of such enclaves forces us to consider a potentially positive aspect of authoritarian enclaves: that they might help rather than hinder democratic consolidation.

The study of democratic enclaves also has implications for how scholars conventionally use the concepts of regime transition and consolidation. Most of the time, these are taken to refer to changes across an entire country or the whole of its political system through the replacement of old rules of the game with new ones. But democratization rarely occurs this way. Rule change is fragmentary and non-linear, with large pockets of anti-system rules developing prematurely in some areas of the regime without spreading to others (just as large pockets of anti-system rules persist after a change of regime). Most authoritarian regimes, including today’s communist survivors China and Vietnam, are internally diverse. Institutionalized democratic spaces can exist within such regimes. The existence of democratic enclaves, in other words, can be imputed from what we know about the internal diversity of all regimes.

The study of democratic enclaves can also reinvigorate the understanding of the spatial aspects of democratization. Domestic geography has rarely been explicitly studied as a factor in democratizations. Indeed, there has been a tendency to believe that modern communications has rendered geography irrelevant – summed up in Przeworski’s phrase that ‘geography, with whatever it implies, is just not enough to shape economic and political futures.’ Yet domestic physical distance still matters, not least due to ‘variations in patterns of historical incorporation and imperial tutelage’ that were geographically-determined. Our causal analysis suggests that ‘distance from capital’ still matters to the probability of enclaves.

Finally, research into democratic enclaves provides important leverage into the ideas versus institutions debate in comparative politics and international relations. In the case of democratic enclaves, while the ideational ‘contagion effects’ are almost always negative for the durability of an authoritarian regime, the structural effects may be positive or negative. The study of democratic enclaves shows that ideas and institutions are not always different pathways to the same outcome but rather different pathways to different outcomes. The study of democratic enclaves reinforces the notion of disequilibrium between ideas and institutions.

For the policy analyst, democratic enclaves should not be used as leading indicators of democratization. Democratic enclaves are neither necessary nor sufficient
to spur democratization. However, they can be watched as potential indicators of democratization, especially when the regime sees fit to crush them. They may be useful for measuring the declining reach of the authoritarian state in the pre-democratic period or the rise of democratic consciousness among key social actors. China’s Open Constitution Initiative (gongmeng) of 2003 to 2009, for instance, demonstrated the spread of democratic ideals to the legal community, a key constituency given the rising role of law experts and lawyers in the country’s party leadership.

For the policy-maker, support for the creation and durability of democratic enclaves within consolidated authoritarian regimes could become a key aspect of democracy promotion and assistance policies. China’s media, for instance, a potentially emerging democratic enclave, has benefited from years of quite deliberate Western training, exchanges, and professionalization aid. Lankina and Getachew note the success of EU efforts to build up democratic enclaves in Russian regions by appealing to leadership incentives to ‘return to Europe’. They cite the western frontier region of Pskov – once described by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott as a ‘Jurassic-like theme park[s] of Soviet-era policies and personalities’ – which has been transformed through targeted aid into one of the country’s regional democratic enclaves. Given the simultaneous reversion of Russia into authoritarianism, Pskov has gone from being a Jurassic Park to a Tomorrowland, normatively and perhaps empirically. Creating more such Tomorrowlands, the idealized forerunners of authoritarian regime transformation, could be a major new thrust of democracy promotion efforts.

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Notes
5. Magaloni, ‘An Authoritarian Enclave?’
At the international level of analysis, democratic enclaves would be democratic states within largely authoritarian regions – contemporary Israel and Iraq, for instance, or pre-Third Wave Botswana and Uruguay.


Notosusanto, ‘Consolidation of Democracy’.

Bouandel and Zoubir, ‘Algeria’s Elections’.


Morlino, ‘Are There Hybrid Regimes?’; Diamond, ‘Thinking About Hybrid Regimes’; Zinecker, ‘Regime-Hybridity in Developing Countries’; Bogaards, ‘How to Classify Hybrid Regimes?’.

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Uggla, ‘The Ombudsman in Latin America’, 448.


Eisenstadt, ‘Off the Streets and into the Courtrooms’, 88.

Middlebrook, ‘Political Change in Mexico’.

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O’Brien and Han, ‘Path to Democracy’.

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11. At the international level of analysis, democratic enclaves would be democratic states within largely authoritarian regions – contemporary Israel and Iraq, for instance, or pre-Third Wave Botswana and Uruguay.


17. Pegram, ‘Horizontal Accountability in Hostile Times’.


23. Middlebrook, ‘Political Change in Mexico’.


26. O’Brien and Han, ‘Path to Democracy’.


49. Wright, ‘Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?’.
52. Middlebrook, ‘Political Change in Mexico’.
59. Singh, Bartkiw, and Suster, 293.
60. Roxburgh, ‘Gorbachev Backs New Party Revolt’; Wagstyl, ‘Perestroika Finally Reaches the Outpost of Sakhalin’.
62. Data and regression results are available upon request.
67. Ibid., 7.
68. Thayer, ‘Vietnam’.
69. Birney, *Cultivating & Containing Democratic Change*.
71. Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa*.
78. Beer, *Electoral Competition and Institutional Change in Mexico*, 12; Rodriguez, ‘Opening the Electoral Space in Mexico’.
80. Li, ‘The Empowering Effect’.
84. Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 133.
86. Ufen, ‘The Transformation of Political Party Opposition in Malaysia and Its Implications for the Electoral Authoritarian Regime’.
90. Lieberman, ‘Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order’.
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